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Papua New Guinea is not reviewed in 
this issue.
Fiji 
The adoption of a new constitu-
tion figured centrally in 2013, as Fiji 
geared up for elections scheduled 
before the end of September 2014. 
Seven years on from the December 
2006 coup, many in Fiji had become 
habituated to life under the military 
commander Voreqe Frank Bainima-
rama. Formerly prominent politicians 
hoped to make a comeback at the 
2014 polls and often prepared for this 
by reviving old alignments. There was 
no sign throughout the year of the 
coup leader’s own much-anticipated 
political party. Economic recovery 
continued, but many investors held 
off, awaiting the outcome of the elec-
tion. Bainimarama’s anti-Australian 
Pacific diplomacy figured promi-
nently, but the stomach for continued 
squabbles with Fiji’s government was 
steadily waning in Canberra. In Sep-
tember, an election in Australia ended 
the Rudd-Gillard Labor Government 
and brought to office the Liberal-
National Coalition under Tony Abbott 
with Julie Bishop as foreign minister 
committed to “normalizing” relations 
with Fiji. 
The year commenced with the 
ditching and attempted suppression 
of the interim government’s own Fiji 
Constitutional Commission (fcc) 
report, the shredded proofs of which 
were burned by police officers in the 
presence of a visibly distraught com-
mission chair, Professor Yash Ghai 
(see Fraenkel 2013). Although the six 
hundred copies were impounded, the 
document was soon leaked and freely 
available on the Internet (fcc 2012). 
In January, President Ratu Epeli 
Nailatikau denounced the fcc draft as 
threatening “financial and economic 
catastrophe and ruin” (Nailatikau 
2013). The commission, he said, had 
“succumbed to the whims of the few 
who have an interest in perpetuating 
divisions within our society.” These 
were bizarre claims, inspired by the 
regime’s discomfort with the ground-
swell of popular political engagement 
occasioned by the fcc’s deliberations. 
The fcc had accommodated all 
of Bainimarama’s “nonnegotiable” 
demands, even endorsing—at least for 
those swearing an oath of allegiance—
the far-reaching immunity provisions 
in its enabling decrees not only for 
perpetrators of the 2006 coup but also 
for those responsible for the 1987 and 
2000 coups (fcc 2012, schedule 6, 
section 27; Fiji Government 2012a, 
2012b; Fiji Government 1990, chap-
ter 14). Its core fault was that it had 
offered a political settlement that was 
palatable to those still, more or less 
publicly, opposed to the regime. This 
was an affront to a government that 
was depicting its origins as a glorious 
social revolution rather than as a mili-
tary coup aimed at ousting Bainima-
rama’s archenemy, the former Prime 
Minister Laisenia Qarase. The military 
commander’s close ally, Land Force 
Commander Colonel Mosese Tikoi-
toga, accused Ghai of “falling in with 
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the wrong crowd,” claimed that the 
law professor’s attempts to distribute 
the fcc draft were illegal, and said 
that the Ghai constitution would have 
entailed a catastrophic return to the 
pre-coup order (Fiji Sun, 5 Jan 2013). 
For Tikoitoga, who was to become 
Fiji’s new military commander in 
early 2014, it was the army’s nation-
saving experience on United Nations 
(UN) peacekeeping missions that was 
the inspiration for what he saw as its 
heroic role within Fiji (The Australian, 
2 April 2013), and nothing could be 
allowed to turn back the clock.
One of the locally based constitu-
tional commissioners, women’s rights 
activist Peni Moore—once an enthusi-
ast for the Bainimarama reform proj-
ect (see McGeough 2009)—expressed 
bewilderment at the rejection of the 
fcc report (Fiji Times, 22 Jan 2013). 
Attorney General Aiyaz Sayed-Khai-
yum said that “it would be highly 
discourteous for anyone to comment 
on or preempt the statement made by 
his excellency to the people of Fiji” 
(Fiji Times, 22 Jan 2013). President 
Nailatikau had reserved particular 
opprobrium for Ghai’s plans for a 
144-member National People’s Assem-
bly (including civil society appointees 
and representatives from the Great 
Council of Chiefs and tasked with ini-
tiating a national dialogue and electing 
the head of state), which he described 
as “anathema to democratic represen-
tation.” He also disliked provisions 
for a “transitional cabinet,” which he 
claimed would empower “corrupt” 
and often “incompetent” civil servants 
(Nailatikau 2013). Like his predeces-
sor Ratu Josefa Iloilo, the president 
was obviously dancing to a heavily 
scripted tune.
Despite this major disruption to 
the Fiji government’s own roadmap 
toward an election, there were signs 
of an approaching accommoda-
tion between Canberra and Suva. 
Echoing Fiji’s president, Australian 
Foreign Minister Bob Carr caused 
some consternation within his own 
ministry and across the Tasman when 
he expressed sympathy for the Fiji 
government’s ditching of plans for a 
“largely unelected national people’s 
assembly” and for the “re-creation of 
an unelected Great Council of Chiefs” 
(abc, 14 Jan 2013). In fact, both bod-
ies would have had few powers under 
the fcc’s proposed arrangements 
other than selecting a largely ceremo-
nial president. Although accompanied 
by much rhetoric about doing away 
with ethno-nationalist traditional 
rulers, Bainimarama’s disbanding of 
the Great Council of Chiefs was better 
identified as just one among many 
postcoup steps to remove or assume 
control over organs of popular or 
communal representation, including 
also the municipal authorities, the 
provincial councils, and the Sugar 
Cane Growers’ Council. In any case, 
both provisions might easily have been 
amended by the scheduled constituent 
assembly. 
In contrast, New Zealand Foreign 
Minister Murray McCully reacted in 
horror at the wastage of his country’s 
aid money entailed by the ditching of 
the fcc report (abc, 11 Jan 2013). 
According to one of the Fiji-focused 
Weblogs, PricewaterhouseCoopers’ 
audited accounts indicated that, of the 
f$1.6 million used by the fcc, New 
Zealand had provided f$582,510 
(36.4 percent), Australia f$601,772 
(37.6 percent), and the European 
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Union f$248,054 (15.5 percent), 
with the remainder coming from the 
British High Commission (f$108,330) 
and the American Bar Association 
(f$59,648) (Coup Four Point Five, 
18 Dec 2013; f$1.00 is equivalent to 
us$0.54). No funding had come from 
the Fiji government, although Yash 
Ghai’s team had been allowed to use 
the otherwise empty parliamentary 
complex at Veiuto. 
There were also other reasons for 
weak Fiji government commitment 
to the fcc process. The Ghai draft 
created the possibility of revival of 
court proceedings to seek redress for 
past injustices (fcc 2012, schedule 
6, section 24), potentially opening 
the door to action by disgruntled 
pensioners angered by reforms to the 
Fiji National Provident Fund. Criti-
cally, the “transitional arrangements” 
would have entailed Bainimarama and 
his cabinet colleagues relinquishing 
power ahead of the 2014 elections to 
a “caretaker cabinet” comprising a 
maximum of fifteen “former senior 
public officers” recommended by a 
“Transitional Advisory Council” (fcc 
2012, schedule 6, section 10 [5], sec-
tion 17 [3]). This the government was 
manifestly unwilling to do. Indeed, as 
the year elapsed, it became ever clearer 
that the scheduled election was not 
intended to permit the ouster of the 
Bainimarama/Sayed-Khaiyum govern-
ment but rather to supply it with the 
oxygen of popular legitimacy.
In a January address to the nation, 
Bainimarama promised a new draft 
constitution by the end of the month 
and said that the scheduled Con-
stituent Assembly would gather in 
February, with the constitution to 
be finalized in April (Bainimarama 
2013a). Yet the weeks rolled by, and 
self-imposed deadlines slipped. In 
the meantime, the government issued 
a decree requiring Fiji’s established 
political parties to register within 
twenty-eight days, with party names 
to be in English and each party to 
collect 5,000 signatures (2,000 in the 
Central Division, 1,750 in the Western 
Division, 1,000 in the Northern Divi-
sion, and 250 in the Eastern Division) 
(Fiji Government 2013f). In a Febru-
ary amendment, trade unionists were 
disqualified from holding office, par-
ties were forbidden from complying by 
changing names but retaining the same 
acronym, and media organizations 
were threatened with f$50,000 fines 
or five-year prison terms for depict-
ing non-registered groups as “parties” 
(Fiji Government 2013e). 
The new rules drew protest from 
both the politicians and overseas 
lawyers about breaches of human 
rights and International Labour Orga-
nization Convention rules (rnzi, 22 
Feb 2013). In the Australian Senate, 
Foreign Minister Carr rejected sugges-
tions that his government had “gone 
soft” on Fiji and justified continu-
ing travel bans on military officers 
and interim government ministers by 
referring to Fiji’s draconian political 
party regulations (Carr 2013b). Fiji’s 
established political organizations 
eventually complied with the new 
decrees, but the interim government 
suggested that they had collected 
fraudulent signatures. The new rules 
most obviously targeted the deposed 
Prime Minister Qarase’s Soqosoqo 
Duavata ni Lewenivanua (sdl), which 
in response initially changed its name 
to the Social Democratic Liberal Party 
so as to conform with the requirement 
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for an English rather than Fijian name 
while retaining the publicly well-
known acronym sdl (rnzi, 28 Jan 
2013). After the second decree forbid-
ding continued use of earlier initials, 
the party modified its acronym to 
sodelpa (SOcial DEmocratic Liberal 
PArty), a shift that generated such 
hilarity as to give the new title rather 
unexpectedly wide currency. 
Only in March did the govern-
ment release its draft constitution (Fiji 
Government 2013c), together with 
a new decree that dropped plans for 
its deliberation and finalization by a 
regime-selected Constituent Assembly. 
This was yet another breach with the 
regime’s own road map as set out in 
decrees 57 and 58 of 2012 (Fiji Gov-
ernment 2012a, 2012b). The explana-
tion Bainimarama gave was that this 
was “forced upon us because of the 
lack of commitment by the political 
parties to register under the require-
ments of the law.” He announced to 
the nation, “Instead of presenting the 
draft to the Constituent Assembly 
under the previous arrangement, we 
will be presenting it directly to you. 
My fellow Fijians, you will be the new 
Constituent Assembly” (Bainimarama 
2013b). The real reason for the cancel-
lation was, at least in part, simply a 
matter of timing, that is, because of 
delays occasioned by the rewriting of 
the constitution. But this was not the 
first indication of government discom-
fort with public dialogue, even of a 
type involving handpicked support-
ers: planned consultations on the fcc 
report had been canceled in October 
2012, and in 2009, dialogue sessions 
with political parties and plans for a 
President’s Political Dialogue Forum 
had been dropped. 
On 21 March, a new deadline of 
5 April was announced for public 
submissions, only two weeks away. 
After protests, the deadline was 
extended. By this time the enthusiasm 
stimulated by the 2012 constitutional 
review process had given way to a 
wave of despondency and disengage-
ment, at least among the political elite 
and civil society groups. In total, the 
government claimed to receive 1,093 
fresh submissions, well below the 
7,000 obtained by the fcc throughout 
2012. The new submissions were not 
publicly released, unlike those received 
by the fcc. The 2012 submissions 
had initially all been publicly avail-
able on the fcc website, although the 
links were soon broken, and by the 
end of the year the website itself had 
vanished. 
The deliberations of Attorney Gen-
eral Sayed-Khaiyum and his legal team 
were held mostly behind closed doors. 
Once the draft was released, Sayed-
Khaiyum toured the country explain-
ing and extolling the virtues of its new 
provisions (Ministry of Information 
2013; Fiji Sun, 30 April 2013). When 
a former education minister, Rewa 
chief Ro Teimumu Kepa, led a delega-
tion to the attorney general’s office 
to present a submission criticizing the 
draft constitution in April, neither 
Sayed-Khaiyum nor his solicitor gen-
eral made himself available to receive 
it (Fiji tv News, 3 April 2013). A few 
days later, Bainimarama told villagers 
in Naitasiri that Fiji’s people weren’t 
interested in politics; they “were 
more concerned on developments like 
electricity, water and education” (Fiji 
tv News, 6 April 2013). For the urban 
and overseas audiences, the govern-
ment’s Washington-based public rela-
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tions firm, Qorvis, produced carefully 
designed propaganda footage about 
the new draft constitution for pub-
lic consumption. One of the Qorvis 
speechwriters privately admitted that 
those few people presently in com-
mand of the government knew very 
well that their position was unsustain-
able (Hooper 2013, 54). 
The government’s March draft 
envisaged Bainimarama’s cabinet 
remaining in office not only after the 
serving of writs for election but also 
up to the first sitting of Parliament. 
As with the fcc draft, communal 
constituencies—in which Fiji’s ethnic 
communities have since colonial days 
voted separately for candidates of 
their own ethnicity—were to be abol-
ished. There was to be a forty-five-
member Parliament serving a four-year 
term, but no upper house. Gone were 
the fcc’s plans for a National People’s 
Assembly and for a closed-list pro-
portional representation (pr) system 
together with a New Caledonia–style 
law on parity designed to increase 
women’s representation. Instead, 
there was to be an open-list pr system 
under which voters would choose not 
only their favored political party but 
also their preferred candidates within 
political parties. This echoed the rec-
ommendations of the 2008 National 
Council for Building a Better Fiji and 
of Catholic priest Father David Arms, 
a locally resident electoral specialist 
who soon found himself appointed to 
the new electoral commission. 
The new draft constitution entailed 
a considerable concentration of power 
in the hands of the prime minister and 
his attorney general (see ccf 2013b). 
The International Senior Lawyers 
Project (islp) concluded that it was 
“not designed to establish a stable 
constitutional democracy in Fiji.” 
Insofar as the draft addressed “the 
deep divisions in Fijian society that 
have contributed to the instability of 
Fiji for the past century,” it did so 
by “ignoring them—by insisting on 
ethnically blind constitutional arrange-
ments” (islp 2013, 4). In the fcc 
draft, the Republic of Fiji Military 
Forces (rfmf) had been primarily 
responsible for “defence and protec-
tion of the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Republic” but could 
be deployed domestically only under 
the control of the police commissioner 
and with the “prior approval of the 
Minister responsible for defence” (fcc 
2012, section 176). The new draft 
reverted to the controversial 1990 
constitution’s provision granting the 
rfmf broad-ranging responsibility 
“to ensure at all times the security, 
defence and well-being of Fiji and all 
its residents” (Fiji Government 2013c, 
section 130 [2]). It was to be excep-
tionally difficult to amend the consti-
tution. After approval by a superma-
jority in Parliament (75 percent), a 
constitutional amendment would also 
require a 75 percent majority in a 
referendum—a threshold far higher 
than that usually adopted for demo-
cratic constitutions. The “coup to end 
all coups” had found for itself a new 
legal framework that was only ever 
likely to be changed by illegal action. 
In March, a survey was released by 
the Pacific Theological College’s Insti-
tute of Research and Social Analysis 
(Boege and others 2013). It entailed 
discussions with focus groups involv-
ing 330 people and in-depth inter-
views with 82 people over 2011–2012. 
The interlocutors found that “the vast 
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majority” of respondents wanted a 
reform of the electoral system, thought 
the military should be reduced in size, 
rejected coups as a method of bring-
ing about change, and wanted “the 
military to return power to the people 
as soon as possible” (Boege and others 
2013, 42, xv). However, there was 
also “virtually unanimous criticism 
of political parties and politicians”; a 
majority indicated distaste for “defi-
ciencies of the leaderships of previous 
democratically elected governments,” 
and most did “not want a return to 
the pre-2006 state of affairs” (Boege 
and others 2013, 37, xvi). These were 
the sentiments Bainimarama tapped 
into in his regular attacks on “dirty 
politicians” (Australia Network tv, 
24 April 2013; fbc, 21 Jan 2013). The 
Pacific Theological College’s survey 
found a stark division between sup-
porters and opponents of the current 
government, with the former “slightly 
outnumbering those expressing criti-
cism,” support tending to be stronger 
in urban and semi-urban areas than 
in rural areas, and backing for the 
military particularly strong among 
young people (Boege and others 2013, 
39). Another 2013 survey, by Minor-
ity Rights Group International, found 
that “a clear majority of indigenous 
Fijians (iTaukei) expressed disquiet 
about what they perceived as the 
government’s anti-Fijian policies,” 
while “non iTaukei respondents were 
predominantly supportive of govern-
ment policies and generally felt that 
inter-ethnic relations had improved 
since 2006” (Naidu 2013, 31). 
By 2013, the media inside Fiji were 
carrying a little more criticism of gov-
ernment policies and initiatives than 
during 2009–2012, but self-censorship 
was nevertheless rampant. The threat 
of punitive actions for overly critical 
comments was also clear: in August, 
a local nongovernmental organiza-
tion, the Citizens’ Constitutional 
Forum (ccf), was fined f$27,000, and 
ccf Chief Executive Officer Akuila 
Yabaki was sentenced to three months 
in prison (suspended) for publishing 
excerpts of a 2011 UK Law Society 
Charity report titled “Fiji: The Rule 
of Law Lost” (High Court of Fiji 
2013). The Fiji Sun was particularly 
sycophantic. When the prime minis-
ter publicly denounced former civil 
servants’ protests about provisions in 
the new constitution draft that alleg-
edly threatened indigenous land rights, 
the Fiji Sun published his comments 
under the headline “Stop Lies. pm to 
Former Civil Servants: End Playing on 
Old Fears” (Fiji Sun, 30 April 2013). 
Appearing on a panel at the University 
of the South Pacific, former Vice Presi-
dent Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi contrasted 
the 2006 coup with previous coups 
when the military had swiftly handed 
power back to civilian leaders. Before 
publishing a story on Madraiwiwi’s 
comment, the Fiji Sun contacted Baini-
marama in France for a response, and 
the resultant story focused centrally 
on the prime minister’s denunciation 
of “critics” and “past leaders” under 
the headline “Not Swayed. pm Tells 
Critics: Change Mindset” (Fiji Sun, 
17 May 2013). 
In August, the government released 
the finalized constitution, although 
changes by the cabinet were still to 
be allowed before the end of the year. 
The new draft showed some signs of 
responsiveness to domestic criticism, 
particularly regarding protection of 
indigenous land rights and the concen-
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tration of powers. Outrageous restric-
tions on the right to life in the March 
draft—“Deprivation of life shall not 
be regarded as inflicted in contraven-
tion of this section when it results 
from the use of force which is no more 
than absolutely necessary” (Fiji Gov-
ernment 2013c, section 8 [2])—had 
been criticized by the ccf (ccf 2013b, 
9) and were deleted from the August 
version. As in the earlier draft, there 
was an extensive bill of rights, includ-
ing significant new socioeconomic 
rights, but the government would still 
be allowed to override freedoms of 
expression, association, and assembly 
“in the interests of national security, 
public safety, public order, public 
morality, public health, or the orderly 
conduct of elections” (Fiji Govern-
ment 2013b, sections 18 [2] [a], 19 [2] 
[a]; see also section 17 [3]). Parliament 
was to be slightly enlarged to 50 mem-
bers, still considerably below the 71 
who sat in the pre-coup Parliament. 
An open-list pr system was retained, 
but in place of the four-constituency 
model, there was now to be a single 
national constituency with a 5 percent 
threshold. Inevitably, the result was 
likely to be a complex and confusing 
ballot paper. 
That districting change may have 
been triggered by the difficulty of fit-
ting the smaller Eastern Division into 
a four-constituency model without dis-
turbing proportionality between party 
vote and seat shares, but it also made 
sense politically from Bainimarama’s 
standpoint. The smaller constituency 
model would have played out better 
for the established political parties, 
who were more likely to draw on 
localized bases of support. Open-list 
pr systems entail a counting of party 
votes and a separate tallying of which 
candidates within each party have the 
largest number of votes. In a single 
constituency model, such systems ben-
efit parties that have candidates with 
nationwide appeal who can stack up 
party votes that enable other, lesser-
known candidates to get elected. With 
a 5 percent threshold, Fiji’s new elec-
toral system will penalize the smaller 
parties (and independents), who are 
likely to require a minimum of around 
twenty thousand votes to get a single 
candidate elected. 
Sayed-Khaiyum compared Fiji’s 
new electoral model with those of 
Israel and Holland (fbc, Aug 22 
2013), but this was inaccurate. Israel 
may have a single nationwide con-
stituency, but it uses a closed-list pr 
system, which is easier to manage in 
large constituencies. The Netherlands 
uses a so-called semi-open or flexible 
list and has eighteen multimember 
constituencies. Real-world examples 
of open-list pr systems with large or 
nationwide constituencies are Colom-
bia’s Senate, with a hundred members, 
and Brazil, which has some districts 
and state legislatures that use open-list 
pr systems and are around the size of 
or larger than Fiji’s fifty-member Par-
liament. Aside from the complexity of 
the ballot paper, and the potential for 
vacancies to generate by-elections that 
entail costly nationwide general elec-
tions, the new electoral arrangements 
will eliminate the connection between 
members of Parliament and specific 
areas within Fiji. The attorney general 
said this would help address the sense 
of neglect felt by people in remote 
parts of the country, although most 
would conclude the exact opposite. 
Large constituencies are sometimes 
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chosen to create a close proportional-
ity between party seat and vote shares, 
but some electoral specialists argue 
that smaller multimember districts are 
able to achieve reasonable proportion-
ality while retaining close ties between 
members of Parliament and their con-
stituents (Carey and Hix 2011). 
Bainimarama’s 2012 “nonnego-
tiable” provisions for the new consti-
tution had included “the elimination 
of ethnic voting” (see Fraenkel 2013, 
373), triggering a protracted but 
confused debate (for the background, 
see Fraenkel 2009). Ending the use 
of ethnically reserved seats was, by 
this time, widely supported within 
Fiji (see Boege and others 2013), but 
this could not, in itself, halt voting 
along racial lines, nor would any of 
the various proposed voting systems 
prevent communal attachments from 
influencing electoral allegiances. To 
prohibit this kind of voting would be 
impossible under any form of democ-
racy, although bans on allegedly ethnic 
parties have been a frequent resort of 
military regimes claiming to transcend 
tribal divisions in Africa. Yet such 
was the political climate that many 
of the submissions to the fcc review 
and during the government’s 2013 
deliberations extolled the virtues of 
this or that electoral system as ideally 
suited to eliminating “ethnic voting.” 
For similar reasons, a New Zealand– 
(or German-) style mixed-member 
pr system was often unfairly rejected 
because it might entail two votes (one 
at the constituency level and another 
for the party)—a provision deemed to 
run counter to the “nonnegotiable” 
provision for “one person, one vote, 
one value.”
In February, Ghai’s partner Jill 
Cottrell explained the fcc’s rejection 
of an open-list pr system as sensible 
because “research shows that all open 
list systems tend to encourage voting 
on ethnic lines” (Cottrell 2013)—a 
claim that was hard to reconcile with 
the evidence from open list–using 
countries like Finland, Brazil, or Indo-
nesia. After the government released 
its new constitution in September, a 
common protest was that an open-list 
pr system would be inconsistent with 
the government’s “nonnegotiable” 
objectives. “Nothing in the Fiji Gov-
ernment Constitution restricts ethnic 
voting,” protested the Citizen’s Con-
stitutional Forum. “When voters can 
choose who to vote for on open party 
lists, especially given Fiji’s history, they 
are likely to vote along the usual eth-
nic lines” (ccf 2013a, 26; Fiji Times, 
23 Sept 2013). 
This implied that if a closed-list 
pr system had been selected, as the 
fcc had proposed, party elites would 
have been more likely to select politi-
cians on a nonethnic basis—a claim 
that might equally be doubted on the 
basis of Fiji’s troubled political history. 
After all, Fiji’s use of “above-the-
line” or “ticket voting” at the 1999, 
2001, and 2006 polls granted con-
siderable control to political parties 
over which candidates were elected, 
without thereby encouraging selection 
of members of Parliament particularly 
disposed to bridging the ethnic divide. 
Fiji’s ticket voting provision borrowed 
an institution from the Australian 
Senate, where it is sometimes seen 
as transforming preferential voting 
into something similar to a closed 
list pr system (Sawer 2005, 286). 
The main scholarly debate among 
political scientists has been between 
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those who believe that all pr systems 
foster ethnicized voting (Horowitz 
1985) and those who contest this (see 
Lijphart 2004; Huber 2012). Much 
less research has focused on the dif-
ference between open- and closed-list 
systems, in part because the border 
is often hazy (many countries have 
“semi-open” or “flexible” lists, as 
in the case of the Netherlands or, in 
2004, Indonesia).
The first line of the new constitu-
tion reads, “We, the people of Fiji, . . .
hereby establish this constitution for 
the Republic of Fiji.” Such phrasing 
is more usually reserved for settings 
in which there has been considerable 
public engagement in the process of 
constitutional design. As Randall 
Powell (one of the judges on the Fiji 
Court of Appeal, which in April 2009 
declared the Bainimarama government 
unconstitutional) pointed out, “The 
draft Constitution has not been put 
to a referendum. It’s been imposed on 
the people” (abc Pacific Beat, 23 Aug 
2013). Amnesty International said that 
the constitution fell “far short of inter-
national standards of human rights 
law” (Amnesty International 2013), 
while Human Rights Watch said that 
it represented “a major step back-
wards” (hrw 2013). Ghai doubted 
whether Bainimarama had actually 
read the constitution and claimed 
that he usually “just repeats what 
his attorney-general tells him to say” 
(Australia Network tv, 23 Oct 2013). 
Within Fiji, the sdl, or sodelpa, as 
well as the Fiji Labour Party and the 
National Federation Party opposed the 
new constitution. Under the auspices 
of the United Front for a Democratic 
Fiji (ufdf), these parties wrote a letter 
of protest to the president, but none 
looked likely to boycott the 2014 elec-
tions. On the day of the presidential 
assent, a small crowd of protestors 
gathered to denounce the new consti-
tution, and fourteen were temporarily 
taken into custody. 
Some within Fiji praised the new 
legal framework. Tui Tavua Ratu Jale 
Waisele Kuwe Ratu was particularly 
supportive, as were 1987 coup leader 
Sitiveni Rabuka (Fiji Sun, 25 Aug 
2013) and Fiji’s high commissioner 
in London, Solo Mara (Mara 2013). 
One of the FCC commissioners, Saten-
dra Nandan, inelegantly applauded 
Bainimarama’s achievement through 
the “subtle force of arms” of an end 
to “communal constituencies, racial 
categorisation, colonial hierarchies, 
feudal patriarchy, discrimination and 
dispossession of many kinds, coupled 
with inventions of traditions and insti-
tutions to rule rather than to serve” 
(Nandan 2013). 
More eloquently, those at the apex 
of the now formally disbanded chiefly 
order expressed the pervasive sense 
of victimization among Fiji’s once-
powerful traditional rulers. Rewa chief 
Ro Teimumu Kepa and Cakaudrove’s 
Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu issued a 
statement denouncing the “interim 
military government” for “failure to 
protect the group rights of indigenous 
Fijians,” for usurping control over 
“native Fijians semi autonomous gov-
ernment (Matanitu Taukei),” and for 
trashing the Ghai draft constitution 
(Naiqama and Kepa 2013). Among 
those chiefs, there were some signs of 
preparedness to make necessary politi-
cal adjustments in order to confront 
the imposed new order. At the first 
gathering of the freshly rebranded 
sodelpa in June, party president Ro 
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Teimumu saluted all three of Fiji’s 
deposed prime ministers, including Dr 
Timoci Bavadra (deposed in 1987), 
Mahendra Chaudhry (deposed in 
2000), and Laisenia Qarase (deposed 
in 2006) (Coup Four Point Five, 23 
June 2013).
Chiefly institutions have been 
greatly weakened since the coup. The 
Great Council of Chiefs had not been 
allowed to meet since 2007, and it 
was formally disestablished in 2012. 
In 2010, the government changed the 
formula governing disbursal of rents 
obtained by the Taukei (formerly 
Native) Land Trust Board (tltb). 
After deductions of 15 percent for 
administration, income had formerly 
been distributed to Fijian chiefs at 
various levels (15 percent to the turaga 
ni mataqali, 10 percent to the turaga 
ni yavusa, and 5 percent to the turaga 
ni taukei), with the remaining 70 per-
cent going to ordinary members of the 
mataqali (lineage or clan). New regu-
lations in December 2010 provided 
instead that rents “shall be distributed 
by the Board to all the living members 
of the proprietary unit, in equal pro-
portion” (Fiji Government 2010). 
Three years on, the practical impact 
of that ostensibly egalitarian reform 
was difficult to accurately gauge, but 
a requirement from 2012 that rents be 
paid electronically into bank accounts 
slowed down disbursals. tltb General 
Manager Alipate Qetaki admitted 
in June 2013 that there were thirty 
thousand landowners without bank 
accounts, that the board was finding it 
difficult to establish how many living 
and deceased members of the mataqali 
should actually receive payments, and 
that unpaid rents were accumulat-
ing at a rate of f$5 million a month 
(fbc 9 June 2013). Many landown-
ers who do hold bank accounts are 
chiefs, and the effort to eliminate the 
role of traditional leaders thus always 
potentially simply empowered some 
alternative middlemen. In November, 
Bainimarama implicitly acknowledged 
problems when he publicly criticized 
tltb “lethargy” and said that “equal 
distribution will be fully implemented 
and automated by the beginning of 
next year” (Fiji Sun, 6 Nov 2013). 
The underlying dilemma may not be 
susceptible to a narrowly technologi-
cal solution. 
Whatever the truth about broader 
rent disbursals, indigenous chiefs from 
Western Viti Levu and the Macuata 
region of Vanua Levu, who were for-
merly recipients of substantial incomes 
from sugarcane farm leases, have lost 
major sources of income, and some of 
these chiefs are now being forced to 
earn a living by other means. Ironi-
cally, the eastern chiefly elite—Baini-
marama’s main focus of attack—are 
less affected because rental incomes 
have never been vast in these parts 
of the country. More broadly, there 
is nowadays less incentive to speed-
ily resolve title disputes. Of the 1,305 
turaga ni yavusa (heads of clans) titles 
in Fiji, the Taukei Lands and Fisheries 
Commission revealed in October that 
544 (42 percent) remain vacant. Of 
the 4,348 turaga ni mataqali (heads 
of lineages) titles in Fiji, 2,189 (50 
percent) were not filled (Fiji Sun, 27 
Oct 2013; translation follows Toren 
1999, 183). The prevalence of vacant 
titles should not necessarily be seen 
as signifying an erosion of the chiefly 
order. Often, those functioning in 
traditional roles—albeit uninstalled—
assume positions that entail de facto 
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recognition of the customary frame-
work, even if the formal succession is 
contested. 
Chiefs such as Ro Teimumu Kepa 
and Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu were 
angered not only by government 
reforms to rent disbursal but also 
by efforts to acquire native lands for 
Bainimarama’s “land bank.” Hark-
ing back to the 1874 Deed of Cession 
to the British Crown, they reminded 
Fiji’s citizens of “the government’s 
treaty obligation to our ancestors 
and to our chiefs in exchange for . . . 
surrendering the sovereign authority 
of these lands.” In retaliation for the 
imposition of the 2013 constitution, 
they suggested that ethnic Fijians in 
government should “cut off their con-
nection with their native groups” and 
delete their “names from their respec-
tive vkb [Vola ni Kawa Bula—Reg-
ister of Native Births] of Mataqalis, 
Yavusas and tribes” (Naiqama and 
Kepa 2013). 
The reactions to the new constitu-
tion from the Australian and New 
Zealand governments reflected a 
wider rapprochement that gathered 
pace through 2013. Australia Foreign 
Minister Carr “welcomed” the new 
constitution (Carr 2013a), while New 
Zealand Prime Minister John Key said 
that the immunity provisions were not 
a “deal-breaker” (New Zealand Her-
ald, 2 Sept 2013). By this time, both 
Canberra and Wellington were aware 
that their travel sanctions were hav-
ing negligible impact on Fiji’s coup-
makers, beyond generating hostility 
toward Australia and New Zealand. 
There was also a palpable sense of 
irritation among many diplomats that 
so much time was being taken up by 
Fiji-related affairs. Britain and the 
United States, as well as other regional 
players, were critical of their South-
ern Hemisphere allies’ policy stances 
toward Fiji, although the credibility 
of British foreign policy was rather 
besmirched when a sting operation 
conducted by the Daily Telegraph 
and the bbc program Panorama 
exposed Tory mp Patrick Mercer 
for accepting £4,000 to press in the 
British Parliament for Fiji’s readmis-
sion to the Commonwealth (The 
Times, 1 June 2013; £1 is equivalent 
to us$1.66). After 2010, Australian 
think tanks such as the Lowy Institute 
and the Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute devoted much energy to 
drawing attention to Fiji’s closer ties 
with China and the associated loss 
of  Australasian regional influence, 
with the objective of encouraging an 
accommodation with the Fiji interim 
government.
Ultimately, Australian policy 
realignments were really driven by 
developments within Fiji, even if this 
was not always obvious to the diplo-
mats themselves or to Australian think 
tanks, which became more vocifer-
ous in almost exact proportion to the 
quieting of criticism from within Fiji. 
Whereas Fiji had witnessed a succes-
sion of severe crises in the three years 
immediately following the coup—
including public sector strikes in 2007, 
threats of a Methodist uprising and 
the interim government’s breach with 
Mahendra Chaudhry’s Fiji Labour 
Party in 2008, the abrogation of the 
constitution in 2009, and schisms in 
the military senior command in late 
2010—the domestic situation had sta-
bilized since 2011. Meaningful change 
now looked less likely to come from 
another crisis or an insurrection and 
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more likely to follow the regime’s own 
July 2009 road map toward elections 
in 2014, if these were to be credible. 
Both the Australian and New Zealand 
governments—rightly or wrongly—
anticipated that Bainimarama would 
win that election, and they wanted 
to better position themselves for that 
eventuality.
Forging closer ties with Fiji was not 
straightforward. Following the signing 
of an official “agrément” in December 
2012, Carr announced that Margaret 
Twomey would be Australia’s next 
high commissioner to Fiji (filling a 
position vacant since the expulsion of 
James Batley in 2009) (Dobell 2013). 
Yet Fiji soon reneged on that arrange-
ment. When Carr commented that Fiji 
was “diminished” by not accepting the 
appointment, Sayed-Khaiyum accused 
Canberra of being “prescriptive and 
highhanded” (Sayed-Khaiyum 2013), 
and Bainimarama told Radio Tarana 
that “they don’t treat us with consid-
eration and respect, and I can assure 
you it’s the same with all the Melane-
sian countries” (Australia Network 
tv, 27 July 2013). Such criticisms 
struck a chord among Pacific leaders 
and earned Bainimarama some popu-
larity across the region. 
During 2013, Fiji’s prime minister 
seized every opportunity to embarrass 
Australia and New Zealand, perhaps 
well advised that to do so would likely 
bring favorable results. One week 
after the withdrawal of the decade-old 
military component of the Australian-
led Regional Assistance Mission to 
Solomon Islands (ramsi), he took 
more than one hundred military and 
police officers to Solomon Islands for 
the 7 July independence celebrations. 
“We also have Fijian civilians present 
at many levels to assist your efforts at 
nation building,” Bainimarama told 
the luncheon gathering in Honiara. 
“Be assured that Fiji stands willing 
and ready to take that assistance to 
another level with more personnel 
and resources, if that is the wish of 
the Government and people of Solo-
mon Islands” (Bainimarama 2013e). 
He did not mention that nearly all of 
those Fiji citizens working in Solomon 
Islands were opponents of the 2006 
Fiji coup, often deposed public ser-
vants who had fought with Bainima-
rama, left Fiji, and found themselves 
senior positions overseas as part of a 
post-2006 diaspora of dissident Fiji 
professionals that was evident across 
the Pacific Islands. The barely con-
cealed challenge to Australia was that 
Fiji might provide foot soldiers for the 
occasionally anticipated Melanesian 
rapid deployment force, although the 
big unanswered question was who 
would pay for this. 
Speaking at the Australia-Fiji 
Business Forum in Brisbane in late 
July, Fiji Foreign Minister Ratu Inoke 
Kubuabola criticized “behaviour on 
the part of the Australian Government 
that is inconsiderate, prescriptive, 
highhanded and arrogant” (Kubua-
bola 2013). The Australian opposi-
tion spokesperson for foreign affairs, 
Julie Bishop, was in the audience. She 
spoke later that day acknowledging 
Kubuabola’s “very powerful speech” 
and said it was “refreshing to hear the 
frustration that the Fijian Government 
feels about Australia’s approach.” At 
the time, Labor was still in office in 
Canberra, but the Liberal-National 
coalition was expected to win the 
September election. As Bishop told the 
forum, “normalising relations between 
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Australia and Fiji is a priority of an 
incoming [Coalition] government” 
(Bishop 2013). 
In August, much attention was 
focused on the inaugural meeting 
of the Pacific Islands Development 
Forum (pidf), hosted by Bainimarama 
in Nadi and attended by East Timorese 
Prime Minister Xanana  Gusmao, the 
prime minister of Solomon Islands, 
and the presidents of Nauru and 
Kiribati (Tarte 2013). In a thinly veiled 
critique of the Pacific Islands Forum, 
from which Fiji remained suspended 
through 2013, Bainimarama promised 
that the new grouping would be the 
“antithesis of most bureaucracies” and 
would not have an “army of over-
paid officials” (Bainimarama 2013d). 
Indeed, Bainimarama said Fiji would 
not rejoin the Pacific Islands Forum 
unless major organizational changes 
were made to the region’s established 
political architecture (rnzi, 13 Sept 
2013). 
Fiji’s 2013 Pacific diplomacy was 
not always smooth sailing. In his 
speech in Brisbane at the business 
forum, Ratu Kubuabola said that his 
government was “decidedly less than 
happy” with the Australian arrange-
ments to “dump” asylum seekers on 
Manus Island in Papua New Guinea 
(PNG), and he demanded “thorough 
regional consultation” (Sydney Morn-
ing Herald, 30 July 2013). Instead of 
traveling to the Pacific Islands Devel-
opment Forum in Nadi in August, 
offended PNG Prime Minister Peter 
O’Neill instead undertook a state visit 
to New Zealand. Only days later, a 
deal for Vodafone (Fiji) to take over 
the management of Papua New Guin-
ea’s Bemobile collapsed (The National, 
6 Aug 2013). In October, Fiji Televi-
sion Ltd moved to relinquish its stake 
in Papua New Guinea’s emtv station 
after Peter O’Neill’s government said 
it was preparing new media owner-
ship legislation (Islands Business, Oct 
2013). And the fallout continued. In 
December, the Fiji government refused 
to accept the appointment of PNG 
High Commissioner Peter Eafeare as 
dean of the Diplomatic Corps, despite 
his being the most senior foreign 
representative in Suva (Post-Courier, 
9 Dec 2013), and Mr Eafeare departed 
Fiji in early 2014. 
Yet this PNG-Fiji feud was neither 
long lasting nor too disruptive of 
ongoing business linkages. Despite the 
diplomatic difficulties, Papua New 
Guinea agreed to deliver f$50 mil-
lion in assistance for Fiji’s 2014 polls. 
In August, PNG investors acquired 
the Pearl Resort and the nearby golf 
course for f$32 million and soon 
afterward announced a major refur-
bishment and extension of the Pacific 
Harbour Marina (Fiji Sun, 19 Aug, 
4 Nov 2013). As funds start to flow 
from its Southern Highlands liquefied 
natural gas and other mineral resource 
developments, Papua New Guinea is 
increasing its investments across the 
Pacific region. 
Fiji’s economy experienced a third 
year of recovery in 2013. The Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (imf) estimated 
real gdp growth at 3 percent for the 
year, and inflation was down to 2.9 
percent after averaging 6 percent per 
annum over the previous five years 
(imf 2013; see also adb 2013a, 
2013b). Sugar output—once the main-
stay of the Fiji economy—had reached 
a trough below 150,000 tonnes in 
2010, half the level of a decade ear-
lier, but performance stabilized over 
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2011–2013 with a new leadership 
team at the Fiji Sugar Corporation 
and technical assistance from the now 
American-owned company Tate & 
Lyle. That company purchased four of 
Fiji’s five shipments of sugar in 2013 
for its refinery on the banks of the 
River Thames in London. 
In March, Mauritian Tate & Lyle 
consultant Dan Boodhna told Tagi-
tagi farmers near Navua that “at an 
average of 40 tonnes per hectare, Fiji 
has the lowest production per hectare 
in the world,” partly due to increas-
ing acidity in the soils (Fiji Times, 
13 March 2013). Other problems 
have also affected the quality of cane 
delivered to the mills. The practice 
of burning cane before harvesting 
has been increasing in Fiji for many 
years, particularly since the late 1980s, 
partly to ease cane cutting, partly to 
eliminate rodents and hornets, and 
above all, more mischievously, to 
jump the queues for supplying cane 
to the mills (Davies 1998, 14–15). 
In September, Police Commissioner 
Brigadier General Ioane Naivalurua 
and Sugar Ministry Permanent Sec-
retary Lieutenant Colonel Manasa 
Vaniqi announced a new program of 
police deployment on horseback to 
halt fires in the cane fields (Fiji Times, 
5 Sept 2013). A more major threat to 
the industry is the loss of duty-free 
access to European markets. In June, 
Bainimarama—in his capacity as chair 
of the International Sugar Organiza-
tion—called for the extension from 
2015 until 2020 of European Union 
duty-free quotas for the African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific (acp) countries 
(Fiji Times, 5 June 2013). 
The year saw further strengthening 
of Fiji’s ties with China. In May, Baini-
marama traveled to Beijing and met 
Chinese President Xi Jinping (Fiji Gov-
ernment 2013a). Lieutenant General 
Wang of the People’s Liberation Army 
was hosted at the Sofitel resort near 
Nadi in August, and three months 
later a reciprocal delegation of senior 
military officers accompanied Defence 
Minister Joketani Cokanasiga to 
China (Islands Business, 28 Aug 2013; 
abc, 27 Nov 2013). Three hundred 
of Fiji’s civil servants are scheduled 
to travel to China for training over a 
three-year period. 
Closer diplomatic ties have assisted 
the expansion of Chinese investment. 
In October, the Shandong Province–
headquartered Zhongrun International 
Mining Company moved to acquire a 
controlling stake in Vatukoula Gold 
Mines on northern Viti Levu and 
announced a f$40 million invest-
ment package pending approval from 
Chinese foreign exchange authori-
ties (Fiji Sun, 5 March, 4 Oct 2013). 
The Chinese-owned bauxite mine in 
Bua on Vanua Levu exported seven 
hundred thousand tonnes in twelve 
shipments, earning Fiji approximately 
f$28.8 million in 2013 (Fiji Times, 19 
Dec, 20 Dec 2013). The long-gestating 
China Railway First Rawai housing 
project ran into difficulty early in 
2013 but was resuscitated after inter-
vention by the prime minister secured 
an additional f$9.3 million grant from 
the government in Beijing to complete 
the work (FijiLive, 30 Sept 2013). 
The link with China was potentially 
politically sensitive. When Baini-
marama announced an intention to 
change the Fiji flag so as to remove 
the British Union Jack from its top 
left corner in January, Catholic priest 
Kevin Barr—once a vocal supporter 
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of Bainimarama’s poverty alleviation 
reforms—wrote in jest to the Fiji Sun 
that it might be replaced with the Chi-
nese flag. That triggered Bainimarama 
to hurl a torrent of expletives at the 
disenchanted priest over the telephone 
and afterward to threaten him with 
deportation (The Australian, 18 Jan 
2013). The embarrassed Barr soon 
rediscovered his humility and was 
allowed to remain in Fiji. 
Fiji’s government was more ruthless 
in dealing with its longer-standing ene-
mies. Deposed Prime Minister Qarase 
was released from prison in April, 
having served seven months for alleged 
corruption. An appeal against his 
conviction was quashed in May (Fiji 
Times, 31 May 2013). That barred 
him from contesting elections and 
drove the sdl/sodelpa to seek a new 
leader. Further charges against Qarase 
brought by the Fiji Independent Com-
mission against Corruption were in 
the pipeline (Fiji Sun, 4 June 2013), 
transparently aimed at  destroying his 
political career. Labour leader Mahen-
dra Chaudhry, who served as finance 
minister under Bainimarama during 
2007–2008, was also brought before 
the courts in 2013 on charges of 
financial irregularities (rnzi, 16 May 
2013; Fiji Sun, 26 Feb 2014). The 
Bainimarama government had shown 
itself quite prepared to drop such cases 
when rivals relinquished aspirations 
to hold public office, as in the case of 
former Chief Justice Daniel Fatiaki 
in December 2008. The treatment of 
dissident soldiers was less forgiving. 
Pita Driti, the former Land Force com-
mander who was alleged to have plot-
ted against Bainimarama and Sayed-
Khaiyum in 2010, had since sought to 
make his peace with the regime, but 
he was nevertheless sent to prison in 
December 2013 for five years. 
In March, Bainimarama casually 
announced his intention to stand for 
elections from the running track of 
the new anz Stadium in Suva (Fiji tv 
News, 22 March 2013), and he prom-
ised to stand down as commander of 
the Republic of Fiji Military Forces 
in early 2014. The prime minister 
courted conservative indigenous sup-
port by denouncing same-sex marriage 
and promising strong legal protec-
tions for indigenous land rights (Fiji 
Sun, 27 March 2013; rnzi, 3 May 
2013). In September, he authorized 
the Public Services Commission to 
agree to substantial pay raises for top 
civil servants. The Fiji Trades Union 
Congress reported a trebling of sala-
ries from f$75,000 to f$221,894 for 
the permanent secretaries in the prime 
minister’s office, finance, education, 
health, and works; an increase from 
f$60,000 to f$160,000 for other 
permanent secretaries; and a raise 
from f$160,000 to f$221,894 for the 
military commander and the chiefs 
of police and prisons (Fiji Times, 24 
Sept 2013). In November, across-the-
board pay raises of between 10 and 23 
percent were announced for the civil 
service (FijiLive, 8 Nov 2013), which 
dissident economist Wadan Narsey 
described as “a blatant ‘vote-buying’ 
tactic” (Narsey 2013). The 2014 
budget included a substantial increase 
in government expenditures—with 
large provisions for road building—
and unlikely plans to finance these 
through f$475 million in sales of 
state assets (Fiji Government 2013d). 
Youths demonstrating on the occasion 
of the budget announcement, sport-
ing T-shirts adorned with the slogan 
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“C’mon Fiji—Make Budgets Public 
now,” were briefly taken into custody 
(abc, 8 Nov 2013). 
The Fiji Sun claimed great public 
support for Bainimarama, but crit-
ics warned that liu muri (deceitful; 
literally, “front-back”) voters might 
say one thing publicly but do another 
at the polls. Certainly, people in Fiji 
seemed keen that there be an election. 
During 2013, using the new biometric 
registration system, over half a million 
signed up—an estimated 87 percent 
of those entitled to do so. With the 
voting age reduced from 21 to 18 
and the new dual nationality provi-
sions enabling many citizens overseas 
to register, the 2014 polls promised 
to be very different from Fiji’s earlier 
elections. In the past, tiny communal 
electorates had their own members of 
Parliament, and district design overall 
favored rural communities. With a 
single nationwide constituency, the 
historical bias against Fiji’s urban 
population was at last removed. 
Some analysts believe that Bainima-
rama’s party is likely to perform well 
in the rural areas but will “struggle to 
win the support of the urban middle 
class who felt victimised by the coup” 
(Steve Ratuva, quoted in the Fiji Sun, 
23 May 2013)—a verdict opposite to 
that offered by the Pacific Theological 
College’s survey. Others consider that 
the election itself will be a sham. And 
still others pointed to the great dif-
ficulty Bainimarama and his govern-
ment have experienced with dialogue 
processes and questioned whether 
military leaders and their acolytes can 
easily or effectively make the transi-
tion to civilian politics, build a politi-
cal party, and venture onto the cam-
paign trail. Deliberations over the new 
legal framework in 2012 and 2013 
had brought “hope and expectations,” 
concluded Fiji’s former vice president, 
Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi, “which may 
generate a great deal of momentum 
that the government may eventually 
be unable to control” (Madraiwiwi 
2013). Whichever way, more worry-
ingly, the postelection government will 
face a 2013 constitution that can-
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New Caledonia
In a year leading up to the 2014 
municipal and provincial elections and 
a possible choice to hold a referen-
dum on independence (or another 
negotiated accord), French loyalists 
and Kanak nationalists debated and 
postured, with some crossover on 
particular issues, while questions of 
sustainable development and reduc-
ing inequalities loomed in the back-
ground. The most dramatic event of 
the year was a massive protest against 
the high cost of living, as autonomy 
powers continued to devolve from 
Paris, which maintained its high levels 
of financial and technical aid. Defin-
ing local citizenship and voting rights 
became contentious, and environmen-
tal concerns haunted the expanding 
nickel mining and processing industry 
that fuels much of the local economy. 
It was also a year of commemorations, 
reconciliations, and regionalism.
In a survey conducted by the local 
government (NC, 27 Feb 2013), only 
three political leaders garnered public 
confidence ratings of 40 percent or 
higher: Paul Neaoutyine (47 percent), 
the pro-independence president of 
the Kanak-ruled Northern Province; 
Philippe Gomès (44 percent, though 
40 percent said they distrusted 
him), deputy to the French National 
Assembly and leader of the loyalist 
Calédonie Ensemble (ce, Caledonia 
Together) party; and Gaël Yanno (40 
percent), who had lost his deputy seat 
to Gomès in 2012, became a dissident 
within the loyalist Rassemblement–
Union pour un Mouvement Populaire 
(rump), and finally created his own 
party, the Mouvement Populaire Calé-
donien (mpc), as well as a new coali-
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tion against independence, the Union 
pour la Calédonie dans la France 
(ucf). Taken together, these leaders 
represent the three largest politi-
cal groupings in the country today, 
though Neaoutyine’s Parti de Libéra-
tion Kanak (Palika) is rivaled in the 
independence movement by leaders 
such as Rock Wamytan of the Union 
Calédonienne (uc), who is president 
of the Congress of New Caledonia, 
and Yanno is challenging his former 
rump boss, Senator Pierre Frogier. The 
pro-independence Front de Libéra-
tion Nationale Kanak et Socialiste 
(flnks), of which the UC and Palika 
are the largest of five member parties, 
has been trying to act together, but the 
loyalist factions of Gomès, Yanno, and 
Frogier have been waging bitter inter-
necine politics for some time now. The 
ce has accused the rump of working 
in ad hoc coalition with the uc-flnks 
(that combination brought down the 
Gomès presidency of the executive 
cabinet in 2011), while Yanno’s mpc/
ucf has accused Gomès of agreeing 
too often with Palika on socioeco-
nomic issues. In September 2013, 
cabinet president Harold Martin of 
the Avenir Ensemble party (ae, Future 
Together, an ally of the rump) closed 
the doors of Congress temporarily 
after political disputes over whether 
to finance moderate rental housing, 
leading the local paper to ask, “Is the 
country ungovernable?” (NC, 11 Sept 
2013). In view of the 2014 elections, it 
may become a challenge to elect a new 
cabinet president.
Yet the delegation of govern-
ing powers from Paris to Noumea 
continues, in compliance with the 
1998 Noumea Accord. The Overseas 
Ministry of the Socialist government 
in Paris created a new structure to 
“accompany” New Caledonia as new 
administrative authority was being 
granted to the country, such as control 
over secondary and higher education, 
commercial and civil law, accident 
insurance, audiovisual communica-
tions, maritime and domestic aviation 
security, and civil defense (including 
fire departments). Because some trans-
fers have been controversial or have 
languished for lack of preparation, a 
special delegate of the ministry will 
supervise and facilitate administrative 
reorganization and personnel training 
(NC, 19 April 2013). Commission-
ers sent by the French Parliament to 
examine the local situation expressed 
regrets that so little groundwork had 
been done since 1998 to enable such 
devolutions, which they had hoped 
would help the country to reduce 
socioeconomic inequalities. They 
concluded that local political quarrels 
over the country’s future status had 
become an impediment to address-
ing problems of high living costs and 
unemployment, so Paris needed to 
take a more active role in pursuing a 
“decolonization” that offered better 
wealth distribution (NC, 9 Sept 2013). 
The French Parliament passed a spe-
cial law that enables New Caledonia 
to create “independent” institutions 
as needed, such as a local antitrust 
authority to promote more competi-
tion. Deputy Gomès in the National 
Assembly saluted this reform, passed 
unanimously in both houses of Parlia-
ment, which allows for such a local 
“gendarme” to combat monopolism 
among importers who keep prices too 
high. The modified law also allows 
new government-subsidized businesses 
and associations to grow at the coun-
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try, provincial, and municipal levels 
and empowers local governments 
to regulate expansion in the mining 
industry (NC, 3 Oct 2013). 
The question of future status in 
the currently “autonomous” (a vague 
term) but sui generis (unique) coun-
try (for which no term adequately 
describes its place in the overseas 
French political system) continued to 
be discussed by an advisory French 
“pilotage” (steering) committee of 
experts, at the annual follow-up meet-
ing of the committee of signers of 
the Noumea Accord, and in political 
and legal debates over definitions of 
a local citizenship in terms of voting 
rights and job hiring priorities. The 
2010 signers’ committee meeting in 
Paris had called for expert advice and 
information to enable local leaders 
to decide what options were avail-
able to fulfill the provisions of the 
Noumea Accord. After three years of 
research into issues such as what is 
sovereign independence in a globalized 
world and can citizenship differ from 
nationality, two metropolitan experts 
offered a report that included four 
possibilities: (1) full sovereignty after 
a referendum that would devolve to 
the country the so-called “reserved” 
powers of defense, public order, 
foreign relations and trade, and cur-
rency; (2) full sovereignty in partner-
ship, as in France’s relationship with 
Monaco (a sovereign city-state and 
United Nations member, but defended 
by France); (3) expanded autonomy 
in a federal arrangement (which is 
what is already happening); or (4) 
permanent autonomy, ie, the status 
quo engraved in marble, as the local 
newspaper put it (NC, 26 Sept, 9 Dec 
2013). In 1960, the United Nations 
suggested the options of independence, 
free association, or integration, but 
France has preferred to invent its own 
“internal” categories. In comparing 
the two approaches, they basically 
resemble each other, though the three 
French alternatives to full sovereignty 
appear to be variations on association 
(a negotiated arrangement in any case, 
as demonstrated by the five countries 
in Oceania that are freely associated 
with either the United States or New 
Zealand), all of which imply more 
self-government than integration (eg, 
Hawai‘i’s statehood). In a sense, the 
three alternative options are designed 
to allow loyalists some wiggle room, 
since most of them prefer self-rule that 
is close to but still short of sovereignty 
because of security concerns. 
In October, the annual signers’ 
committee meeting was collegial, in 
anticipation of the May 2014 pro-
vincial elections that will also choose 
a new Congress, which can decide 
whether to hold a referendum on 
independence (if 60 percent of mem-
bers want one) or to negotiate a last-
ing accord on future status. Loyalists 
touted the degree of consensus reached 
in the talks, which focused mainly on 
educational, administrative, finan-
cial, and economic issues, including 
ongoing French aid. Pro-independence 
leaders such as Wamytan agreed to 
examine the four options the experts 
had proposed, but they also stressed 
the need to re-verify voting rights 
(only long-term residents can now 
vote in provincial elections, the results 
of which proportionally determine 
Congress members) and to accelerate 
the rate of transfers of authority to the 
country from Paris that the Noumea 
Accord specified (some of which the 
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loyalists consider optional). Neaou-
tyine urged more coordination in 
the mining industry, since nickel will 
someday run out and three processing 
plants were now competing during a 
world nickel price slump. (One idea 
floated was not to export any more 
raw ore in order to keep the value 
added via processing.) The French 
government also empowered its high 
commissioner in Noumea to monitor 
bank charges and if necessary reduce 
them to moderate the cost of living. A 
commission of the local congress was 
said to be making progress in coming 
up with a common flag for the coun-
try (both the French and Kanaky flags 
now fly in tandem over public build-
ings), and an exposition of Kanak 
art had opened at the Quai Branly 
museum in Paris (NC, 14 Oct 2013). 
Citizenship was a contentious sub-
ject as a possible referendum loomed, 
and Wamytan wanted more Kanak 
qualified for and some non-Kanak dis-
qualified from the voter rolls. He took 
his case to the French court of appeals, 
the European Court of Human Rights, 
and the United Nations, so a team of 
judges arrived to certify the electorate 
(NC, 4 March 2013). New Caledonia 
has three voter categories: those who 
can vote in local municipal, French 
legislative, and French presidential 
elections; a smaller group who could 
vote in 1998 (or their resident off-
spring) and are thus eligible to vote in 
provincial elections; and a still smaller 
group who can vote on “exiting the 
accord” (ie, choosing future status), 
for whom the qualifying date is 1994 
(another small group can vote in 
European Union elections). Restricting 
the electorate on important matters, as 
eventually approved and enshrined in 
the Noumea Accord, was something 
the flnks long struggled for ever since 
the massive nickel boom in the late 
1960s and early 1970s when govern-
ment immigration policies deliberately 
skewed the electorate against local 
autonomists despite explicit UN reso-
lutions against such tactics. A local 
citizenship identity card is in prepara-
tion, to fulfill a neglected Noumea 
Accord provision, and favoring locals 
in hiring (depending on job skills 
needed) is now a country law (NC, 6 
April 2013; NCla1ere, 4 April 2013).
Pro-independence parties, like their 
opponents, began to campaign in this 
lead-up year to the 2014 elections. At 
the Palika party congress, Neaoutyine 
raised the issue of whether all flnks 
members were still pursuing full sover-
eignty or some were content to remain 
within the confines of expanded 
autonomy. Palika had been founded 
in the mid-1970s by leftists, unlike the 
uc, which had been founded in the 
1950s by churches and chiefs. Neaou-
tyine wanted full sovereignty, and his 
question during the party congress was 
likely referring to the uc’s quasi-coop-
eration with the rump since 2011, 
which itself might be due to an older 
generation’s becoming satisfied with 
well-paid government positions (in 
replacing some colonial settlers) and a 
relative independence at the mercy of 
global financial institutions and multi-
national corporations, without making 
significant structural changes in the 
country (NC, 29 Jan 2013). Naku Press 
said that Kanak had become a minor-
ity due to nickel boom immigration, 
which led to 1980s violence and then 
to the softening process of dialogue 
while France continued its “cornuco-
pia” policy of financial largesse, which 
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institutionalized economic dependency 
and diverted politics into a struggle 
for self-interest and incomes among 
local leaders on both sides. Leaders 
should serve the people, it said, not 
the reverse, and that requires deliv-
ering more concrete actions: “The 
slogan no longer suffices, the indepen-
dence advocate must now go farther 
to defend his socio-economic project” 
(mnp, 8 Feb 2013). 
For its part, the UC wanted to get 
out the vote better, considering the 
lingering apathy among some alien-
ated Kanak, notably in the outer 
islands, and to promote unity in the 
form of a “nationalist bloc” to take 
advantage of disunity among loyal-
ists and perhaps even gain a majority 
in the  Congress (where 43 percent 
of seats are currently held by pro-
independence parties, who need 
nine more votes in order to hold a 
referendum). Concrete projects were 
needed to rally popular support and to 
persuade opponents of self-rule what 
its real benefits would be for everyone. 
Revealingly, a former UC president was 
suspended for a year for supporting a 
ce (Gomès) motion of censure against 
the current cabinet president, Martin, 
who is an ally of the rump (NC, 11 
Feb 2013). Aloisio Sako, president 
of the Rassemblement Démocratique 
Oceanien (rdo), which is a full mem-
ber of the flnks, hopes to convert 
more resident Polynesians to the 
independence cause by emphasizing 
the need to obtain New Caledonian 
citizenship, since they have often voted 
loyalist in the past for fear of losing 
their right to work there (NCla1ere, 
17 June 2013). Wallis and Futuna, his 
homeland, is almost totally economi-
cally dependent on France and on 
remittances from its mostly working-
class diaspora in New Caledonia. The 
flnks held a series of “citizen meet-
ings” to urge independence supporters 
to vote (NC, 15 July 2013).
In August, Wamytan was elected 
president of the Congress for the 
third time, after one year in which a 
ce Kanak held the post. This year, 
the loyalists did not combine their 
thirty-one votes on the third round of 
balloting, suggesting the unwilling-
ness of the ce and the rump to work 
together anymore and, in effect, the 
rump’s tacit willingness to share some 
top posts with the uc-flnks, despite 
the consequent defeat of its own 
loyalist Kanak candidate. The mostly 
settler loyalists still control all four 
New Caledonian seats in the French 
Parliament in Paris as well as the 
presidencies of the executive cabinet 
and the populous Southern Province. 
The ce Kanak incumbent, Gerard 
Poadja, was seen as too partisan in 
his management of the dossiers in 
the Congress and in his opposition to 
allowing the chair of the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group (msg) to head the 
meeting of that regional organization 
in New Caledonia because the chair 
was Commodore Voreqe Bainima-
rama of Fiji, who had come to power 
in a military coup in 2006. Poadja 
criticized the rump for even fielding 
a candidate (former Senator Simon 
Loueckhote) and thus helping the 
flnks, whereas Loueckhote blamed 
the ce for his not being elected. Palika 
backed Wamytan’s election, obtained 
the post of first vice president of the 
Congress (out of eight vice presidents 
who make up a kind of congres-
sional mini-cabinet that examines 
proposed bills), and touted the success 
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of pro-independence unity with 2014 
in mind. The final vote was 23 for 
Wamytan, 17 for Loueckhote, and 13 
for Poadja. Wamytan, a Kanak high 
chief and former president of the uc, 
flnks, and msg, gave a conciliatory 
speech but emphasized the need to 
move forward in fulfilling the Noumea 
Accord’s goal of a consensual “com-
mon destiny” while recognizing the 
country’s diversity, decolonization 
with economic rebalancing, and the 
integration of the country into the 
Pacific region: “Each of you is here 
by the will of the Caledonian people. 
It’s you who make the laws. It’s you 
who fashion the look of Caledonia of 
tomorrow” (NC, 6 Aug, 9 Aug 2013). 
Daniel Goa, president of the uc, 
proposed the creation of a constitu-
ent assembly after the flnks wins 
the 2014 elections in order to hold a 
referendum, create a constitution, and 
clarify New Caledonia’s relationship 
with France. That idea drew criticism 
from both Palika and loyalists as a bit 
premature, but Goa still asserted that 
“independence is inevitable” (NC, 9 
Aug 2013; NCla1ere, 4 Nov 2013). 
In August, the Congress voted 
unanimously to respect the UN Dec-
laration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, which France had supported 
in 2007. But despite that encouraging 
consensus, loyalists still showed bitter 
divisions. When the Congress had to 
choose someone to prepare a country 
law that froze prices on necessities, the 
rump and ce traded jibes, passing the 
task to each other sarcastically and 
evoking laughter from others. Cabinet 
President Martin reminded them that 
the May 2013 strike against the high 
cost of living had disrupted the coun-
try, so they should take responsibility 
and not mock their colleagues. But the 
ce accused Martin’s cabinet of asking 
the high commissioner to intervene 
instead of signing the protocol with 
the unions, so Martin traded angry 
insults with the ce. Jacques Lalié 
of the flnks finally volunteered to 
prepare the law (NC, 20 Aug 2013). 
Gomès’s ce had earlier splintered 
from Martin’s ae party, which had 
then allied with the rump, against 
whose domination the ae had first 
arisen in 2004! Now, Yanno’s fac-
tion had split from the rump, which 
Yanno felt was not taking a strong 
enough stand against independence, 
yet he also promised, like Gomès, to 
unite the loyalists. At first, Yanno 
allied with a splinter group of the 
Gaullist metropolitan Union pour un 
Mouvement Populaire (ump) in Paris 
that arose when Nicolas Sarkozy lost 
his reelection bid in 2012 to Social-
ist François Hollande. Frogier of the 
rump had then suspended Yanno and 
Sonia Backes for party disloyalty, so 
in March they had formed their own 
party, the mpc. When Yanno decided 
to run against the rump as candidate 
for mayor of Noumea, the capital, the 
metropolitan ump conducted a poll 
among its local followers to choose 
which candidate to endorse, and 
Yanno won, thus reentering the ump 
fold—but not that of the local rump 
(NCla1ere, 21 Nov, 19 Dec 2013). 
The conflict appears to be among 
strong personal egos and settler 
“clans.”
Centrist Didier Leroux, formerly of 
the original ae/ce, warned loyalists 
that patronage politics and electoral 
maneuvering risked “gangrenizing” 
local society without addressing 
pressing issues such as socioeconomic 
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inequalities and stable future status 
(NC, 5 April 2013). Frogier, a part-
Tahitian descendant of a deported 
convict, argued that the old blocs of 
independence versus loyalism were 
obsolete and that the majority could 
not impose itself on the minority. 
Instead, leaders of vision needed to 
achieve an enduring solution. He said 
independence was not feasible, but he 
was unclear as to what would replace 
that goal other than the ill-defined 
status quo. He wanted a new accord, 
perhaps even a form of independence 
in association with France, though 
he hotly denied actually using that 
specific term, as the ce asserted (NC, 
10 April, 22 April 2013). He also 
proposed opening up citizenship and 
voting rights to make the country 
“generous and attractive”; chang-
ing the division of revenues so the 
populous, multiethnic, mostly loyalist 
South would benefit more (since 1988, 
to promote economic rebalancing, the 
two Kanak-ruled regions receive 75 
percent of nickel income); and imple-
menting a form of self-government 
that did not mean separation from 
France (NCla1ere, 19 Sept 2013). 
Meanwhile, the sale of firearms 
has increased so much that perhaps 
100,000 are owned in a country of 
250,000 inhabitants, partly because of 
a possible independence referendum 
(and the growing problem of juvenile 
delinquency). Gomès, the high com-
missioner, and Overseas Minister 
Victorin Lurel called for tighter restric-
tions on guns (NCla1ere, 8 Nov, 16 
Dec 2013; pir, 15 Nov, 23 Dec 2013). 
To acknowledge the success of the 
ce in winning both deputy seats from 
the rump in 2012, Martin agreed to 
reshuffle some cabinet portfolios (NC, 
16 April 2013). Loueckhote claimed 
he could unite the loyalists, but the 
ce was not interested. Instead, Gomès 
announced his plan for a “clarified” 
referendum choice, not just yes or 
no, so that people would understand 
exactly what their real options were. 
His party had been rather centrist 
and social democratic in its policies 
when he held the cabinet presidency 
before Martin, but after the uc-rump 
tandem ended the Gomès reign in 
2011, he gathered up some remnants 
of other small loyalist groups, includ-
ing the right-wing Front National 
(fn), which had lost its congressional 
seats in 2009, partly due to a more 
restricted electorate of long-term resi-
dents. At his party congress in June, 
Gomès said he had supported the 
reconciliation ceremonies this year and 
wanted peace for the country through 
a consensual solution like the accords 
of 1988 and 1998, not a “guillotine” 
referendum that would produce win-
ners and losers and lingering tensions. 
He noted that pro-independence 
groups, most notably the Parti Tra-
vailliste (pt, Labor Party), which was 
affiliated with radical labor unions, 
expected to win the 2014 elections, 
while Frogier was colluding with the 
UC for a status somewhere between 
becoming independent and remain-
ing French. Gomès warned that New 
Caledonia did not have the resources 
for defending itself, maintaining public 
order, and running the courts or higher 
education system—hence the ongoing 
need for financial aid from France. 
He warned of foreign threats from 
instability in neighboring Melanesian 
countries as well as rising Chinese 
power (even at the United Nations). 
He wanted the two choices of becom-
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ing independent or remaining part of 
France to be clearly spelled out, but 
so far he has failed to do so himself 
(NCla1ere, 20 June 2013). Nor have 
the situations of the five “associated” 
countries in Oceania been seriously 
studied for what might bear on New 
Caledonia’s case. 
The most dramatic grassroots 
protest of the year was the twelve-
day union strike in May against the 
high cost of living (one-third higher 
than in France), which people often 
blame on importer monopolism and 
the doubled salaries and benefits paid 
to metropolitan contract workers and 
retirees. Didier Guénant-Jeanson of 
the largest labor federation, the Union 
Syndicale des Ouvriers et Employés de 
la Nouvelle-Calédonie (usoenc), in 
alliance with three other unions and 
with encouragement from Gomès’s 
ce, mobilized marches in Noumea 
and elsewhere involving 20,000 
protesters, demonstrations in front of 
supermarket chains, and barricades 
at intersections and the port, among 
other actions that were reminiscent 
of a similar effort in 2011. In pushing 
the government to act on accumu-
lated studies and recommendations 
over the years, the usoenc leader 
vowed not to give up the quest for a 
fair share of business profits through 
lower prices, after two years of failed 
negotiations. Experts agreed that the 
importers and distributors needed to 
lower their markups, especially on 
essentials like foods and fuel. Gué-
nant-Jeanson said he wanted “a new 
equilibrium, a different sharing of the 
wealth . . . to build our country” (NC, 
16 May 2013). Because the strike was 
announced in advance, the cabinet 
passed two measures just beforehand, 
in the form of tax code revisions 
lowering income taxes on the middle 
class and taxes on the construction of 
middle-income rental housing, while 
also seeking fuel from Singapore, 
extending the Paris-funded “jobs for 
the future” program for youth, and 
subsidizing workers with incomes 
below the minimum wage (NC, 13 
May 2013). The protocol signed by 
the unions and government lowered 
prices by 10 percent on 300 food and 
hygiene products, as well as 200 non-
food products such as fuel; created 
a streamlined, new general tax on 
commercial activity that reduces mul-
tiple markups and taxes on products; 
and enacted other measures such as 
reduced bank charges and better deals 
on bus, air, and sea transport tickets 
and telephone cards, to be enforced, 
ironically, by the French high commis-
sioner (NC, 27 May 2013). 
Critics from both ends of the politi-
cal spectrum argued that such Band-
Aid measures would not really address 
deeper structural problems, such as 
the lack of an equitable mining royalty 
fund (which French law actually 
prohibits), tax reforms that benefit the 
middle class more than workers, insuf-
ficient state regulation of private enter-
prises, and needed reforms such as the 
construction of affordable  housing. 
The second largest-labor coalition, 
Union Syndicaliste des Travailleurs 
Kanak et Employés (ustke), which 
is affiliated with the pt and supports 
independence, called it an “agree-
ment for nothing” because it failed 
to address wage increases, limiting 
hiring to locals whenever possible, and 
inter-provincial rebalancing (NC, 31 
May 2013). The local Socialists, led by 
Michel Jorda, praised the organization 
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of the strike but said the superficial 
outcome that neglected affordable 
housing, renters’ rights, higher taxes 
on the rich and on luxury homes, and 
other progressive social measures was 
“a great ridiculous moment of the 
whole political class” because it relied 
on the high commissioner to enforce it 
instead of local leaders: “We walk on 
our heads” (NC, 31 May 2013). Fro-
gier of the rump said the agreement 
could have been reached two years 
earlier, while Pierre Bretegnier of the 
same party said it might even increase 
unemployment. Gomès of the ce 
denounced the cabinet’s middle-class 
tax reforms as “dishonest and scandal-
ous,” in effect agreeing with Caroline 
Machoro of the flnks that they did 
not address the work of the special 
congressional commission on broader 
fiscal reforms (NCla1ere, 29 May 
2013). As economist Gaël Lagadec of 
the local university put it, every sub-
sidy produces new costs: “The horizon 
of a politician is almost always that of 
the next election, thus it’s short-term.” 
Even in France, incurring new debts 
instead of making structural changes 
leaves it to future generations to solve 
the problem (NC, 21 May 2013). The 
visiting head of the Bank of France 
recommended gradual elimination of 
the “indexing” (doubling) of metro-
politan civil servant salaries in New 
Caledonia (NCla1ere, 12 June 2013), 
which Wamytan had also called for. 
Before the end of the year, the usoenc 
was again calling for deeper reforms 
(NCla1ere, 4 Nov 2013). 
Visiting French Premier Jean-Marc 
Ayrault did not favor ending “index-
ation” for metropolitan salaries over-
seas (even though it suggests neocolo-
nial “hardship pay” in colonies, since 
it doesn’t apply to New Caledonians 
who move to France), but he said that 
France would enforce the agreed-to 
reforms and continue to maintain aid 
levels for affordable housing and edu-
cation. The struggle to reduce inequal-
ities was important, he said, because 
metropolitan salaries overseas were 
twice as high in New Caledonia as in 
France, and the political campaigning 
for 2014 should not mask the coun-
try’s socioeconomic challenges. When 
asked if the state ownership of the 
Société le Nickel (sln) via its multi-
national holding company, Eramet, 
would hinder New Caledonia’s ability 
to increase its own share of control 
from 34 to 51 percent, the premier 
said vaguely that Eramet’s inter-
national scale also needed to be con-
sidered (NC, 27 July 2013). The world 
nickel industry was suffering from 
a glut and lower prices, due mainly 
to the economic crisis in Europe and 
a consequent decline in the demand 
for stainless steel, while China was 
becoming a major consumer and also 
producer by processing imported ore 
from Indonesia and the Philippines. 
New Caledonia has one-fourth of the 
world’s nickel reserves, and, in addi-
tion to the sln’s Doniambo process-
ing plant outside Noumea, two new 
plants were starting production, at 
Koniambo in the North and Goro in 
the South, creating more local compe-
tition and environmental concerns (eg, 
Goro’s repeated crises). Local leaders 
and outside experts have called for 
“synergy” in nickel mining and pro-
cessing in New Caledonia as well as 
more planning for a future when the 
nickel supply will inevitably run out, 
but such a vision still awaits concrete 
actions (mnp, 28 June 2013; pir, 1 
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July 2013; NCla1ere, 2 July 2013). 
Meanwhile, the overall economy of 
the country is stagnant, as new jobs 
and household expenditures are both 
in decline. Squatter camps continue 
to grow around Noumea while the ce 
argues with the rump in the Congress 
and in the courts about whether to 
build more affordable housing or 
to renovate the existing camps. The 
Congress finally resumed the con-
struction of affordable housing, with 
French aid and ce and flnks votes, 
after the rump (which runs the South) 
had stopped construction. The Islands 
Province, however, lacks nickel and 
remains less developed, so it exports 
young people to the main island, 
where some unemployed Kanak resort 
to delinquency (NCla1ere, 10 July 
2013; NC, 25 Feb 2013). 
Independence supporters continue 
to try to reorient the country toward 
Oceania instead of Europe. The Mela-
nesian Spearhead Group had formed 
in the 1980s to support the Kanak 
decolonization struggle, and the flnks 
is a member. Kanak play roles in the 
msg staff, and the Kanaky flag flies 
over all MSG offices, alongside the flags 
of the other four members, which 
are, however, independent countries 
(Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, 
Vanuatu, and Fiji). Wamytan is a 
past chair of the msg, and this year 
Victor Tutugoro of the flnks became 
chair (NC, 5 April 2013; pir, 5 April 
2013). In a leaders’ meeting in New 
Caledonia, despite objections by the 
ce that the outgoing msg chair, Prime 
Minister Bainimarama of Fiji, was 
allowed to participate, the organi-
zation signed various juridical and 
economic cooperation agreements 
and endorsed the establishment of a 
Department of Peacekeeping Opera-
tions within the msg secretariat (pir, 
24 June 2013; NC, 19 July 2013). A 
delegation of the Pacific Islands Forum 
also visited New Caledonia, where 
Cabinet President Martin repeated his 
request that the country could become 
a full, not just associate, member (he 
also wants the country, not the flnks 
alone, to belong to the msg), to no 
avail. Both the Forum and msg await 
more progress in fulfilling the Noumea 
Accord (NCla1ere, 18 July 2013). The 
flnks continues to report to the UN 
Decolonization Committee, on whose 
list New Caledonia was reinscribed 
in 1986, and French Polynesia joined 
it this year, despite objections from 
France and its notoriously corrupt 
client leader in Tahiti, Gaston Flosse 
(NCla1ere, 17 May 2013; TPM, June–
July 2013). Kanaky and Vanuatu 
continue to nurture close ties apart 
from Martin’s dollar diplomacy, and 
the flnks and the Customary Sen-
ate of New Caledonia are trying to 
help Vanuatu resolve a maritime 
border dispute with France. The New 
Caledonia Museum also returned 
some traditional red feather money 
to Solomon Islands (pir, 20 Dec, 24 
Dec 2013). But France still regards 
New Caledonia as a strategic asset, for 
intelligence listening stations; geopo-
litical, military, and trade cooperation 
in the Asia-Pacific region; and a poten-
tially profitable exclusive economic 
maritime zone. As the French defense 
minister said, “France is a power of 
the Indian and Pacific Oceans. She has 
territories where certain inhabitants 
have recently expressed their desire to 
live within the national community 
. . . which necessitates security and 
protection” (NC, 2 June 2013).
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The year 2013 was also one of 
commemorations of past tragedies 
and peace accords, as many people of 
goodwill tried to nudge the country 
along the path of decolonization and 
reconciliation in quest of a “common 
destiny,” as the Noumea Accord pre-
scribed. In 2012, a film by Matthieu 
Kassovitz had stirred up local emo-
tions with its depiction of the bloody 
Ouvea conflict of 1988 (in the Islands 
Province) between Kanak national-
ists and French troops, and this year 
Kassovitz said the conflict could have 
been avoided if France had respected 
Kanak traditions more than a century 
earlier, instead of marginalizing and 
dispossessing the indigenous people: 
“France must make honorable amends 
to close the wounds. . . . Respect 
opens every door” (Caledosphere.com, 
1 Feb 2013). Annually, for twenty-five 
years, a French priest and support-
ers have relit a flame at the Arc de 
Triomphe in Paris, hoping for a monu-
ment to the dead on Ouvea: “The 
politicians should not have sent in the 
army” (NC, 20 April 2013). There are 
multiple monuments on Ouvea and 
elsewhere to the French and Kanak 
dead from that conflict, and this year 
a visual exposition was displayed in 
the local Gossanah church. It featured 
Djubelly Wea, who killed Jean-Marie 
Tjibaou and Yeiwene Yeiwene in 
1989 for compromising in signing the 
Accord of Matignon after the trag-
edy and was then himself killed. His 
relatives now said, “Young people 
must absorb this history”; “They 
shout Kanaky and sometimes insult 
whites, but they don’t really know 
what happened”; “We must remember 
for the children, never forget. Whites, 
Kanak, we’re all brothers. It’s up to 
us to build the country together” (NC, 
22 April 2013). Robert Kapoeri, an 
attacker on the police station twenty-
five years ago, felt sorrow that they 
had underestimated the risks that 
led to so many deaths on both sides: 
“What a waste!” (NCla1ere, 2 May 
2013). But Jacqueline Deteix said to 
New Caledonian loyalists, “It’s time 
to decolonize your heads and under-
stand that we cannot NOT demand 
the independence of our country” (NC, 
6 May 2013). Premier Ayrault, visit-
ing Ouvea, vowed to see the Noumea 
Accord through to self-determination 
on behalf of all local citizens (NC, 27 
July 2013). In Koné in the Northern 
Province, where local Kanak had also 
attacked a police station in 1988 (and 
had revolted in 1917), people draped a 
statue of a French soldier in the world 
wars and a statue of a Kanak warrior 
with their respective flags, the tricolor 
and that of Kanaky (NC, 3 May 2013).
In July, the local TV news reminded 
people of the Nainville-les-Roches 
round table of 1983, thirty years 
earlier, when Paris, Kanak, and settler 
leaders had almost reached a peace 
agreement, only to have the settler 
Rassemblement refuse to sign the doc-
ument, which led to five more years of 
violence before the Matignon Accord 
(NCla1ere, 8 July 2013). In another 
reconciliation effort, the French 
Museum of Natural History said that 
in 2014 it would finally return home 
the skulls of Chief Atai and his priest, 
both leaders of the 1878 Kanak revolt 
(NC, 21 Nov 2013). A colloquium 
was held in Paris to commemorate 
the quarter century of peace since the 
Matignon-Oudinot Accords of 1988. 
Among the speakers, legal scholar 
Mathias Chauchat reminded listeners, 
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“Only the reduction of inequalities 
and the agreed to project of a com-
mon society will enable an exit from 
communitarianism” (NC, 27 June 
2013). Pro-independence Naku Press 
said that most of the French dignitar-
ies present were leftists because all 
the peace accords had been negoti-
ated by the Socialists, but even so, the 
discourse had evolved considerably 
since the 1980s talk of “terrorism.” 
The Noumea Accord is not a simple 
decentralization, it said, but is explic-
itly a decolonization, and Neaoutyine 
and Machoro had reminded the 
audience that much work remained 
to do (mnp, 1 Nov 2013). Wamy-
tan suggested that when the current 
power transfers are complete, the 
legal  difference between expanded 
autonomy and full sovereignty will be 
no thicker than “a cigarette paper.” 
Michel Rocard, who negotiated the 
Matignon Accord with Tjibaou and 
Jacques Lafleur in 1988, agreed that 
the path had mostly been completed 
(NC, 11 Oct 2013). Local historian 
Louis-José Barbançon, a convict 
descendant whose centrist party had 
worked with Tjibaou’s  independence 
coalition in the early 1980s, calculated 
that the violence during that decade 
had taken seventy-three lives and cre-
ated 1,200 refugees and was thus a 
war, which could have been avoided. 
Over half the loyalists had rejected 
even the Matignon Accord, similar to 
the failed Nainville talks, but overall a 
majority of the country prevailed, and 
the Noumea Accord ten years later 
was approved by 72 percent of voters. 
The country had therefore changed, as 
socioeconomic conflicts had replaced 
communal ones, and an educated 
Kanak middle class had arisen. He 
read aloud the names of the 1980s 
dead and said the peace accords were 
written with “the ink of their lives” 
(Barbançon 2013). Fellow convict 
descendant  Bernard Berger is writing 
a three- volume history of the country 
to  educate young citizens; it is entitled, 
“We Cannot Remake History.” Two 
new local TV stations have started up, 
and the one in the North is run by 
trained Kanak, who are promoting 
“the best of common destinies” (NC, 
24 Jan 2013). 
david chappell
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Papua
In 2013, the Indonesian govern-
ment faced the increasingly complex 
political challenges of separatism in 
Papua as well as the internationaliza-
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tion of Papuan issues. The govern-
ment’s approach of trying to promote 
the welfare of the people of Papua 
along with security concerns has not 
made any headway. The political and 
security situation in Papua worsened 
as the government grew increasingly 
repressive and less transparent. The 
deteriorating human rights situation 
was also reflected in the rising number 
of political prisoners and detainees.
Amid the conflicts, the lack of trust 
among various strategic stakehold-
ers and the political opportunism in 
Jakarta and in Papua have fostered 
manipulative exercises in a prolifera-
tion of administrative regions as well 
as fraudulent and disruptive regional 
elections. These current practices 
have plunged the local government 
into administrative and public service 
crises, resulting in the neglect of the 
people’s welfare.
During the year, a bold attempt was 
made by Governor of Papua Lukas 
Enembe to resolve the Papuan prob-
lem by introducing for the first time 
the idea of the Otonomi Khusus Plus 
(Special Autonomy Plus, also known 
as Otsus Plus), which was to be 
derived from a revision of the Auton-
omy Law of 2001. Detailed later in 
this review, the new bill was supposed 
to offer comprehensive answers for 
the fundamental problems in Papua, 
though the broad participation of 
Papuan people and full support from 
Jakarta would always be required for 
it to succeed. 
One can learn from the experiences 
of the Papua Peace Network (ppn) in 
creating public consultation and in 
building support from various parties 
in Papua and Jakarta. Lukas Enembe 
might succeed with Otsus Plus if a 
civilized and honest dialogue approach 
is adopted. But no matter how exem-
plary the substance of Otsus Plus may 
be—or that of any other proposi-
tions to solve the  Papuan problem, 
for that matter—unless the process 
truly involves various stakeholders, 
particularly those in the opposition, 
no resolution is likely to succeed. Such 
involvement is essential for any result 
to be acknowledged as legitimate. 
The year 2013 should also be seen 
as a special one for the eradication of 
corruption in Papua and West Papua. 
Compared to the previous period, over 
the course of this year the government 
made a serious effort to eradicate 
corruption through the hard work of 
Police Chief of Papua Tito Karnavian, 
who established an Anticorruption 
Force, and Chief Prosecutor of Papua 
E S Maruly Hutagalung, who made 
a breakthrough by prosecuting many 
officials involved in corruption. All 
the legislative and executive officials 
involved, from the highest to the 
lowest ranks, were put on trial. This 
also shows that corruption in the two 
provinces has been very prevalent, 
from the village to the provincial level. 
This year, law enforcement efforts as 
well as findings of corruption have 
increased significantly.
The government believes that the 
essence of the problem lies in the 
welfare of the Papuan people. Their 
view is that if they can manage to 
improve the people’s welfare, then 
Papuan aspirations for independence 
will fade. Therefore, the government 
has been fully exploiting resources 
for “accelerated development,” for 
programs  categorized as “quick wins,” 
and for projects with high political 
value. Their intentions were revealed 
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in the incredible amount of “auton-
omy funds” (totaling nearly 40 trillion 
idr by 2013) and other  disbursements 
flowing from the central govern-
ment to Papua and West Papua. 
(One US dollar is approximately 
11,338 Indonesian rupiah [idr].) 
The establishment of the Unit for 
 Acceleration of Development in Papua 
and West Papua (up4b) and some 
breakthroughs in the coordination of 
socioeconomic development further 
affirmed the government’s vision. 
Concerning the freedom of expres-
sion, the government is of the opinion 
that, even if carried out in a peaceful 
and orderly manner, rallies voicing 
aspirations for Papuan independence 
should be categorized as acts of 
treason under articles 106, 110, and 
116 of the Criminal Code (kuhp). In 
Papua, Regional Chief of Police Tito 
Karnavian also applied Law 9/1998 
and Law 12/1951. The police chief 
confirmed that demonstrations rais-
ing the issue of Papuan independence 
are prohibited because they do not 
support national unity. This policy is 
believed to be in line with the govern-
ment’s vision for combating separat-
ism and preserving the integrity of 
the Unitary State of the Republic 
of Indonesia in Papua (nkri). The 
government does not consider such 
demonstrations part of civil rights and 
political freedoms of expression as 
guaranteed by article 28 of the 1945 
Constitution and article 19 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.
Dealing with the civil political 
movement, in 2013 the police grew 
more repressive and issued no notifica-
tion receipts (sttps, which are used 
by police as de facto permits to hold 
demonstrations) for any demonstra-
tions that were deemed separatist. A 
large group of policemen, sometimes 
combined with the army, was always 
present in order to control the rallies. 
The police prohibited mass mobiliza-
tion of citizens and even watched over 
meeting points on the nights prior to 
demonstrations. They also dispersed 
those who joined the demonstrations, 
arrested and interrogated the activists, 
and prosecuted the leaders. Only a 
few rallies were carried out without 
being dismissed. The police even 
raided “prayer sessions” organized 
by groups that were considered 
 separatist.
Throughout the year, the police 
arrested or interrogated more than 
500 people. In 2012, the number 
of political prisoners and detainees 
had reached about 26 people, and in 
2013 the police arrested at least 49 
new political prisoners and detainees, 
bringing the total to approximately 75 
people. During the processes of deten-
tion and investigation, some allega-
tions about persecution, torture, and 
even murder of activists emerged. No 
allegations of human rights violations 
have yet been proven because there is 
no institution that is able to conduct 
an investigation impartially. All infor-
mation is monopolized by the police, 
and the allegations of human rights 
activists and campaigners have been 
ignored by the state. 
Confronting the armed group of the 
National Liberation Army/Free Papua 
Movement (tpn/opm) who launched 
several attacks, killing Indonesian 
National Armed Forces (tni) soldiers 
and then seizing their weapons, the 
government has not substantially 
increased its military operations 
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or developed any new strategies to 
immobilize the organization. In 2013, 
the government made an assessment 
that the civil political movements in 
the urban areas of Papua and their 
networks overseas are far more 
dangerous and require special han-
dling. Apparently this was the reason 
why the Papuan police reacted more 
strongly to the demonstrations of the 
National Committee for West Papua 
(knpb) than to the occasional shoot-
ings in Puncak Jaya.
Recognizing that the security 
approaches from the end of 2010 to 
early 2012 were not effective, Indone-
sian President Susilo Bambang Yud-
hoyono has started using a dialogue 
approach to resolve the Papuan prob-
lem. At the end of 2010, he appointed 
Farid Husain to explore prospects 
with the tpn/opm and other political 
leaders. In late 2011 and early 2012, 
the president openly declared that 
he was ready for a dialogue with the 
leader of the Papuan people. Unfortu-
nately, the suspicion of Papuan leaders 
was still very palpable. In 2013, the 
circle of powerful people around 
President Yudhoyono considered 
that, behind the support for a dia-
logue agenda, there was an agenda of 
referendum and “internationalization” 
of Papua. The president’s elite circle 
was not capable of distinguishing 
hardliners demanding a referendum 
from moderate groups truly interested 
in dialogue. As a result, Yudhoyono’s 
efforts have stalled.
Since 2009, the civil and political 
activities in urban areas of Papua and 
West Papua have been dominated by 
the knpb. The network of the orga-
nization has grown rapidly in key 
cities in Papua and supports having a 
referendum for Papuan independence. 
It was noted in 2012 that the demon-
strations conducted by knpb were not 
always orderly and peaceful. Some 
of their rallies disrupted traffic, with 
knpb supporters attacking settlements 
and civilians, terrorizing journalists 
and members of the Parliament of 
Papua, and persecuting those who did 
not support their cause. The knpb’s 
rallies always liaised with the overseas 
Free Papua Movement (opm), particu-
larly with Benny Wenda, who is based 
in Oxford, England. 
In 2013, realizing the fact that the 
police force has grown increasingly 
repressive and intending to garner 
public sympathy, the knpb continually 
emphasized that it would conduct its 
rallies in an orderly and peaceful man-
ner. Despite being subjected to harsher 
repression, throughout the year the 
knpb held ten demonstrations in vari-
ous cities in Papua and West Papua. 
On one hand, the knpb stressed the 
point that peaceful demonstrations are 
part of the freedom of expression and 
democracy that must be respected, and 
they accordingly criticized the oppres-
sive measures of the police. On the 
other hand, the knpb took advantage 
of the alleged oppression and violence 
that infringed on its members’ human 
rights to support the campaign for 
Papuan independence in international 
forums. 
Since mid-2012, the armed groups 
of tpn/opm have chosen “General” 
Goliath Tabuni, whose base is in 
Puncak Jaya, as their supreme com-
mander. Other leaders in Timika, Biak, 
Paniai, and elsewhere acknowledged 
the appointment. The number of 
weapons controlled by the group has 
gradually increased, as has the number 
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of members. Furthermore, the tpn/
opm collaborated with the well-estab-
lished knpb, which possesses broader 
political knowledge and experience. 
The Indonesian police and national 
army have not managed to capture 
and uncover the groups residing in the 
forest, resulting in a greater potential 
for security disturbances. While it is 
increasingly difficult for the security 
forces to suppress these armed groups, 
the latter are still not likely able to 
incapacitate local governments. 
In 2013, the armed groups of tpn/
opm were less aggressive than in 
2012. The Puncak Jaya Group perpe-
trated six fatal violent actions against 
a total of 27 victims. Nine tni mem-
bers were killed and two others were 
injured. There were also four civilians 
killed and ten wounded, while two 
members of the tpn/opm were killed. 
In one attack by the tpn/opm, seven 
members of the military were killed at 
once. Quite unusually, the tni did not 
carry out any military operations in 
retaliation, fearing a further excess of 
human rights violations. They decided 
instead to transfer the cases to the 
police.
In 2013, the Free West Papua Cam-
paign (fwpc) led by Benny Wenda in 
Oxford successfully attracted inter-
national attention and agitated the 
Indonesian government. First, on 28 
April 2013, Wenda held the official 
opening of the fwpc office in Oxford, 
which was attended by Lord Mayor of 
Oxford Mohammad Niaz Abbasi and 
other prominent British figures. The 
Indonesian government reacted quite 
strongly to this. Indonesian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Marty Natalegawa 
criticized the opening of the office and 
immediately asked the British ambas-
sador to Indonesia for clarification. 
Second, on 1 December 2013, Wenda 
managed to open a representative 
office of fwpc in Port Moresby, Papua 
New Guinea (PNG), with the gover-
nor of Port Moresby, Powes Parkop, 
in attendance. Even more unsettling 
was the hoisting of West Papua’s 
Morning Star flag (used as a pro-
independence symbol) alongside the 
PNG flag in a government office. PNG 
Prime Minister Peter O’Neill, who has 
been friendly with the Indonesian gov-
ernment, tried to prevent the incident, 
but failed.
In 2013, the Free Papua factions 
based in Vanuatu and Australia, 
collectively represented by the West 
Papua National Coalition for Libera-
tion (wpncl) led by Vice Chairman 
Dr John Ondowame and Secretary 
General Rex Rumakiek, also managed 
to secure the support of the Mela-
nesian Spearhead Group (msg). The 
decision about wpncl membership 
in the msg was postponed, however, 
despite the fact that both Vanuatu and 
Solomon Islands believe that there 
are human rights violations in Papua 
and support the struggle for Papuan 
independence. Such backing for the 
opposition has forced the Indonesian 
government to step up its efforts, for 
example, by lobbying the msg lead-
ers to postpone wpncl membership, 
sending Coordinating Minister for 
Legal Political and Security Affairs 
(Menkopolhukam) Djoko Suyanto to 
Fiji, and inviting PNG Prime Minister 
O’Neill to Jakarta for economic coop-
eration talks.
International criticism of the Indo-
nesian government increased during 
2013, along with growing sympathy 
for the people of Papua due to the 
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hampered implementation of the Spe-
cial Autonomy Law and the problems 
of human rights violations, particu-
larly the lack of freedom of expres-
sion for Papuans. Serious attention by 
various nongovernmental organiza-
tions such as Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch, Asian Human 
Rights Watch, and others has become 
routine. Recently there have also been 
increasingly critical appraisals of vari-
ous government representatives in the 
Universal Periodic Review forums, 
the debates in the British Parliament, 
and the official and open support 
expressed by certain member countries 
of the msg for Papua’s struggle for 
independence.
The opm factions in various 
countries (Australia, Vanuatu, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States) have been 
increasingly synergistic in enhancing 
the Free Papua campaign in interna-
tional forums. The fwpc in Oxford 
coordinates rigorously with the knpb 
in Indonesia and supports overseas 
activities by rallying protests in Papua 
and in other areas of Indonesia. Previ-
ously, opm’s struggle was only sup-
ported by nongovernmental organiza-
tions, universities, and a small circle 
in the Parliament. In 2013, however, 
official and open support also came 
from government officials and state 
institutions. As a movement with few 
resources, the achievements of these 
groups are very significant.
During the year, the recently 
inaugurated governor of Papua, 
Lukas Enembe, attempted to revise 
Law 21/2001 on Special Autonomy 
(Otsus) to become Special Autonomy 
Plus (Otsus Plus), which was to be 
embodied in a new bill, the Papuan 
Government Bill. With approval from 
President Yudhoyono in April 2013, 
as well as the support of a number 
of leaders of the Papuan Legislative 
Council (dprp), Enembe engaged the 
assistance of a team from Cendrawa-
sih University in June 2013 to edit the 
draft. In order to broaden political 
support, the Papuan People’s Assem-
bly (mrp) was also involved in the 
completion of the writing of the bill. 
Enembe also consulted the governor 
of West Papua, Abraham Octavianus 
Atururi. 
While preparing the new bill, Gov-
ernor Enembe charged the mrp with 
evaluating special autonomy status 
by organizing a Public Consultation 
Meeting (Rapat Dengar Pendapat 
[rdp]) with indigenous Papuans. Prior 
to the rdp, which took place 25–27 
July 2013, the mrp had organized a 
survey to collect opinions from indig-
enous Papuans on the implementation 
of special autonomy since 2001. The 
results of the survey were brought to 
the rdp, at which at least 318 indig-
enous Papuans were present. 
In general, the rdp concluded that 
special autonomy has failed, especially 
in sectors of health, education, econ-
omy and infrastructure. Therefore, the 
chairman of the mrp concluded, “99 
percent [of the participants] recom-
mended quickly resuming the Jakarta-
Papua dialogue, to be mediated by a 
neutral third party in a neutral venue” 
(mrp 2013). Moreover, the partici-
pants reminded Governor Enembe not 
to use the rdp as justification for the 
idea of Otsus Plus. The rdp empha-
sized that revision of special autonomy 
would only be possible after dialogue 
between Jakarta and Papua (Tabloid 
Jubi, 28 July 2013). 
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The results of the rdp were also 
reported to the president and the 
National House. In Jakarta, the rdp 
results created uneasiness and, as 
usual, the government chose not to 
offer an official response. In Jaya-
pura, as if nothing had obstructed his 
plans, Governor Enembe delivered the 
draft of Otsus Plus to the mrp on 21 
October 2013 for discussion in light 
of the results of the rdp. Interestingly, 
the chairman of the mrp did discuss 
the draft and suggested some changes 
without referring to the recommen-
dations for dialogue from the rdp. 
 Governor Enembe brought the final 
draft to Jakarta at the end of January 
2014.
In terms of its substance, the West 
Papuan version of the Papuan Gov-
ernment Bill is more concrete and 
comprehensive than Law 21/2001. 
The most important issues of Papua 
and West Papua are covered in a 
more detailed manner. The subjects 
of  natural resource management, 
 restrictions on migration to Papua, 
local political parties, the court of 
human rights and reconciliation, 
central and local authorities, educa-
tion and health, the proliferation of 
administrative regions, international 
cooperation, sports, and commu-
nal land are clearly formulated for 
the maximum benefit of indigenous 
 Papuans. If both versions were to be 
carefully combined, the bill could 
essentially become the new road 
map for the resolution of the Papuan 
problem.
However, the revision of the Special 
Autonomy Law is still problematic in 
terms of its process. From the begin-
ning, it gave a strong impression of 
being elitist, for it merely involved the 
elite provincial government, the dprp, 
and the mrp. The process was deemed 
closed-door since it was quite difficult 
for others to get hold of the initial 
draft. Religious, nongovernmental, 
and other civil society organizations 
were not consulted, nor were hard-
liners. Groups of students who are 
members of the Youth, Student and 
People’s Movement of Papua (Gem-
par) rallied against the Otsus Plus. 
The bottom line is that since public 
consultation was not carried out, there 
was no public support and no political 
legitimacy. Worse still, many Papuans 
already believed that the Otsus Plus 
was manipulated by Jakarta.
The biggest challenge of the Otsus 
Plus is indeed coming from Jakarta. 
First, the regime of President Yudho-
yono is nearing its end. His power is 
becoming less effective, and his party 
is more concerned with the upcoming 
presidential election in 2014. Support 
for the bill from the Indonesian House 
of Representatives (dpr-ri) has yet 
to be secured. Second, the substance 
of the bill, particularly those parts 
concerning the court of human rights, 
local political parties, and restric-
tions on migration to Papua, might 
raise suspicion among conservatives 
in Jakarta about a “separatist” hid-
den agenda. Based on the experience 
with Law 21/2001, some resistance is 
expected. Unless consultations with 
Jakarta are conducted intensively with 
full support provided by the president 
and various political parties, the bill 
will likely not be passed.
In 1999, the province of Irian Jaya 
(transformed to “Papua” in 2000) 
had only nine regencies (kabupaten) 
or municipalities (kota). In line with 
the regional autonomy and decen-
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tralization process in Indonesia, the 
proliferation of administrative regions 
also affected this province. Until 2012, 
the land of Papua had two provinces: 
Papua, consisting of one municipal-
ity and 28 regencies; and West Papua, 
comprising one municipality and 12 
regencies. At the end of 2013, the 
dpr-ri approved a bill authoriz-
ing administrative regions consisting 
of 30 new regencies and three new 
provinces. With the government’s 
approval, Papua will have 72 regencies 
and municipalities, with a popula-
tion of only 3.6 million people (2010 
census).
The administrative proliferation 
process has resulted in new govern-
ment buildings, hospitals, and schools. 
However, the new buildings are largely 
empty and do not function optimally. 
Civil servants are often absent from 
work, school, or puskesmas (district 
health centers) where they are suppos-
edly working, and yet such behavior 
results in no penalties. Based on vari-
ous analyses, administrative prolifera-
tion has lowered the performance of 
local governments, particularly in the 
public service. In 2011 the Indonesian 
Ministry of Home Affairs (Kemdagri) 
ranked West Papua Province as the 
worst in performance, and seven of 
ten regencies identified nationally as 
worst in performance were in Papua 
and West Papua.
The proliferation has also trig-
gered the creation of bogus data from 
fictitious populations, villages, and 
districts for the allotment of legislative 
seats and increased civil service posi-
tions. With the proliferation of admin-
istrative regions, approximately 1,800 
members of Parliament (dprd) and 
144 regents or mayors and their depu-
ties would be elected. There would 
also be a thousand local government 
officials and tens of thousands of new 
civil servants. Local government bud-
gets would likely be devoted primarily 
to paying the salaries of those officials 
and civil servants and covering costs 
of other government facilities and 
operational expenditures. The overly 
rapid administrative expansion, whose 
process was full of manipulation, 
was conducted without any strategic 
planning for inclusive development in 
Papua. 
The administrative proliferation 
also has expanded the incidence of 
corruption. In 2013, West Papua was 
named by the government as the most 
corrupt province in Indonesia, while 
Nduga, in Papua Province, was identi-
fied as the most corrupt regency. The 
Indonesian Forum for Budget Trans-
parency noted that the Nduga Regency 
was the most corrupt nationally in 
terms of capital expenditures for 
public facilities. The regency recorded 
eight cases of corruption, involving 
89,452,480,000 idr in total. 
In January 2013, John Ibo, the 
incumbent chairman of the dprp, was 
sentenced to twenty months in jail 
for a fictitious residential construc-
tion project worth 5.2 billion idr. 
Not long after, the Supreme Audit 
Agency (bpk) also found that a large 
number of members of the dprp were 
implicated in the abuse of the social 
aid fund of 2012, ranging from tens 
to hundreds of millions of rupiah per 
person. Of note, President Yudho-
yono’s special staff Velix Wanggai also 
allegedly enjoyed a share of 200 mil-
lion idr siphoned from the fund. The 
police chief promised to investigate the 
case.
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The chairman of the dpr of West 
Papua (dprpb), Joseph Auri, was also 
put on trial in November 2013 for 
allegedly misappropriating 22 billion 
idr from the state-owned enterprise 
pt Padoma. The case also involved 
other members of the dprpb. Most of 
the funds have been returned, but the 
dprpb members who were involved 
are still awaiting trial. It is unlikely 
that all members of the dprpb are 
going to be jailed, and corruption 
appears to affect lower levels of 
government as well. The leaders and 
members of the Legislative Council of 
Sorong City (dprd Kota Sorong) were 
also allegedly involved in the misap-
propriation of funds amounting to 5.4 
billion idr for the inauguration of the 
mayor of Sorong in 2012.
Not only were legislative offi-
cials involved in corruption but also 
many provincial government offi-
cials, such as West Papuan Regional 
Secretary Marthen Rumadas, Head 
of Finance of Papua Province Edi 
 Sirait, and Head of Treasury Marthen 
Erari. Other cases of corruption kept 
 surfacing, with regents and chiefs 
of departments as well as officials 
of lower rank under suspicion, such 
as former Regent of Merauke John 
Gluba Gebze and his subordinates. 
Many tribal and village chiefs were 
also implicated for corrupt practices 
in creating fictitious villages in order 
to secure community development 
block grant (respek) funds.
Corrupt practices were also 
found within the higher ranks of 
law enforcement. National Police 
of Papua Adjutant First Inspector 
(Aiptu) Labora Sitorus was arrested 
for his involvement in a case involving 
illegal fuel smuggling and logging. The 
Financial Transaction Reports and 
Analysis Center found transactions 
during 2007–2012 in the account of 
Sitorus that reached 1.5 trillion idr. 
In order to protect his illegal business, 
Sitorus confessed that from 2012 to 
2013 he had transferred as much as 
10 billion idr to high-ranking police 
officers. Another fellow law enforce-
ment officer, former Kajari (Head of 
State Attorney) of Sorong Djasman 
Sumardi, was also a defendant in the 
Corruption Court of West Papua for 
allegedly disbursing the proceeds of 
the auction of illegally logged tim-
ber from state-owned land into his 
personal account in four separate 
incidents.
The Papua Peace Network (ppn or 
jdp), a civil society group formed in 
Papua and Jakarta, has been active 
since 2010 as a facilitator that con-
nects the government to a variety of 
groups, including the government 
opposition in Papua and overseas. 
The jdp has been campaigning and 
advocating for a dialogue approach to 
the resolution of the Papua conflict. 
The network has also been working 
to build the foundation of a peaceful 
process of conflict resolution in Papua 
so that the results will be seen as legiti-
mate and acceptable to the conflicting 
parties, particularly by Papuan leaders 
and the government.
In Papua, Jakarta, and overseas, 
numerous consultations, discussions, 
and personal meetings with civil 
society groups have been carried out 
to build constituencies and active 
networks to support the dialogue. 
Campaigns were conducted through 
mass media, various social media, and 
the publication of numerous books. 
By 2013, support had been garnered 
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from Papuan traditional leaders, 
local  nongovernmental organizations, 
churches, and students, as well as 
from civil society organizations at the 
national level. At the international 
level, groups concerned with human 
rights and justice issues also showed 
their support. Moderate pro-inde-
pendence factions have also noticed 
the constructive  possibilities of the 
dialogue process.
The jdp also established communi-
cation with many private figures and 
key government agencies to promote 
the dialogue approach as an option. In 
early 2013, some communications and 
exploratory meetings were conducted 
to find common ground among the 
conflicting parties. The main objective 
was to build trust by providing space 
and opportunities to speak, hear, and 
talk to each other openly and equally. 
Exploratory meetings were also car-
ried out to establish common ground 
in order to build a peaceful Papua in 
security, sociopolitical, and socioeco-
nomic domains as well as in sociocul-
tural ones.
By the end of 2013, the Indonesian 
government had grown more cautious 
in responding to the issues of Papua 
due to the increasingly complicated 
development of various civil political 
movements in Papua, the activities 
of civil armed groups, the interna-
tionalization of the Papuan conflict, 
as well as the forthcoming legislative 
and presidential elections in 2014. 
As a result, Papuan advocacy seems 
to be temporarily at an impasse. To 
reduce the communication gap that 
has resulted in the decline of mutual 
trust between the government and 
Papuan society, the Indonesian Insti-
tute of  Sciences (lipi), in cooperation 
with the jdp, will strive to continue 
facilitating any future exploratory 
meetings.
MURIDAN S WIDJOJO
Appreciation to Maretta Kartika 
Sari, who helped with translation for 
this review. 
Editor’s Note: Muridan S Widjojo 
passed away on 7 March 2014 after 
a long illness. We are grateful for his 
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The year 2013 was another trying 
one for Solomon Islands, with some 
promising developments and also 
problematic hangovers from 2012. In 
the region, national leaders partici-
pated in the discussions and activities 
of the Pacific Islands Forum, the South 
Pacific Community, and the Melane-
sian Spearhead Group (msg). Nation-
ally, the ruling government reiterated 
its areas of policy emphasis, formally 
established a national university, 
commenced the formal transition of 
the Regional Assistance Mission to 
Solomon Islands (ramsi), and initi-
ated reconciliation efforts in parts of 
the country, albeit amidst criticism and 
a range of controversial decisions.
One of the memorable and posi-
tive events of 2013 was the country’s 
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hosting of the South Pacific Pageant, 
which brought in ten contestants from 
neighboring Pacific Islands to vie for 
the South Pacific Queen crown. The 
contestants brought to the forefront 
issues facing contemporary Pacific 
societies. Notably, they all highlighted 
the widespread concern for domestic 
violence and its impacts on women, 
children, and society in general; as 
the Fijian contestant declared, it “is 
not acceptable” (SS, 15 Dec 2012). 
Solomon Islands was honored to host 
such an important regional event, and 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister 
of Home Affairs Manasseh Maelanga 
reiterated this in his speech welcoming 
the contestants by stating that “events 
like this bring together people from 
the Pacific to the Solomon Islands and 
reinforce our image as the Hapi Isles” 
(SS, 2 Dec 2013).
Fiji Prime Minister Voreqe Baini-
marama was the guest of honor during 
the country’s thirty-fifth anniversary 
of independence on 7 July 2013. 
This gesture showed the closeness of 
Solomon Islands and Fiji as Mela-
nesian neighbors; moreover, it was 
a statement of their solidarity in the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group, where 
Solomon Islands and Fiji have stood 
by each other’s side during times of 
trouble. The message behind Baini-
marama’s selection might have been 
directed at the bigger countries in the 
region and those outside of the msg 
family who were not very happy with 
the Fijian prime minister and his path 
to power. Prime Minister Bainimarama 
boldly affirmed the countries’ close 
relationship by saying, “We are now 
working with our Melanesian part-
ners—including Solomon Islands—to 
build a new and better region in the 
South West Pacific, a stronger region 
with more economic clout and a 
louder voice in global affairs” (Fiji 
Government 2013). There were con-
cerns locally about the cost of host-
ing Bainimarama and his delegation 
on his trip. Just the vehicle that was 
purchased for Bainimarama’s use cost 
taxpayers approximately us$41,340 
(SS, 9 July 2013). (One US dollar is 
approximately si$7.27.) Nevertheless, 
this invitation and visit by Fiji’s prime 
minister demonstrated the genuineness 
of the two countries’ relationship. To 
some extent, such visits boost Solo-
mon Islands’ image. As Dorothy Wick-
ham told Radio New Zealand (10 July 
2013), Bainimarama noted that some 
ordinary, rural Solomon Islanders have 
expressed admiration for some of his 
policies. 
Another noteworthy visit was that 
of King Tupou vi of Tonga in his 
capacity as chancellor of the Uni-
versity of the South Pacific (usp) to 
award certificates, diplomas, and 
degrees to 146 graduates at the usp 
Solomon Islands Centre in Septem-
ber. It was an important event, as the 
king represented both his country 
and the Pacific’s regional university. 
As with Bainimarama’s visit, people 
were happy that another neighbor-
ing Pacific Island leader visited the 
country and that King Tupou vi took 
time to share the experiences of Tonga 
and the university community with his 
subjects living in the country as well 
as with various government dignitar-
ies, including Deputy Prime Minister 
Maelanga (USP Beat, 11 Oct 2013). 
The significance of this visit is that 
Solomon Islands continues to benefit 
from regional cooperation arrange-
ments and is working closely with 
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other Pacific Island states on what 
matters to its people. 
The year 2013 also celebrated hid-
den successes achieved by local and 
ordinary Solomon Islands businesses. 
Although these were not very well 
covered by the local media, there were 
certain positive changes throughout 
the country that are worth acknowl-
edging. These are achievements in 
communities, spearheaded not by 
political leaders but by visionary Solo-
mon Islanders and community groups 
in their own ways. One such success 
that stood out was the purchase and 
commissioning of a third interisland 
cargo and passenger vessel by the Isa-
bel Development Corporation (idc) to 
service the local population and other 
remote provinces (idc, 11 March 
2014; sibc Online, 12 Feb 2014). 
The Isabel Province–based shipping 
company has grown steadily since its 
establishment by visionary leaders 
forty years ago. 
Another commendable success 
celebrated in 2013 was the move by 
the Guadalcanal Plains Landowners 
Association (gpla) to venture into 
tourism development. It has long been 
noted that landowning groups in the 
country do not always invest money 
from their resources for sustainable 
revenue. Indeed, since the establish-
ment of Solomon Islands Plantations 
Ltd in the late 1960s, landowning 
groups rarely invested their money in 
profitable businesses but rather shared 
it among themselves for consumption. 
This changed with the emergence of 
visionary leaders in the group after the 
civil strife of 1998–2003. The estab-
lishment of the gpla in 2005 saw the 
diversion of shares by landowners into 
worthwhile undertakings and invest-
ments. In late 2012, the landowners 
shared dividends to the tune of SI$15 
million from their investments—the 
first return of investment of its kind 
by landowning groups in the country 
(SS, 14 Dec 2012). In 2013, the gpla 
ventured into the tourism industry 
by purchasing their first motel/hotel 
to run, providing a positive model 
for other groups in Solomon Islands 
to emulate in order to ensure that 
services and sustainable revenues are 
offered to their own people.
The year closed with the nomina-
tion and knighting of Paul Tovua in 
recognition of his service to the nation 
(SS, 6 Jan 2014). Sir Paul Tovua was 
recommended for knighthood in 2013 
and was appointed Knight Com-
mander of the Order of St Michael 
and St George during the 2014 New 
Year’s awards, a fitting award for a 
leader and statesman who struggled 
to bring peace back to the country. 
Sir Paul was a former member and 
Speaker of Parliament and chair of 
the Peace Council, among other posi-
tions in which he served the welfare of 
citizens. 
On the political front, the age-old 
game of finger pointing and accusa-
tions of corruption and unethical 
decision making continued to feature 
prominently in both provincial and 
national politics. In Malaita Province, 
Premier Edwin Suibaea was accused 
of weak leadership and poor financial 
management, leading to the resigna-
tion of two ministers in March (SS, 4 
March 2013). Suibaea managed to 
defer a motion of no confidence at 
the time, giving him the opportunity 
to secure enough support to continue 
ruling (SS, 29 April 2013). Guadal-
canal Province has struggled with 
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an unstable government since 2012. 
In September 2013, eight executive 
members resigned from the Stephen 
Panga–led provincial government (SS, 
25 Sept 2013). With some delaying 
tactics and persuasion, three members 
joined Panga’s camp in early 2014, 
although Panga’s deputy also resigned 
(SS, 10 Jan 2014).
Political wrangling also occurred 
at the national level. Throughout the 
year, the opposition group in Parlia-
ment and civil society organizations 
accused the government of making 
unethical decisions on certain issues, 
including the diversion of landowner 
royalty funds by various government 
ministries as well as compensation 
claims from former Attorney General 
Julian Moti. From the royalty funds, a 
total of “[si]$3,704,602.53 was paid 
to the Guadalcanal provincial govern-
ment, in cash, between 13th February 
2013 to 3rd May 2013” (SS, 11 July 
2013). The question was why such 
funds were paid outside of the provi-
sions of the Mines and Minerals (Roy-
alties) Regulations 2011 (sig 2011). 
Prime Minister Lilo stepped in and 
vowed to pursue the culprits, appoint-
ing a task force to investigate the issue 
(SS, 26 Sept 2013). To date, little has 
been done to catch those responsible.
A decision made in 2007 by the 
governments of two former prime 
ministers, Manasseh Sogavare and 
Derek Sikua, also returned to haunt 
the Solomon Islands government in 
2013: the Moti affair. The current 
Lilo-led government was reportedly 
making contact with deported former 
Attorney General Julian Moti to settle 
his claims out of court. The govern-
ment, together with Sogavare, strongly 
felt that Moti should be compensated 
and that the national government is 
obliged to pay. The ruling government 
sent current Attorney General Billy 
Titiulu to negotiate directly with Moti 
on how to settle the claims (sibc, 24 
Dec 2013). Opposition leader Derek 
Sikua, however, disagreed with the 
out-of-court settlement, saying that 
“any claim for compensation in rela-
tion to Mr Moti’s 2007 deportation 
should be made through the courts” 
(sibc, 28 Jan 2014). Meanwhile 
Andrew Muaki, a lawyer and for-
mer government advisor, pointed out 
that no Solomon Islands court has 
declared Moti’s deportation illegal 
and therefore the government is not 
obliged to compensate him (SS, 17 Jan 
2014). The government could have 
settled the issue out of court, but with 
criticism from the wider community, 
the issue is being sidelined, at least for 
the time being. This will likely return 
as an issue during the 2014 national 
 election.
The Solomon Islands government 
was able to realize its long-term 
dream of having its own university 
in 2013. The Ministry of Education 
and Human Resource Development 
introduced a bill in Parliament (sig 
2012) that changed the name of the 
Solomon Islands College of Higher 
Education (siche) to Solomon Islands 
National University (sinu), amend-
ing the siche Act of 1984 (sig 1984). 
The move was met with both criti-
cism and praise. Some congratulated 
the government on this achievement, 
though critics mostly pointed to the 
lack of trained manpower, financial 
resources, and will to complete the 
transition from siche to sinu. 
Barely a year after sinu’s founding, 
critics’ fears began to be seen as well 
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founded. The government was report-
edly faced with financial difficulties, 
which resulted in its failure to meet 
its obligations toward sinu in 2013. 
The university management was left to 
deal with student demonstrations over 
late payment of their allowances and 
was even forced to ban students from 
the dormitories if they didn’t pay their 
fees (sibc, 7 Feb 2014). It should be 
stressed that over the years, successive 
governments have made it a practice 
to provide full scholarships to students 
doing teacher training and nursing 
health studies at siche as well as to 
other students in regional universities 
in Fiji and Papua New Guinea, and 
even those in Cuba. Otherwise, they 
face tremendous difficulty in paying 
tuition and fees and supporting them-
selves and their families on the student 
allowances. The move to ask students 
to pay a certain percentage of their 
tuition and fees was met with mixed 
feelings. This year, sinu students were 
still calling on the Ministry of Educa-
tion and Human Resources Develop-
ment and their respective members of 
Parliament to pay their fees and other 
essential education costs (SS, 7 Feb 
2014). Indeed, the recent decisions by 
the government to award education 
fees to members of Parliament exacer-
bated the “waiting for a free handout” 
mentality on the part of the students. 
At the primary and secondary 
school levels, teachers and the govern-
ment were at loggerheads throughout 
2013. The teachers staged a sit-in pro-
test to force the government to look 
at an overdue pay increase following 
a salary adjustment (ie, a re-leveling 
exercise) that had been agreed to in 
2011 (sto, 7 Dec 2011). The strike 
was resolved with the intervention of 
the Ministry of Education promising 
teachers that their past-due increases 
would be paid through a si$38 mil-
lion fund approved by government 
(SS, 5 Feb 2013). But the government 
failed to meet the stated deadline, 
and throughout 2013 the relation-
ship between the state and teachers 
continued to be a thorny one. The 
education sector faced a lot of difficul-
ties with its administration and came 
under much criticism for failing to live 
up to agreements with the teachers’ 
association. All national examinations 
were delayed until November 2013, 
which ultimately delayed the start of 
the 2014 school year, progression of 
students to high classes, and the selec-
tion and sending of new students to 
regional universities (SS, 5 Nov 2013). 
The law-and-order situation 
in  Solomon Islands continued to 
be  fragile, although it has greatly 
improved compared to the tense 
period of 1998–2003. In 2013, ramsi 
announced its transition away from 
playing a leading role in the three 
pillars of its intervention: law and 
order, governance, and development. 
These functions are now slowly being 
returned to the Solomon Islands 
government and its institutions. 
ramsi’s transition was initiated ten 
years after the intervention began in 
2003.  Speaking at the official com-
mencement of the transition phase, 
Secretary-General of the Pacific 
Islands Forum Tuiloma Slade stated: 
“Solomon Islands is now a secure and 
stable country, open for business and 
its people free from intimidation” 
(ramsi 2013, 1). 
There are mixed feelings in Solo-
mon Islands about the transition, but 
there is nothing much that the people 
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or their government can do to halt it, 
as the decision to proceed was made 
by Australia and New Zealand, the 
main sponsors of the intervention 
project. Part of local skepticism is 
attributable to the uncertainty over 
the Royal Solomon Islands Police 
Force’s readiness to take on the role of 
policing. However, the police did some 
things well in 2013. For instance, with 
the help of the people of the Weather 
Coast of Guadalcanal, the police 
recaptured three prison escapees who 
were closely associated with the war-
lord Harold Keke at the height of the 
tensions (SS, 8 Nov 2013). The escap-
ees were apprehended after months of 
terrorizing their own people of South 
Guadalcanal. Police also attended to 
many other crimes around Honiara 
and throughout the other nine prov-
inces. Unfortunately, Edmund Sae, a 
fugitive who has been on the run since 
the arrival of ramsi, has yet to be 
 captured on Malaita. Malaitan com-
munities did not cooperate with the 
police for fear of their own lives. In his 
New Year’s speech, Solomon Islands 
Governor General Frank Kabui called 
on Mr Sae to do the right thing and 
give himself up to police (SS, 6 Jan 
2014). It should be pointed out that 
the possibility of another amnesty 
recently proposed by Prime Minister 
Lilo might just serve to encourage 
wanted criminals like Sae to keep 
holding on to their guns. 
There is also public concern over 
the delay in appointing a new police 
commissioner. In late 2013, five indi-
viduals were shortlisted for the post. 
One name was selected and forwarded 
by the Police and Prison Service Com-
mission to the Prime Minister’s Office 
in a formal recommendation to the 
governor general for appointment. 
Unfortunately, the person appointed 
was disqualified because of an age 
limit. This did not sit well with some 
groups in Solomon Islands, especially 
the Malaita Maasina Forum (mmf), 
which alleged that Prime Minister 
Lilo already had a person in mind, 
resulting in the disqualification of the 
recommended candidate. Although 
not substantiated, the mmf continues 
to accuse the Prime Minister’s Office 
during the latest round of the search 
for a new police commissioner (sibc, 
26 Feb 2014), despite the urgent need 
for a commissioner to enhance the 
people’s trust in police leadership and 
the force. 
The failure of the government to 
officially release the 2012 report by 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion on the roots of the ethnic tensions 
continued to confuse people in 2013. 
A version of the report was leaked and 
there is no indication when the report 
will be officially made public. Mean-
while, the reconciliation between the 
people of the Weather Coast and the 
government was criticized as selective 
and insensitive (sibc, 17 Dec 2013). 
Hardy Kona, a critic of the govern-
ment in this particular effort of recon-
ciliation, stated that “reconciliation 
must be fair and inclusive otherwise 
it would only be disadvantageous and 
discriminatory” (sibc, 17 Dec 2013). 
In Honiara, the basic demands of 
city living continue to be problematic. 
City dwellers continue to experience 
water and electricity shortages and 
traffic congestion. In 2013, a Parlia-
mentary Task Force was set up to look 
into the ever-increasing transport con-
gestion in Honiara and the subsequent 
“short bus routes” taken by buses. 
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Because of short routes, some passen-
gers are forced to take more than one 
bus to get to their destination, and a 
trip that used to cost si$3 may now 
cost as much as si$15. The task force 
consisted of all members of Parlia-
ment, and a report was produced after 
several consultation meetings. The 
task force recommended various strat-
egies to address the short bus routes 
that adversely affect the Honiara 
traveling public (National Parliament 
of Solomon Islands 2013). Although 
the cabinet has yet to deliberate on 
the recommendations, the continuous 
insistence by bus owners to exploit 
the general public of Honiara must be 
addressed, and government interven-
tion is needed. Whatever the outcome, 
this issue will continue to be a matter 
for deliberation in 2014.
On the regional, subregional, and 
international fronts, one of the critical 
issues for Solomon Islands was its lack 
of a clear position on the indepen-
dence movement for West Papua. The 
country was accused of having a dou-
ble standard when it came to discuss-
ing the issue in various forums. Unlike 
Vanuatu, the position of Solomon 
Islands was not obvious at the United 
Nations General Assembly. Prime 
Minister Lilo was also accused of fol-
lowing the wishes of the Indonesian 
government when a Solomon Islands 
delegation allegedly used Solomon 
Islands government funds to pay for a 
trip to Indonesia, despite Lilo’s claim-
ing that the trip was fully funded by 
Indonesia. After protests by the public 
and in the media about the value of 
spending taxpayer dollars on the trip, 
the Indonesian government reportedly 
refunded the monies. Reports con-
firmed that funds were received from 
somebody within Indonesia, although 
whether the source of the refund was 
actually the government of Indonesia 
could not be determined (SS, 22 Aug 
2013). Earlier in the year, Solomon 
Islands was again accused of blindly 
following the interests of Fiji during 
the Melanesian Spearhead Group’s 
trip to Indonesia. The trip resulted in 
much criticism of the msg, and a pro-
posed meeting to decide on the msg’s 
position on West Papuan membership 
in the organization was delayed. Vanu-
atu withdrew from the msg delega-
tion, indicating where it stands on the 
issue (Radio New Zealand, 13 Jan 
2014). West Papua will likely continue 
to be featured in MSG discussions in 
2014.
Issues related to land and economic 
development continued to be featured 
throughout 2013. The tensions over 
environmental threats and pollution 
by the Gold Ridge mine on down-
stream and surrounding communities 
appeared sporadically throughout the 
year. Media statements, roadblocks, 
and strikes indicate that there are dif-
ferences to be sorted out between the 
company, the state, and affected com-
munities on these various concerns. 
Similar incidents and disruptions to 
logging companies occurred in other 
parts of the country. Disagreements 
with extractive industries continue to 
trigger conflicts among community 
members and companies. In Temotu, 
a church leader and his followers 
destroyed a logging company camp 
after all their attempts to ask the 
company to stop logging failed to bear 
fruit throughout the year (SS, 8 Jan 
2014). The destruction was estimated 
at si$1.1 million, and the perpetra-
tors were arrested and charged (SS, 8 
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Jan 2014). Similar incidents happened 
in Malaita and Isabel provinces in 
2013. The increased incidence of such 
actions by community groups should 
serve as a warning that landowner 
concerns must be attended to when 
there are initial signs that the com-
munity and company disagree. Land 
issues also frustrate the government’s 
development efforts: the govern-
ment’s program on economic growth 
centers was stymied by land disputes 
and disagreements. In order for such 
and similar undertakings to proceed, 
 landownership and disputed area 
issues must be addressed. 
The year 2013 saw the government 
rearticulate its priorities and what it 
hopes to achieve during the remain-
der of its term. Toward the end of the 
year, Prime Minister Lilo put out a list 
of priorities that his government will 
pursue in 2014 (sibc, 22 Jan 2014), 
ranging from the forthcoming general 
elections to multilateral cooperation 
(opmc, 21 Jan 2014). The irony is 
that the national general election will 
be held in late 2014; why the govern-
ment only came out with its priorities 
toward the end of its tenure leaves 
much to be desired, and one only 
hopes that at least one of its  priorities 
is achieved before the national 
 elections.
At the close of 2013 and the begin-
ning of 2014, international reggae 
bands and artists visited Solomon 
Islands. Julian Marley, the son of reg-
gae king Bob Marley, visited the coun-
try and put on a show. Unfortunately, 
it was marred by stone-throwing fans 
who were unable to make it into the 
concert area, resulting in police and 
youth casualties (sto, 23 Dec 2013). 
In early 2014, Shaggy (Orville Rich-
ard Burrell), another world-renowned 
artist from Jamaica, visited Solomon 
Islands. The show had no incidents 
of bad behavior, in contrast to the 
Marley performance (sto, 4 Feb 
2014). Both of these stars sang songs 
about love, oppression, politics, and 
people. One was a very peaceful show 
while the other resulted in casualties. 
These disparate outcomes may be 
an indication of the uncertainty and 
mixed reactions of Solomon Islanders 
as they await the results of the 2014 
general elections and the ramsi transi-
tion. Whatever happens, time will 
tell the status of the country’s social, 
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tions of corruption within the govern-
ment increased to unprecedented levels 
related to misuse of funds, shady land 
deals, questionable dismissals of public 
service officials, and the unexplained 
death of the minister of infrastruc-
ture and public utilities, Harry Iauko, 
rumored to be related to the arrival 
in Port Vila harbor of a mysterious 
super-luxury yacht, the Phocea, and 
its detention by the government due to 
fraudulent ownership documentation. 
One of the hottest issues dur-
ing 2011, which was not completely 
resolved by the end of that year, was 
ratification of Vanuatu’s bid to join 
the World Trade Organization (wto). 
The government introduced a bill in 
Parliament in December and, despite 
opposition by most of the major non-
governmental organizations such as 
the Malvatumauri (National Council 
of Chiefs), Chamber of Commerce, 
Vanuatu Christian Council, and Vanu-
atu National Workers Union, it passed 
by a vote of 25 in favor, 20 against 
(including that of Minister of Justice 
Ralph Regenvanu), and one abstention 
(Van Trease 2012). The bill, however, 
remained unsigned by the president, 
His Excellency Iolu Johnson Abbil, 
who had gone overseas for health 
reasons as the year ended. The act-
ing president (the deputy speaker of 
Parliament) explained that he could 
not sign the bill, as the president had 
left instructions that he would not 
assent to wto ratification if it was 
unconstitutional, which had yet to be 
determined (VDP, 17 Jan 2012). 
According to the Vanuatu Constitu-
tion, “when a bill has been passed by 
Parliament it shall be presented to the 
President of the Republic who shall 
assent to it within 2 weeks.” Other-
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Vanuatu
This analysis covers a two-year 
period—2012 and 2013—that encom-
passes national elections in late 2012 
and the eventual change of govern-
ment the following year. As 2012 
began, however, moves by the Opposi-
tion, led by Edward Natapei, to bring 
down the Kilman-led government had 
all but ceased, while rivalry within and 
between political parties increased as 
individual politicians sought to posi-
tion themselves in anticipation of the 
national election, which was expected 
in October. At the same time, allega-
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wise, if the president considers that the 
bill may be unconstitutional, “he shall 
refer it to the Supreme Court for its 
opinion. The bill shall not be promul-
gated if the Supreme Court considers 
it inconsistent with a provision of the 
Constitution” (chapter 4, article 16 
[3] and [4]). On his return to Vanuatu 
in mid-January, however, the presi-
dent did not act on the bill, and the 
government was forced to bring a 
constitutional case against him. In 
his judgment, Chief Justice Vincent 
Lunabek noted that the president had 
not assented to the bill, nor had he 
referred a case to the Supreme Court 
in accordance with article 16 (3) and 
(4) of the constitution. In response to 
the government’s case, the president 
expressed his concern about what he 
viewed as the “considerable lack of 
consultation, as expressed by the pub-
lic before the bill was passed by Parlia-
ment.” The president was expressing 
his disapproval of the bill rather than 
seeking a judgment on its constitution-
ality—in effect, posing the question 
of “whether or not the president can 
refuse to assent to a bill.” The chief 
justice, however, made it clear in his 
judgment that under the constitution 
the president did not have the power 
to refuse to sign a bill—only to refer 
a constitutional question about the 
bill to the Supreme Court within two 
weeks of the bill having been pre-
sented to him. The president’s inaction 
constituted a “failure of omission” on 
his part under the constitution, and he 
was, therefore, “invited to assent to 
the Bill for the Protocol on the Acces-
sion of Vanuatu (Ratification) Act No. 
19 of 2011 by signing the copies of the 
Bill” (Supreme Court 2012; VDP, 23 
June 2012).
While it took until June 2012 for 
the issue of Vanuatu’s membership in 
the World Trade Organization to be 
completely resolved, there had been a 
significant political casualty in Janu-
ary following the vote in Parliament 
the previous December. Having voted 
against the bill, Ralph Regenvanu 
was terminated as minister for jus-
tice by Prime Minister Kilman and 
replaced by Charlot Salwai, member 
of a new breakaway group from the 
Union of Moderate Parties (ump) who 
called themselves the ump for Change 
(umpc). In his termination letter, 
Kilman criticized Regenvanu for his 
“continued actions and support for 
issues that have been contradictory 
to the collective policy decisions of 
the Council of Ministers . . . [which] 
raised serious questions of loyalty 
within the Council and members of 
the government coalition” (VDP, 17 
Jan, 18 Jan 2012).
Regenvanu expressed disappoint-
ment at his termination in a long 
interview reported in the Vanuatu 
Daily Post, describing how he had 
supported Kilman continually since 
the 2008 election and by joining 
the coalition in December 2010. He 
agreed that he had not supported 
the wto bill, nor the controversial 
appointment of Thi Tam Goiset, 
member of the well-known Dinh 
family, the previous December as 
roving ambassador to Russia (VDP, 3 
Jan 2013). Likewise, he pointed out 
that he had opposed and was the only 
member of Parliament (mp) to vote 
against the government bill to increase 
salaries and benefits of politicians and 
had publicly expressed his opposition 
to the purchase of new vehicles for 
several ministers. At the same time, 
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Regenvanu described the significant 
results he had achieved while heading 
three different ministries during the 
previous year (Ni-Vanuatu business 
development, lands, and justice). On 
the positive side, Regenvanu noted 
that he was now free to practice the 
policy that he had espoused while 
campaigning in the 2008 election: “to 
provide a role model for good leader-
ship as an mp and a national leader” 
and to focus on preparing the candi-
dates of his Graon mo Jastis Pati (gjp, 
land and justice party) to contest the 
national elections at the end of 2012 
(VDP, 19 Jan 2012).
While Vanuatu’s membership in 
the World Trade Organization was 
finally resolved and did not feature 
prominently in the coming election 
debate, several other issues from the 
past spilled over into 2012. The status 
of West Papua continued to concern 
many Ni-Vanuatu—representatives of 
the Free West Papua movement have 
had an office in Vanuatu since the 
early 1980s. Prime Minister Kilman’s 
decision in April 2011 to side with 
Fiji’s strongman, Frank Bainimarama, 
to support granting observer status to 
Indonesia in the Melanesian Spear-
head Group (msg) was very contro-
versial and elicited numerous articles 
and letters to the editor condemning 
the move as a betrayal of Vanuatu’s 
Melanesian brothers and sisters in 
West Papua (Van Trease 2012, 428). 
The Kilman government had also 
negotiated a Development Coopera-
tion Agreement with Indonesia that 
concerned the leader of the Vanua‘aku 
Pati (vp), Edward Natapei, because 
it recognized Indonesian sovereignty 
over West Papua and stated specifi-
cally that the two signatory countries 
must not interfere in each other’s 
internal affairs. Natapei declared 
in February 2012 that any future 
 government of which the VP was a 
part would review the agreement (VDP, 
3 Feb 2012).
Despite strong protest from various 
elements of the community, Kilman 
pressed on with his new strategy to 
engage with Indonesia. In May, he met 
the Indonesian ambassador to Vanu-
atu in Port Vila to discuss possible 
police and paramilitary training, and 
the next day an Indonesian military 
plane arrived loaded with promised 
aid, including computers, tractors, 
and other vehicles. That afternoon, a 
peaceful demonstration at the airport 
by pro–West Papuan youths resulted 
in police arrests, to the dismay of 
many Ni-Vanuatu, who viewed sup-
port for West Papuan independence 
as an established policy of the govern-
ment. A spokesman for the Kilman 
government responded by saying that 
after thirty years of failing to change 
the situation it was time for Vanuatu 
to try a new strategy of engagement 
with Indonesia (VDP, 15–19 May 
2013). As the election approached, 
there were suspicions that Indonesia 
was funneling money into Vanuatu to 
support particular politicians (VDP, 28 
Sept 2012). 
The politics of land in Vanuatu is 
another issue that never seems to be 
resolved. Numerous land disputes 
were reported in the daily press during 
2012, usually about custom ownership 
related to proposed leasing to foreign 
investors. The ongoing problem is 
that, under Vanuatu law, the minister 
of lands had been given the right to 
grant a lease in any cases in which 
land was disputed, the proceeds to be 
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held in trust until the rightful custom 
owner(s) could be determined. It is not 
uncommon for disputes to be invented 
when an investor is unable to persuade 
Ni-Vanuatu landowners to grant a 
lease (VDP, 11 Jan, 24 Feb, 4 July 
2012). Calls to take away the minis-
ter’s power to grant leases under such 
circumstances have been made for a 
number of years—this was one of the 
twenty-one resolutions of the Vanuatu 
Lands Summit, held in 2006—but no 
government since that time has had 
the courage or inclination to act, and, 
as a result, widespread dissatisfaction 
continues among Ni-Vanuatu land-
owners and chiefly authorities (Malva-
tumauri 2006).
Of even greater concern during 
2012 was the increasing practice of the 
minister of lands to approve the sale 
of state land under value and without 
tender (VDP, 31 March, 4 April 2012). 
The usual sequence of events was for 
the land to be sold to a Ni-Vanuatu 
friend or associate at a low price, who 
then sold it on to a waiting buyer at 
a much increased price, pocketing the 
profit and, it is commonly believed, 
sharing it with the minister concerned 
(VDP, 2 April 2012). This practice has 
been occurring for years and led to 
a Council of Ministers’ decision in 
2010, when Natapei was prime min-
ister, declaring “that there will be no 
more sale of state owned land assets,” 
but the practice continued unabated 
under the Kilman government and is 
illustrative of the increase in the level 
of corruption experienced in Vanuatu 
(VDP, 13 April 2012). 
Although the Prime Minister’s 
Office also announced in June 2012 
that it would no longer tolerate 
the sale of state assets, the practice 
persisted, reaching a new level during 
the last few weeks before the election 
when Minister of Lands Steven Kal-
sakau instructed the director of lands 
to allocate state land in Luganville and 
Port Vila to staff in the Department of 
Lands at grossly reduced values (VDP, 
12 Sept, 21 Sept 2012). The Land 
Management and Planning Commit-
tee announced in early October that it 
had approved forty urban land leases 
for Lands officers in Luganville, many 
of which involved existing leases that 
the Department of Lands had canceled 
due to the failure of lessees to pay 
their land taxes (VDP, 17 Oct, 19 Oct 
2012). With the election only a few 
days away and the outcome uncertain, 
the minister of lands urged the acting 
director of lands to “organize this as 
a priority and forward all certificates 
and leases to me for approval” (VDP, 
24 Oct 2012). 
Relations between Vanuatu and 
Australia took a surprising turn for 
the worse in late April 2012, when 
Australian Federal Police (afp) 
arrested Clarence Marae, the private 
secretary in the Prime Minister’s 
Office, at Sydney Airport as he tran-
sited with the prime ministerial delega-
tion, who were on a trip to Israel. 
According to Australian authorities, 
he was arrested over a matter that had 
occurred ten years earlier in which he, 
along with Australian nationals oper-
ating in Vanuatu, was alleged to have 
been involved in activities to defraud 
the Commonwealth and for which 
a warrant of arrest had been issued. 
Marae was subsequently transferred to 
Brisbane, charged with one count of 
conspiracy to defraud the Common-
wealth, and confined to jail without 
bail. 
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On his return to Vanuatu, Prime 
Minister Kilman protested at the way 
in which the incident had occurred 
and demanded an apology from 
Australia. The prime minister’s party 
had been shuffled into the immigra-
tion hall instead of the vip lounge, as 
is the normal procedure, and at that 
moment, the afp arrested Marae. 
Reactions in Vanuatu were mixed. 
Some people saw the incident as 
showing disrespect for Vanuatu’s 
prime minister, while others were less 
critical. The Nagriamel Movement 
demanded that the government expel 
afp personnel working in Vanuatu as 
part of the Australian Government’s 
Police Force Strengthening Project. In 
contrast, Edward Natapei (president 
of the vp and leader of the Opposi-
tion) noted that the afp had merely 
been executing a court-sanctioned 
warrant of arrest, and he criticized the 
prime minister for engaging someone 
who had, indeed, previously been 
convicted for misconduct by Vanu-
atu courts. However, with no official 
apology forthcoming, on 9 May 2012, 
Kilman ordered the afp to leave Vanu-
atu within twenty-four hours (VDP, 
1–11 May 2012). 
As it turned out, the decision to 
expel the afp worked to Vanuatu’s 
significant disadvantage by depriv-
ing local police authorities of vital 
support in dealing with a criminal 
incident involving suspicious inter-
national players. On 22 July 2012, 
twenty police officers took part in a 
joint operation with Customs, Immi-
gration, and Quarantine officers to 
board the Phocea, a mega yacht that 
had recently arrived in Vila harbor. 
After checking Internet sources, police 
officials reported that the yacht was 
“highly suspicious of being involved in 
smuggling high powered arms, money 
laundering and breaching related laws 
of maritime borders” (VDP, 25 July 
2012). A court warrant was issued 
and a search of the yacht discov-
ered numerous documents related to 
bilateral arrangements and others with 
forged signatures, which were confis-
cated. “A substance in a plastic bag 
that may be opium” was also discov-
ered (VDP, 28 July 2012). 
On board the yacht were sixteen 
crew members, including a Samoan 
and a Tongan who in March 2012 
had been involved in a case related to 
their obtaining Vanuatu citizenship by 
false and misleading statements. Both 
men were arrested and subsequently 
appeared in court. Tongan police also 
became involved in the investigation 
when it was revealed that the  Phocea 
had stopped over in Tonga on its 
way to Vanuatu from Europe via the 
Panama Canal and that cabinet mem-
bers had been entertained on board. 
Internet investigations also found sus-
picious changes in the yacht’s registra-
tion and discovered that the yacht had 
been registered in Vanuatu in 2005 as 
a diplomatic yacht of Vanuatu owned 
by Anh Quan Saken, who became 
a citizen in 2012 and was alleged 
to have been appointed as Vanuatu 
consul to Vietnam (VDP, 24, 25, 26, 30 
July 2012). 
It came as a surprise when the 
police investigation revealed that the 
Phocea had actually been moored for 
several days outside the harbor near a 
small resort without clearing customs 
and immigration and that at least two 
government ministers and possibly 
three other members of Parliament 
had been on board. Photographs of 
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the ministers found on board—Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs Alfred Carlot 
and Minister of Education Marcel-
lino Pipite—confirmed this (VDP, 27 
July 2012). They were subsequently 
charged with and pleaded not guilty 
to the offence of “boarding before a 
customs officer—contrary to section 
16 (1) cap257” (VDP, 24 Oct 2012). 
The case had not been heard even by 
the end of 2013. 
The police investigation had begun 
to make significant progress in raising 
questions, if not finding out concrete 
answers, about the circumstances 
surrounding the Phocea when it was 
reported that Minister of Internal 
Affairs George Wells had decided to 
suspend the head of the Fraud Unit, 
Andrew Kalman, who was investi-
gating the Phocea affair. Initially, no 
reasons were given for the suspension, 
except that Kalman was “jeopardiz-
ing the case,” but subsequently he 
was accused of causing delays in the 
investigation and selling information. 
Kalman denied all the allegations and 
was preparing to challenge them in 
court (VDP, 1 Aug, 8 Aug 2012). 
Over the next two months, the 
captain and crew of the Phocea were 
prevented from leaving Vanuatu while 
cases were prepared against them 
for breaching customs and immigra-
tion regulations related to their delay 
in seeking clearance when they first 
arrived in Port Vila. Most were given 
relatively modest fines and eventually 
allowed to depart the country. The cir-
cumstances remain unclear, however, 
how the yacht’s owner, Anh Quan 
Saken, was able to board a plane 
within three days of the arrival of the 
Phocea. Clearly, someone in authority 
facilitated his departure. He was called 
to appear in court to face charges with 
the captain, but he did not return to 
Vanuatu to do so. Indeed, there were 
many questions regarding Saken’s true 
identity and his relationship with Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs Alfred Carlot. 
In December 2011, Carlot had 
appointed longtime resident of ques-
tionable character, Thi Tam Goiset, as 
Vanuatu’s roving ambassador to Rus-
sia and other eastern European coun-
tries (VDP, 3 Dec 2011). She has been 
involved in politics for decades and 
has a reputation for shady activities, 
having been arrested in New Cale-
donia several years ago while using a 
diplomatic passport with no official 
status and in possession of a number 
of unexplained passports and vt5 mil-
lion (One US dollar is approximately 
93.5 Vanuatu vatu [vt]). Under her 
contract, Goiset was not entitled to 
any remuneration for services rendered 
but would be entitled to 15 percent of 
any money granted to the government 
of Vanuatu as a result of her represen-
tations to other foreign government 
agencies. The Daily Post noted that it 
was ironic that Goiset’s contract came 
to light physically (a copy was printed 
on the front page of the newspaper) 
after Prime Minister Kilman “reiter-
ated his government’s stand against 
corruption”; the news paper also noted 
that Goiset was linked to the deci-
sion of Carlot and Kilman in 2011 to 
recognize the pro-Russian, breakaway 
republic of Abkhazia (VDP, 3 Jan 
2012). 
The prime minister’s first secre-
tary, Richard Kaltongga, produced 
documents alleging that the minister 
of foreign affairs had also appointed 
Saken as ambassador-at-large to Peru, 
Colombia, and the United States as 
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well as Vanuatu commissioner of 
trade, business development, and 
culture for Central America and 
Panama. Carlot denied the accusa-
tions, claiming that the documents 
were forged, but he did confirm that 
Saken had made significant financial 
contributions to the running of the 
Vanuatu embassy in Brussels. He also 
recommended that Goiset be removed 
as Vanuatu’s roving ambassador 
to Russia, but the Prime Minister’s 
Office insisted she remain (VDP, 29 
Sept 2012). Goiset’s involvement 
with Saken and the Phocea remained 
mysterious at this point, as did the 
true nature of her relationship with 
members of the Kilman government. 
By October, the Phocea had become a 
permanent feature in the harbor, and 
the affair began to fade somewhat 
from public view as attention shifted 
to the national elections scheduled 
for the end of the month. The yacht 
had been impounded by the Vanuatu 
government and would remain so well 
into 2013.
The Kilman government was 
significantly damaged by the way 
it handled the Phocea affair and by 
its involvement in what seemed to 
be potentially criminal activities. 
Indeed, the government had devel-
oped the reputation of being soft 
on corruption, whether through the 
actions of certain of its own ministers 
or through its lackluster approach 
to dealing with embedded corrup-
tion and incompetence in the public 
service—a problem, in fact, that has 
been neglected for years by previ-
ous Vanuatu governments. The land 
issue has already been mentioned, but 
there were others. In June, Minister 
of Education Marcellino Pipite signed 
a deed of release payment with the 
director of a local stationery store, for 
which he had cabinet approval, for 
the payment of vt17 million, despite 
the fact that the State Law Office had 
advised that there was nothing to pay, 
as the store’s claim had been struck 
down by the Supreme Court several 
years earlier. The money was report-
edly drawn out of funds earmarked 
under the Teaching Services Com-
mission for outstanding payments 
to teachers (VDP, 8 June 2012). By 
October, the Daily Post reported in 
front-page headlines that the Ministry 
of  Education had run out of money, 
attributing the situation to the non-
budgeted vt17 million that had been 
taken out of operating funds, result-
ing in teachers not being paid and 
overseas students on scholarships not 
getting their stipends (VDP, 18 Oct 
2012). 
Another concern among some 
members of the public, which was 
attributed to policies of the govern-
ment, was the increasing number 
of Chinese workers being allowed 
into the country. They were mostly 
employed on construction sites, an 
area of employment that is reserved 
for local people, and thus appeared to 
be taking jobs away from Ni-Vanuatu. 
The government seemed to ignore 
the problem, and there was suspicion 
that special favors were being given 
to  certain local contractors to allow 
them to recruit foreign workers (VDP, 
7 Jan, 28 Jan 2012). Likewise,  worries 
surfaced in the country when the 
government reported that it had estab-
lished a scheme in Hong Kong to sell 
permanent resident visas to wealthy 
Chinese as a source of government 
revenue and potential investment, with 
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nearly seven hundred having already 
been sold by the end of the year (VDP, 
27 Oct 2012). This is clearly a difficult 
issue for the government to deal with, 
as Chinese-Vanuatu relations go back 
to independence, and the People’s 
Republic of China is a generous aid 
donor. 
Of particular concern has been 
the government’s practice of using 
its power to dismiss officials for no 
apparent reason, rather than using 
established Public Service procedures. 
In addition to the dismissal of the 
head of the Fraud Unit investigating 
the Phocea, a series of senior police 
officers were dismissed without clear 
reasons being given. For example, 
there has never been an adequate 
explanation why Police Commis-
sioner Joshua Bong was “told” to take 
leave in May and was replaced by 
Acting Police Commissioner Arthur 
Coulton (VDP, 22 May 2012). The 
same applies to the suspension of the 
senior commander south the following 
month—the minister of internal affairs 
gave no explanation in response to 
inquiries (VDP, 27 June 2012). Even 
more confusing was the imprisonment 
of several senior police officers in 
late May for “suspicion of inciting a 
mutiny”—no explanation given—and 
Bong’s reinstatement as police com-
missioner pending a court challenge 
(VDP, 2 Oct 2012). Within a few days, 
the Supreme Court struck down the 
mutiny charges, ten other senior police 
officers were suspended, and Bong 
was again terminated as chief of police 
(VDP, 8 Oct 2012). 
Several major political parties 
faced severe problems in the months 
leading up to the election, mostly 
related to individual power struggles, 
some dating back months or years. In 
January 2012, tensions that had been 
building within the ump since the 
previous December between longtime 
leader Serge Vohor from Santo and 
a younger rival, Charlot Salwai from 
Pentecost, began to take form. Sal-
wai announced that a group within 
the party who supported him would 
be called UMP for Change (umpc). 
Evidence of the split became obvious 
in the following months as individuals 
declared which group they identified 
with, culminating in February with 
two party congresses competing for 
participants and the Vohor-led faction 
officially expelling the rebels (VDP, 17 
Feb, 29 Feb 2012). Following a court 
case by the Vohor faction, which was 
subsequently appealed and disallowed, 
the Supreme Court ruled that Salwai’s 
group could not use the ump or umpc 
name to identify themselves in the 
coming election (VDP, 28 Aug 2012). 
As a result, Salwai renamed the umpc 
as the Reunification of Movement for 
Change (rmc).
The Vanuatu Republican Party had 
also experienced a power struggle in 
2011, with Alfred Carlot leading a 
breakaway group from his uncle, the 
party’s founder, Maxime Carlot Kor-
man. Differences continued between 
Marcellino Pipite and Korman, who 
attempted to expel Pipite from the 
party, but this was ruled null and void 
in a ruling by the appeals court (VDP, 
12 May 2012). Pipite was subse-
quently elected president of the Vanu-
atu Republican Party (vrp), which 
was confirmed after a court challenge 
(VDP, 30 June, 21 Sept 2012). The 
effect of this was to sideline Korman, 
who responded by establishing his 
own Vanuatu Democratic Party (VDP, 
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24 Sept 2012)—the second time in his 
political career that he had been forced 
to take this action. He also made 
the decision to run as a  candidate in 
the Efate Rural constituency rather 
than continue to challenge for one of 
the six Port Vila seats, which he had 
held since he first entered Parliament 
in 1979. One positive development 
for Korman was the decision by the 
Kilman government to seek his rein-
statement in Parliament. He had been 
stripped of his parliamentary privi-
leges eleven months earlier after being 
found in contempt of Parliament in 
2011 due to unconstitutional  rulings 
he had made as Speaker (VDP, 28 Aug 
2012). 
One of the most significant dis-
putes—the attempt by Tanna mp 
Harry Iauko to replace Edward 
Natapei as leader of the Vanua‘aku 
Pati—was resolved barely two weeks 
before the election. The dispute 
focused on recognition of two com-
peting party congresses held in 2010 
on the island of Tongoa—the Iauko 
faction at Lumbukuti village and the 
Natapei faction at Panita village—
both of which elected executives. 
Following several last-minute appeals, 
the court ruled in favor of the Panita 
congress and Edward Natapei. This 
meant that Iauko would have to find 
another name for his group by the 
time of the election, if he chose to 
contest separately (VDP, 10 Oct 2012). 
Iauko appealed but was turned down 
at the last minute. As a result, he went 
into the election under the name “the 
Iauko Group.” 
During 2012, most of the other 
major parties—eg, the Peoples Pro-
gressive Party headed by Prime Minis-
ter Kilman, the Green Confederation 
headed by Moana Carcasses, and 
the National United Party headed by 
Ham Lini—had been negotiating for 
support throughout the country, each 
claiming to have convinced groups 
from different islands to switch alle-
giance in their favor. Ralph Regenvanu 
traveled around the country hold-
ing awareness sessions in an attempt 
to broaden recognition of the gjp. 
He was its only elected member of 
Parliament, representing the Port Vila 
constituency. Two former political 
strongmen who had been defeated in 
earlier elections also decided to run 
again: Barak Sope continued to lead 
his own Melanesian Progressive Party 
(mpp), and Willie Jimmy founded a 
new party, the Liberal Democratic 
Party. The Nagriamel Movement, 
which dates back to independence, 
also expected to field more candidates. 
An interesting addition to the 
political alignment was a new party 
calling itself the Presidential Party. Its 
founders, who included several former 
presidents of the Republic of Vanu-
atu—Ati George Sokomanu, Kalkot 
Matas Kelekele, Jean Marie Léyé, 
and Father John Bani—believed that 
the way for Vanuatu to overcome the 
political instability that it had been 
experiencing since the early 1990s was 
to replace the Westminster model with 
a presidential system patterned on that 
of the United States. They and their 
supporters attracted a lot of publicity 
over the four years since the previous 
election in 2008, and in 2012 they 
established the Presidential Party as 
a means of promoting their ideas and 
bringing about change (VDP, 3 May, 
21 Aug 2012). While the problem of 
political instability is indeed very real, 
the idea of changing the voting system 
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did not seem to win over many voters. 
Most people understood their propos-
als and would have seen changing 
the voting system as far too radical a 
solution. The Presidential Party got 
slightly fewer than three thousand 
votes in the national election—a mere 
2 percent of the total (Vanuatu Gov-
ernment 2012). 
The election was scheduled for 30 
October 2012, with the campaign set 
to run from 10 to 27 October, but due 
to the high interest nationally, cam-
paigning and recruiting of supporters 
had been going on unofficially for 
months. Preparations by the Electoral 
Office began earlier in the year with 
a voter-awareness program, while the 
task of updating the electoral roll had 
been going on regularly at designated 
times throughout the year. 
A major controversy occurred 
in mid-October, when the Electoral 
Office published its first list of names 
of candidates who had qualified to 
stand for the election, that is, those 
who had met the requirements as 
specified under the law in the Repre-
sentation of the People Act (Vanuatu 
Sessional Legislation 2006): Vanuatu 
citizenship, minimum twenty-five 
years of age, not disqualified from vot-
ing, not currently imprisoned or under 
a suspended sentence not yet ended, 
and not in bankruptcy. Among those 
not qualified was the prime minister, 
Sato Kilman, who had fallen victim 
to a new requirement, added to the 
act in 2007, that an individual would 
be disqualified as a candidate if he 
or she was “in default of payment of 
any rates, charges or other debts due 
to the Government or Government 
agency” (Vanuatu Sessional Legisla-
tion 2007). According to the Electoral 
Office, Kilman owed Value Added Tax 
and rents amounting to vt13 million 
(VDP, 12 Oct 2012). The following 
day, the prime minister’s first political 
advisor, Richard Kaltongga, denied 
the existence of the debt and threat-
ened the media with “stringent legal 
controls” to ensure ethical reporting 
(VDP, 13 Oct, 16 Oct 2012). Within 
a few days, the Council of Minis-
ters decided to remove the principal 
electoral officer, Lawson Samuel, and 
replaced him with the commissioner 
of labor because of alleged “complica-
tions faced by candidates who submit-
ted their names,” which included the 
prime minister (VDP, 19 Oct 2012). 
Kilman was allowed to contest the 
election and won, but newly elected 
mp Willie Jimmy instituted an appeal 
in the Supreme Court to clarify 
whether the prime minister had in fact 
cleared the debt (VDP, 9 Nov 2012). 
The court did not make a ruling until 
February, quashing the petition (VDP, 9 
Feb 2013). 
There were a few minor incidents 
at polling stations, but the voting 
and counting went off without major 
incident. Nevertheless, a number of 
political leaders labeled the election 
as the “worst in history” due to many 
irregularities in voting—in particular, 
inaccuracies in the electoral roll (eg, 
missing names) and alleged fraud 
relating to proxy voting. In addi-
tion, there were alleged widespread 
attempts to bribe voters during the 
campaign period and promises of cash 
to newly elected members of Parlia-
ment during the government forma-
tion period (VDP, 10 Nov 2012).
The problem with the electoral roll 
is that it is very difficult to maintain in 
its present form. Updating is done by 
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electoral and provincial administrative 
officers traveling around the islands 
and through the neighborhoods of 
Port Vila and Luganville, interview-
ing individuals and family members. 
There is no automatic way to remove 
the names of people who are deceased 
or to easily amend the registration of 
people who have changed residence—
an increasing problem, as the move-
ment of people in search of employ-
ment is on the rise. According to the 
2009 national census, Vanuatu’s total 
population was 234,023, of which 
143,050 were age eighteen years or 
older. At the same time, the official 
count of total registered voters was 
192,632—nearly 50,000 more than 
possible, given the census data (Vanu-
atu National Statistics Office 2009). 
The Daily Post ran a story with these 
figures, which elicited a number of 
letters from the public in response, 
expressing outrage at the situation 
(VDP, 12 Oct 2012). 
The degree of the obvious inac-
curacy of the electoral roll cast doubt 
over the validity of the final election 
results and, in particular, the problems 
concerning proxy voting. In Vanuatu, 
individuals can designate someone 
in their home islands to vote on their 
behalf by sending their electoral cards 
through electoral officials. Given the 
present registration system, there is no 
way to check to see whether people 
have more than one card. It is com-
mon knowledge that this is the case; 
thus double voting is commonplace, 
which can easily tip an election result 
one way or the other. Indeed, sev-
eral of the electoral challenges dealt 
with by the court after the election 
involved alleged illegal proxy voting. 
The severity of the problem faced in 
the 2012 election has led the govern-
ment to seek development assistance 
to introduce a biometric voting system 
involving photograph and thumb-
prints before the next anticipated 
 election in 2016. 
The 2012 election continued several 
trends of previous elections. Beginning 
in the 1990s, the number of parties 
and candidates contesting elections 
has been steadily increasing, splitting 
the vote to the degree that no single 
party has been able to win a majority 
of the seats in Parliament. In 1979, 
there were 14 parties and 69 candi-
dates, compared to 37 parties and 345 
candidates in 2012. The Vanua‘aku 
Pati was able to form majority govern-
ments following the 1979, 1983, and 
1987 elections, but when the party 
split in 1991, no single party captured 
a majority of the votes, leading to the 
formation of a coalition government. 
This has been the pattern ever since 
and is the main factor contributing to 
Vanuatu’s political instability. Like-
wise, the increase in vote splitting has 
had a negative effect over the years on 
the degree of representation in Par-
liament. The percentage of the total 
vote won by successful candidates 
has declined almost every year since 
independence—from a high of 76.4 
percent in the 1979 election to a mere 
35.7 percent in 2012—meaning that 
Vanuatu’s Parliament was elected by 
only a minority of the voters (Van 
Trease 2005).
To the surprise of many, Sato 
Kilman’s coalition was returned to 
power, gaining 29 seats versus 23 
for the rival alliance led by Edward 
Natapei, the former prime minister 
whom Kilman had replaced in a vote 
of no confidence in December 2010 
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(VDP, 19 Nov, 20 Nov 2012). Of 
special significance was the gain made 
by Graon mo Jastis Pati—an increase 
of three rural seats in addition to 
that held by the party’s leader, Ralph 
Regenvanu in Port Vila. The 2012 
election also marked the end of long 
political careers for two senior politi-
cians—Maxime Carlot Korman (vrp), 
who was elected to the country’s first 
Parliament in 1979, representing Port 
Vila, and Sela Molisa (vp), represent-
ing Santo, who was first elected in the 
early 1980s (Vanuatu Electoral Com-
mission 2013). 
The resulting coalition govern-
ment included Kilman’s own People’s 
Progressive Party (6); Green Confed-
eration (3); Iauko Group (3); Nagri-
amel (3); rmc (3); National United 
Party (3); Natatok (2); Peoples Service 
Party (1); Vanuatu National Party 
(1); Vanuatu Republican Party (1); 
Vanuatu Development Progressive 
Party (1); Independents (1); and one 
member of the Union of Moderate 
Parties (1)—Tanna mp Silas Iatan—
who refused to join the rest of his 
party in opposition. The Opposition, 
led by Edward Natapei, was made up 
of his own Vanua‘aku Pati (8); Union 
of Moderate Parties (4); Graon mo 
Jastis Pati (4); Melanesian Progressive 
Party (2); Liberal Democratic Party 
(1); Independents (3); and National 
United Party (1)—Tanna mp Mokin 
Stephen, who refused to join his party 
in government. Women did not do 
very well; only ten contested and none 
were elected. A surprise to many was 
the election of a waetman (white man) 
as member of Parliament from the 
island of Epi—longtime resident and 
naturalized citizen from the United 
States, Robert Bohn. The first non-
Melanesian to be elected to Parliament 
was, of course, Prime Minister Moana 
Carcasses (Republic of Vanuatu 2012). 
The issue of corruption in govern-
ment, which had received ongoing 
coverage in the media throughout 
much of 2012 and before, was a major 
issue in the campaign, as well as the 
Kilman debt issue and his reversal of 
Vanuatu’s long-standing support for 
West Papuan independence by allow-
ing Indonesia observer status in the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group and by 
signing the Development Cooperation 
Agreement. Indeed, there had been 
a strong feeling that Kilman and his 
coalition partners would be defeated, 
but the optimism turned out to be 
a reflection of the political bubble 
that isolates Port Vila from the rest 
of the country. Social media played 
an important role in raising political 
awareness for the first time, but the 
outer islands would have been much 
less connected compared to the two 
urban centers. The historical differ-
ence in degree of awareness of politi-
cal issues between urban and rural 
voters was again borne out in the final 
results. While the Opposition did well 
in Port Vila, capturing five of the six 
seats, the government parties actually 
increased their numbers in the coun-
try overall. No Port Vila members 
of Parliament were included in the 
new Kilman government (McDonnell 
2012). 
As is common in Vanuatu, it took 
time for the final election results to 
settle down. In early December, the 
Natapei-led opposition introduced a 
motion of no confidence in the newly 
confirmed Kilman government but 
lacked the numbers to bring about a 
change (VDP, 1 Dec, 11 Dec 2012). 
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There was much dissatisfaction among 
the Opposition parties regarding the 
conduct of the election, with the result 
that twenty-four electoral petitions 
were registered with the Supreme 
Court. Ralph Regenvanu (gjp) was 
particularly concerned about the large 
number of proxy votes that were cast 
and called for the “investigation of 
allegations that the Principal Electoral 
Officer Lawson Samuel was trans-
ferred out of his post on the eve of the 
election so that 1000’s of false proxies 
could be issued to be used in favor of 
certain caretaker ministers who were 
facing defeat in the election” (VDP, 3 
Nov 2012). Most electoral petitions 
were not dealt with until 2013, and 
none of them were successful. 
With the election over, attention 
turned once again to the Phocea, 
which was still anchored in Port Vila 
harbor. The captain’s case finally 
came to judgment in the magistrate 
court, which fined him vt310,000 
for breaching Vanuatu’s Custom Act. 
At the same time, the trial date was 
set for the two ministers who had 
illegally boarded the yacht before it 
had cleared immigration and customs, 
Alfred Carlot and Marcellino Pipite 
(VDP, 15 Nov 2012). As for the yacht 
itself, it was still under detention. 
According to the police, it had been 
discovered that the members of the 
crew had forged their qualifications 
and certificates and were not, there-
fore, qualified to man the vessel in 
Vanuatu waters (VDP, 16 Nov 2012). 
The next day’s front-page story in the 
Daily Post—which reported the dis-
covery of a grounded yacht in Vava‘u 
in Tonga with more than 200 kilo-
grams of cocaine (worth an estimated 
a$116 million) and a dead man on 
board—was a jolt to the community, 
given all the rumors surrounding the 
Phocea (VDP, 17 Nov 2012). (One US 
dollar is approximately 1.08 Austra-
lian dollars.) 
In early December, efforts by the 
government to release the Phocea 
failed when Director of Ports and 
Marine Morris Kaloran ruled that a 
deed of release signed by Infrastruc-
ture Minister Harry Iauko was not 
in order, that is, it was done without 
consulting Ports and Marine and 
thus did not meet the requirements 
for dealing with such a situation as 
required by law (VDP, 8 Dec 2012). 
Three days later, the minister was 
found dead in a hotel room in Lugan-
ville—Vanuatu’s second city, located 
on the northern island of Santo. The 
doctor in attendance said that the 
cause of death was unclear, but no 
autopsy was performed. Iauko had 
flown to Luganville the day before 
(10 December) following the success-
ful defeat by the Kilman government 
of the no-confidence vote. Rumors of 
wrongdoing were flying everywhere, 
with the suggestion that his death was 
somehow linked to the Phocea and 
a mysterious Southeast Asian—or 
South American—looking woman at 
the hotel who allegedly boarded the 
next morning’s Air Vanuatu flight to 
Brisbane. There does not appear to 
have been any police investigation, 
and nothing further about the death 
was reported in the media except the 
government’s expressing sympathy to 
the family and lamenting the loss of a 
“man of action” (VDP, 12 Dec, 13 Dec 
2012). At the end of December, Prime 
Minister Kilman authorized the release 
of the Phocea, claiming that there was 
no longer any legal basis to retain the 
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yacht. The controversy, however, was 
far from over. A local lawyer, Less 
Napuati, had filed a damages claim 
against the owner of the Phocea for 
forging his signature on official docu-
ments, and the yacht was not allowed 
to leave. 
The year 2012 came to an end with 
many questions yet to be answered 
about the Phocea affair and, indeed, 
much uncertainty about the future. 
Would the questionable sale of govern-
ment land be allowed to continue? 
Would the arbitrary dismissal of 
public officials by the government 
in pursuit of its own questionable 
agenda continue? Would the blatant 
corruption and abuse of office that 
had become so obvious to everyone 
through the media, which diligently 
reported despite some threats from 
government officials, continue without 
provoking some sort of reaction by 
civil society? Would the Kilman gov-
ernment be able to hold onto power? 
As is normal in Vanuatu, it took 
several weeks following the Christ-
mas and New Year holiday period 
for anything newsworthy to surface, 
except for the continuing revelations 
about the Phocea. The yacht remained 
at anchor in Port Vila harbor—a 
reminder of the disturbing events of 
the previous year. The fact as noted 
in the Daily Post that the Vanuatu 
government no longer had any link 
with Interpol (VDP, 8 Jan 2013)—hav-
ing expelled the Australian Federal 
Police in May 2012 (VDP, 1–11 May 
2012)—deprived authorities of what 
could have been valuable assistance 
in sorting out the sleazy Phocea saga. 
What information did become avail-
able to the public was due mainly to 
the dedicated efforts of local journal-
ists—particularly those of the Vanuatu 
Daily Post and via the Vanuatu Daily 
Digest, a daily news blog by longtime 
resident and private journalist Bob 
Makin. 
In mid-January 2013, information 
surfaced raising questions about the 
yacht’s official registration and owner-
ship. Documents identifying both 
Luxembourg and Malta were used 
on the Phocea’s voyage to Vanuatu, 
but there was a question regarding 
the true owners. Pascal Anh Quan 
Saken’s name appeared on documents 
for entry into Panama, French Poly-
nesia, and Tonga (VDP, 12 Jan, 17 Jan 
2013). Vanuatu’s Ports and Marine 
Department, however, reported that 
it had received advice from the Malta 
Shipping Registry that Maltese regis-
tration had been obtained mid-2012 
“without any proof of ownership and 
other requirements” and had, there-
fore, been canceled as of 14 January 
2013. In the view of Vanuatu officials, 
the Phocea had become “effectively 
stateless and remained under detention 
at anchor in Port Vila Harbour” (VDP, 
19 Jan 2013).
The link between the Phocea and 
prominent government politicians was 
again thrust into public view when 
it was reported a few days later that 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Alfred 
Carlot had traveled to Port Moresby 
in Papua New Guinea (PNG), where 
he met a chartered flight carrying Pas-
cal Anh Quan Saken and his brother, 
Charles Henry Saken. Flight clear-
ance had been requested by Vanuatu’s 
embassy in Brussels—the official docu-
ment from the embassy was reprinted 
on the front page of the Daily Post 
(VDP, 19 Jan 2013)—but the plane 
appears to have arrived unannounced, 
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raising the concern of PNG officials. 
A report by the PNG police quoted 
in the Post-Courier in Papua New 
Guinea on 21 January noted that the 
two Saken brothers were naturalized 
citizens of Vanuatu and “alleged that 
Mr Quan has travelled extensively 
into many hostile and trouble hotspots 
in the world and thus has been impli-
cated in illegal gun running and drug 
trafficking activities in the recent past, 
especially in the Golden triangle area 
in South East Asia and in Central and 
South America. . . . What is more 
suspicious is that they did stop over at 
the tax haven country of Maldives for 
re-fuelling purpose as indicated by the 
pilot” (quoted in Makin 2013b). 
Saken explained that as “Deputy 
Head of Vanuatu’s Embassy in the 
European Union headquarters in 
Belgium, . . . his work as a diplomatic 
representative focuses on energy and 
disaster management projects. . . [and] 
Alfred Carlot was so impressed by 
our work that I have done in Belgium 
that he wanted us to go to the USA to 
implement the same program. So, that 
is why I came to PNG, because the 
only place for a Vanuatu citizen to get 
a visa for the USA is PNG.” He also 
strongly denied that he was a drugs 
or arms smuggler (VDP, 26 Jan 2013). 
At the same time, PNG Prime Minis-
ter Peter O’Neill issued a statement 
denying “media allegations linking his 
government to Phocea fugitive wanted 
in Vanuatu, Pascal Anh Quan Saken, 
arriving in a Boeing 737 jetliner which 
made an unexpected illegal landing 
at Jackson’s Airport,” and Carlot 
announced that his trip to Papua New 
Guinea was a diplomatic mission and 
had nothing to do with the Sakens or 
the Phocea (VDP, 22 Jan 2013).
Prime Minister Kilman, having 
clearly lost control of his minister of 
foreign affairs, responded to questions 
from a Daily Post reporter that he 
“did not know that his Foreign Affairs 
Minister, Alfred Carlot, would attend 
a meeting in Papua New Guinea with 
Phocea fugitive Pascal Saken” (VDP, 21 
Jan 2013). A few days later, he tried to 
distance himself further by announc-
ing through his first political advisor, 
Richard Kaltongga, that “Alfred Car-
lot’s trip to Papua New Guinea, which 
the Prime Minister’s Office was not 
informed of, was a private trip,” and 
he denied rumors of Saken’s having 
provided funds to the prime minister’s 
Peoples Progressive Party. “Maybe he 
funded some other political parties but 
not ppp,” argued the political advisor 
(VDP, 27 Jan 2013). 
The continued presence of the 
 Phocea was a growing threat to 
Kilman and his government and he 
was eager to get the yacht out of Port 
Vila. The main stumbling block to 
achieving this appears to have been 
Director of Ports and Marine Mor-
ris Kaloran, who had refused to 
release the yacht because it was not 
in compliance with Vanuatu’s laws. 
The government’s solution was to 
prod the Public Service Commission 
to suspend Kaloran from his position 
(VDP, 22 Jan 2013). A leaked e-mail 
between Kilman’s first political advi-
sor and Kaloran dated 29 December 
2012 revealed that the director had 
been subjected to significant political 
pressure. He was told, “If you can-
not comply with the Prime Minister’s 
instructions please advise and forward 
your resignation immediately” (VDP, 
31 Jan 2013). Kaloran, a long-
standing and highly respected public 
political reviews • melanesia 539
servant, was finally terminated in late 
February (VDP, 26 Feb 2013). 
Despite the government’s efforts to 
silence the uproar, the Phocea and the 
questionable activities of its alleged 
owner, Pascal Anh Quan Saken, would 
not go away. In mid-February, Prime 
Minister Kilman found it necessary to 
respond to continued media allega-
tions linking him to Saken with a 
statement denying that his political 
election in 2012 or the formation of 
government had received financial 
support from Saken (VDP, 16 Feb 
2013). That the prime minister found 
it necessary to make such a state-
ment is an indication of the culture of 
corruption that has come to underlie 
Vanuatu politics and fuel the political 
instability over the past two decades. 
Seldom does an election or vote of no 
confidence occur that accusations are 
not voiced of money changing hands.
Members of the Opposition, some 
of whom had emphasized the issue of 
corruption in the national election a 
few months earlier, expressed their dis-
gust over the stench of corruption that 
continued into the new term of the 
Kilman government. Edward Natapei, 
leader of the Opposition, demanded 
that Kilman terminate the minister of 
foreign affairs or “any other ministers 
who involved themselves in similar 
situations that could affect Vanuatu’s 
credibility regionally and internation-
ally” (VDP, 24 Jan 2013). 
Likewise, the new gjp member for 
the Efate Rural constituency expressed 
his objection to the decision by new 
Minister of Lands James Bule to grant 
a lease to a developer of land in the 
Lelepa/Mangaliliu area of North Efate 
known as Lelema—which indicated 
that it was business as usual for the 
new Kilman government. The land-
owners had worked together to map 
out and register their custom land in 
the name of the community in order to 
safeguard it for their own future use, 
but the minister ignored this develop-
ment and signed a lease recognizing 
another individual from Mele village 
as the landowner, who then sold the 
2,300-hectare lease to two wealthy 
naturalized citizens, Michel Monvoisin 
and Ludovic Bolliet, for a fraction of 
its value (VDP, 9 Jan, 10 Jan 2013). 
A stay order issued by the court has 
prevented the final lease from being 
issued, but the dispute is still not 
settled (VDP, 11 Jan 2013). 
In late February, the Daily Post 
reported that the leader of the 
 Opposition had had a meeting with 
the prime minister to discuss a num-
ber of problems facing the country, 
including the increasing evidence of 
corruption in government (VDP, 20 
Feb 2013). Not surprisingly, Nata-
pei raised the issue of the visit of the 
 minister of foreign affairs to Papua 
New Guinea and noted his concern 
over Minister Carlot having per-
formed a customary ceremony of 
reconciliation with Prime Minister 
O’Neill on his recent visit to Port Vila 
on behalf of the Vanuatu government 
(VDP, 9 Feb 2013).  Natapei noted that 
if  Carlot’s trip to Papua New Guinea 
was a private matter—as the Prime 
Minister’s Office had announced—
then no reconciliation ceremony 
between the two governments was 
necessary. 
The discussion also focused on 
specific political issues and propos-
als. Natapei expressed his disapproval 
of the appointment of mp Moana 
Carcasses as parliamentary secretary 
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to the prime minister, which had taken 
place in January—the first time in the 
history of Vanuatu since independence 
that such a position had been created 
(VDP, 12 Jan 2013). Natapei repeated 
his argument at the time that the 
appointment was unjustified—it was 
at the ministerial level—and accused 
Kilman of simply “creating a job for 
an mp to keep the Government intact” 
(VDP, 15 Jan 2013). It should be noted 
that article 40 (2) of the constitution 
stipulates that only thirteen minis-
ters are allowed. While Carcasses’s 
Green Confederation formed part of 
the Kilman government, he had not 
been given a ministry at the time of its 
formation in November 2012. 
Most significant was Natapei’s 
offer to work with the government. 
Natapei proposed that Kilman 
undertake a major reshuffling of 
his cabinet—to remove some of his 
ministers—in order to accommodate 
the whole of the Opposition as part 
of the government. This move on the 
part of the leader of the Opposition 
was quite unusual in Vanuatu politics. 
Rather than simply trying to destabi-
lize the government to gain power by 
prying loose members of the existing 
coalition, Natapei hoped to be able 
to reason with Kilman—to argue that 
the best way to deal with the country’s 
difficult problems would be to com-
bine their efforts in a kind of grand 
coalition or government of national 
unity.
Natapei also shared his ideas about 
new legislation that the Opposition 
hoped to introduce to “combat cor-
rupt practices in Vanuatu politics.” 
He proposed that legislation be 
introduced to require that all outside 
sources of funding for political parties 
be declared. Likewise, as a means to 
stop the frantic buying of the support 
of members of Parliament to form a 
majority after an election, the party 
with the highest number of elected 
members should be given the first 
chance to form a new government. 
Despite his weak position, Kilman 
apparently was not prepared to work 
with Natapei and the Opposition. 
Within a few weeks, Vanuatu was in 
the midst of another disruptive vote 
of no confidence—not surprising, 
given the government’s chaotic state of 
affairs.
If there was to be a challenge to 
Kilman’s leadership, the approach-
ing budget session of Parliament—
scheduled for 8–22 March—would 
provide the opportunity for members 
to take action. The political situation 
was, however, somewhat confused 
with rumors growing that some 
backbenchers within the government 
were looking for a change of leaders 
from within their own group with the 
expectation that this would attract 
Opposition backing. In anticipation of 
such a scenario occurring, a number of 
Opposition members began to change 
sides in advance of a motion being 
lodged. It was reported that—with the 
exception of the party leader, Serge 
Vohor, who remained loyal to Nata-
pei—all ump members of Parliament, 
led by Port Vila mp Tony Wright, 
broke ranks with the Opposition to 
join the government (VDP, 8 March, 
9 March 2013). 
The Daily Post observed that as 
Parliament opened, there appeared to 
be three factions among Prime Min-
ister Kilman’s supporters in govern-
ment, which made the decision of the 
Opposition to lodge a motion of no 
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confidence on 11 March somewhat 
unusual. The motion was signed by 
only 16 of the 51 sitting members (the 
Speaker is the fifty-second member but 
would not have been eligible to sign). 
It appeared that the Opposition did 
not have the numbers needed to pass 
the motion (VDP, 19 March 2013). It 
should be noted that because Parlia-
ment was already in session, only one-
sixth of the members needed to sign 
in order to table a motion, whereas a 
majority would be required to call an 
extraordinary session (Constitution of 
the Republic of Vanuatu, paragraph 
43 [2]). The government responded a 
few days later by presenting a motion 
to the Speaker to suspend MP Ralph 
Regenvanu, who had introduced the 
motion. It accused him of attempting 
to destabilize Parliament by “present-
ing no confidence motions when the 
opposition hasn’t got the number in 
parliament to vote them out” (VDP, 
15 March 2013). Nevertheless, the 
Speaker, George Wells, confirmed that 
the motion of no confidence in the 
government was in order and sched-
uled a debate for the following week. 
On Tuesday, 19 March 2013, with the 
defection from the government of 2 
government ministers and 6 members 
of Parliament, the Opposition’s num-
bers had increased to 28—more than 
enough to bring down the Kilman 
government (VDP, 20 March 2013). 
However, as is usual in the lead-up to 
a no-confidence motion in Vanuatu, 
the unexpected is always possible. 
The Opposition members were in 
high spirits when they entered Parlia-
ment on the afternoon of 20 March, 
but the mood quickly changed when 
Speaker Wells announced that Prime 
Minister Kilman had handed in his 
resignation just prior to the conven-
ing of the session and had assumed 
the position of interim prime minister 
until a vote for his replacement could 
take place. Wells then announced 
that since the only item on the 
agenda was to debate a motion of 
no confidence and the prime min-
ister had resigned, the purpose of 
the sitting was defeated. The leader 
of the Opposition, as mover of the 
motion, immediately pointed out that 
there were, in fact, two parts to the 
motion—first to remove the prime 
minister (which was now unnecessary) 
and then to elect a new prime minister. 
Natapei then moved that Parliament 
should proceed immediately to elect 
a new prime minister. Speaker Wells, 
however, announced that Parliament 
would meet one week later on 29 
March to elect a new prime minister 
and declared the session closed (VDP, 
21 March 2013). 
Natapei announced to the Daily 
Post that the Opposition would seek 
an immediate court ruling on the 
Speaker’s decision, which, he pointed 
out, was in contravention of Parlia-
ment’s Standing Order 9 (3), which 
stipulates that “the position of prime 
minister must be filled immediately 
when it becomes vacant.” When asked 
whom the Opposition would support 
for prime minister, Natapei answered 
that their candidate would be Port 
Vila mp Moana Carcasses, adding that 
he knew the choice was controversial 
since Carcasses is a “ni-Vanuatu by 
naturalization . . . [but] he has every 
constitutional right to become a Prime 
Minister of Vanuatu” (VDP, 22 March 
2013).
The chief justice, Vincent  Lunabek, 
ruled in favor of the Opposition’s 
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application, noting that “the Speaker’s 
decision that the Parliament session 
has no other business to discuss due 
to the prime minister’s resignation 
is irrelevant as the resignation is an 
external matter that can’t be allowed 
to interfere with the procedures and 
processes of the parliament as stated 
in Article 42 of the Constitution.” 
The chief justice, therefore, ordered 
the Speaker to reconvene Parliament 
on 23 March “to allow the motion 
against the Prime Minister to con-
tinue” (VDP, 23 March 2013). When 
the vote was taken, Moana Carcasses 
was elected prime minister with 34 
votes in favor and 18 against. Ham 
Lini (nup) from Pentecost became 
leader of the Opposition. 
In early April, the new govern-
ment passed a motion to suspend the 
Speaker from parliamentary sittings 
until the end of 2013 in retaliation 
for his attempt to stymie the vote of 
no confidence against Kilman (8 April 
2013). He was replaced as Speaker 
by Philip Boedoro (vp) from Maewo. 
A rumor began to circulate that the 
new Opposition would be tabling a 
no-confidence motion against the new 
government, but nothing eventuated 
and, in the end, Lini admitted that 
they did not have the numbers (VDP, 
8 April 2013).
Carcasses’s cabinet included all six 
of Port Vila members of Parliament: 
Moana Carcasses (Green Confedera-
tion), Prime Minister; Edward Nata-
pei (vp), Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade; 
Willie Jimmy (Liberal Democratic 
Party), Minister of Finance; Ralph 
Regenvanu (gjp), Minister of Lands; 
Patrick Crowby (ump), Minister of 
Internal Affairs; and Tony Wright 
(ump), Minister of Youth Develop-
ment and Sport. The other seven min-
isters included: Bob Loughman (vp) 
from Tanna, Minister of Education; 
Esmon Sae (mpp) from Malakula, 
Minister of Infrastructure and Public 
Utilities; David Tosul (ppp) from Pen-
tecost, Minister of Agriculture; Mar-
cellino Pipite (vrp) from Santo, Min-
ister of Tourism and Commerce; Serge 
Vohor (ump) from Santo, Minister 
of Health; Maki Simelum (vp) from 
Ambrym, Minister for Justice and 
Social Welfare; and Thomas Laken 
(independent) from Tanna, Minister of 
Planning and Climate Change. On the 
whole, due to the heavy representa-
tion of Port Vila, the cabinet was not 
well balanced regionally—always an 
important consideration in coalition 
formation and a fact that would not 
go unnoticed in the months that fol-
lowed. 
In early April, Prime Minister 
Carcasses announced what he called 
the “100 Day List” of priorities to be 
achieved during the first one hundred 
days of the government’s term in 
office; it included sixty-eight specific 
items (VDP, 11 April 2013; Vanuatu 
Government 2013). In addition to 
the usual reorganization of minis-
terial portfolios and departments, 
appointment of political advisors and 
directors general, and review of the 
membership of all boards to various 
statutory bodies and institutions, the 
new government laid out an array of 
specific policy objectives it intended 
to pursue. There was heavy emphasis 
on dealing with the issue of corruption 
in government, especially activities 
that had attracted regular, prominent 
news coverage such as the misuse of 
government vehicles and overseas 
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travel. Favoritism in the awarding of 
scholarships for university studies was 
an ongoing problem, and a proposal 
was included to ensure transparency 
in selection based on merit rather 
than family connection. One of the 
most important proposals to deal 
with corruption was to amend the 
Ombudsman Act to “re-instate the 
power of the Ombudsman to institute 
a civil case against a leader to recover 
misappropriated funds and to be able 
to prosecute a leader for breach of the 
Leadership Code if the Public Prosecu-
tor has not commenced proceeding 
three months after issuing a Report 
alleging breaches.” Unfortunately, this 
change had not been acted on by the 
end of 2013. The appointment of a 
new police commissioner and attorney 
general would also help to lay to rest 
these lingering controversies.
Foreign affairs received early atten-
tion from the new government. There 
was to be a full review of all overseas 
appointments—ambassadors, consuls, 
and trade representatives. Specific 
reference was made to the removal 
of the diplomatic status of Thi Tam 
Goiset as ambassador to Russia and 
to the review of the activities she 
had undertaken. In May, Minister 
Natapei announced that Vanuatu 
would  establish foreign relations with 
Georgia and revoke recognition of 
Abkhazia, which became official in 
August (VDP, 22 May, 5 Aug 2013). 
The new government also committed 
itself to support for West Papua’s full 
membership in the Melanesian Spear-
head Group and for termination of 
the Development Cooperation Agree-
ment with Indonesia that Kilman had 
negotiated. The msg Trade Agreement 
had become an issue in the previous 
year, and the new government pro-
posed to review its costs and benefits 
to Vanuatu.
Evidence of corruption in the 
operation of the Citizenship Commit-
tee prompted the inclusion in the “100 
Day List” of a proposal to establish a 
commission of inquiry “to investigate 
and audit all Vanuatu citizenships 
granted and Vanuatu passports issued 
and to cancel all citizenship granted 
which did not meet the requirements 
of the Constitution and the law” 
(Vanuatu Government 2013). In 
addition, it was proposed that consid-
eration should be given to amending 
the constitution to provide for dual 
citizenship.
Not listed in the “100 Day List,” 
but clearly a high priority, was the 
government’s desire to be rid of the 
mega yacht Phocea and all the sus-
picious activities and events associ-
ated with it. In early April the prime 
minister announced that, in his view, 
“the Phocea should leave” (VDP, 12 
April 2013). This finally happened on 
3 May 2013, when it was reported 
that Customs was “compelled” to 
provide clearance for the vessel based 
on a certificate of registration alleg-
edly provided by the New York office 
of the Vanuatu Maritime Services 
Limited (the institution that manages 
Vanuatu’s shipping registry). Customs 
officials reportedly expressed disap-
pointment at the decision and noted 
that “Customs has clearly advised 
the government on what is the cor-
rect procedure according to the law 
and our international obligations, but 
the pm and State Law Office [SLO] 
have failed to understand our posi-
tion. It is therefore with great regret 
that Customs will have to follow the 
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instructions of the pm and slo” (VDP, 
3 May 2013). 
Despite a report from police and 
Customs officials that no firearms or 
drugs had been found in a search of 
the Phocea (VDP, 12 Feb 2013), many 
unanswered questions remained. Was 
there a connection between the death 
of the infrastructure minister in the 
Kilman government, Harry Iauko, 
in December 2012, just three days 
after the director of Ports and Marine 
had rejected his signed release form? 
What exactly were ministers Alfred 
Carlot and Marcellino Pipite doing on 
the Phocea prior to the yacht’s being 
cleared by customs? Both men had 
appeared in court, and a trial date had 
been set, but no further hearings have 
taken place. 
Dealing with corruption in the 
 Ministry of Lands was another high 
priority area for the new govern-
ment, but it was the aim of the new 
minister of lands, Ralph Regenvanu, 
to formulate comprehensive land 
reform legislation. The minister’s first 
step was to secure the suspension and 
eventual removal of the sitting direc-
tor general of the Lands Department, 
accusing him of allegedly “attempt-
ing to pervert the course of current 
investigation, being undertaken by the 
Public Service Commission, concern-
ing the leases of state lands issued to 
public servants” (VDP, 13 April 2013). 
Regarding this issue, the minister 
“requested all staff of the Department 
of Lands who had obtained leases over 
state land from the former Minister of 
Lands Steven Kalsakau to surrender 
these leases” (VDP, 18 April, 20 April 
2013). The result of meetings between 
the minister and the lands officers 
concerned was, however, negative—no 
leases were surrendered (VDP, 8 May 
2013).
Land reform was not a new priority 
for Regenvanu—he had been focus-
ing his attention on land issues since 
his time as director of the Vanuatu 
Cultural Centre and was the driving 
force in organizing the National Lands 
Summit in 2006. Indeed, his short 
time as minister of lands and then as 
minister of justice in the early years of 
the Kilman government had given him 
the opportunity to identify specific 
areas in need of reform and to formu-
late a strategy to bring about reform. 
Regenvanu’s strategy was to under-
take a series of consultations to inform 
and seek advice from communities 
around the country in the formula-
tion of a Land Reform Policy, which 
he intended to take before Parliament 
before the end of 2013. The consulta-
tions concluded with a National Land 
Law Summit in which the Malvatu-
mauri and chiefs from all around the 
country joined Minister Regenvanu 
and other  government officials, 
including the director of the Vanuatu 
Cultural  Centre, in a full discussion of 
the proposed land reform legislation. 
The National Land Law Summit and 
the Malvatumauri endorsed the new 
legislation. The Efate Vaturisu Council 
of Chiefs, however, was reluctant to 
commit to the new reform program, 
noting that they needed more time 
to consider the legislation because 
it affected their circumstances (VDP, 
15–17 Oct 2013).
The land reform was, in fact, a 
package involving the reforms as well 
as new legislation and changes to the 
constitution. Revisions to the Land 
Reform Act of 1980 removed the 
power of the minister of lands to sign 
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off on leases on behalf of disputing 
custom owners and to create leases 
of state land without the approval of 
the Council of Ministers. The new 
Customary Land Management Act 
replaced the existing Customary Land 
Tribunals Act of 2001 and “created 
new processes for identifying custom 
owner groups and managing disputes 
about custom ownership in accor-
dance with the rules of customary law. 
It includes limited rights of appeal 
on grounds of improper process, for 
example a meeting not being held 
properly, but requires that final bind-
ing determinations that identify cus-
tom owner groups can only be made 
by customary institutions” (McDon-
nell 2014).
The new legislation required 
adjustments to the constitution. 
Article 30 was changed, requir-
ing Parliament to consult with the 
Malvatumauri about any changes to 
land law. A newly drafted article 78 
defines custom ownership in Vanuatu 
as associated with groups and guar-
antees their right to resolve disputes 
through their own processes rather 
than through formal state courts. 
As Minister Regenvanu explained, 
“The new laws bring determination 
of custom owners back to custom-
ary institutions, it removes the power 
from courts and the government to 
determine who the custom owners 
are and puts it back under rules of 
custom” (McDonnell 2014). The 
legislation and constitutional amend-
ments were passed by Parliament in 
December, but the legislation was not 
gazetted as law until early in 2014 
(VDP, 3 Dec, 17 Dec 2013). Without 
doubt, this land reform package rep-
resents the most important changes to 
the administration of land in Vanuatu 
since independence. 
Another significant accomplish-
ment of the Carcasses government was 
the passage of legislation to amend 
the Municipalities Act to provide 
reserved seats in the municipal coun-
cils of Vanuatu for women. This very 
progressive move—the first of its 
kind in the Pacific—follows years of 
campaigning by women’s groups and 
nongovernmental organizations to 
encourage women to become more 
active in politics. A small number of 
Ni-Vanuatu women have succeeded 
over the years in winning election to 
Parliament or municipal councils, but 
never more than one or two at a time. 
The amendment was passed unani-
mously and guarantees 30 percent of 
the municipal council seats for women 
(VDP, 30 Aug 2013). It came into effect 
in time for the Port Vila municipal 
election in January 2014. 
Despite all the euphoria surround-
ing the new direction of the Carcasses 
government, several controversial 
decisions raised concern that cer-
tain negative aspects of Vanuatu 
politics seemed to be continuing as 
usual. To the surprise of many, the 
prime minister decided to terminate 
the highly respected Reserve Bank 
governor, Odo Tevi, whose contract 
Kilman had only recently renewed. 
The leader of the Opposition, Ham 
Lini, condemned the termination as 
a “critical mistake,” noting that “the 
management of Vanuatu’s stable fiscal 
policy was due very much to Tevi’s 
strict control” (VDP, 27 April 2013). 
The termination was seen by many 
as opening up a position for one of 
the prime minister’s friends, and Tevi 
instituted court action against the 
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government for breach of contract 
(VDP, 7 May 2013). 
On the whole, the Carcasses-led 
government proved to be quite stable 
and lasted through to the end of 
2013 without any major challenge. 
A minor reshuffle did occur early in 
the year, when veteran Port Vila mp 
Willy Jimmy was replaced as min-
ister of finance by the existing min-
ister of justice, Maki Simelum (vp) 
from Ambrym, and MP Silas Yatan 
(ump) from Tanna replaced Sime-
lum as minister of justice. Carcasses 
explained only that the changes were 
made because of differences of opin-
ion within the cabinet (VDP, 11 May 
2013). In an interview with the Daily 
Post, Willie Jimmy swore that “there 
was no such meeting held with other 
MPs to discuss forming a political bloc 
as claimed in the media”—which sug-
gests that he may have been seen as 
a threat by Carcasses (VDP, 13 May 
2013). 
In due course, it became clear that 
at the heart of the dispute was Wil-
lie Jimmy’s refusal to sign off on the 
issue of a promissory note amount-
ing to us$350 million for a project 
negotiated by the prime minister with 
a Singapore company to upgrade 
airports in Vanuatu without consulting 
even the minister of finance, let alone 
the cabinet as a whole (VDP, 14 May, 
15 May 2013). The most significant 
element of the project was funding for 
constructing a new airport on North 
Efate—an idea that had been floated 
by Ham Lini as deputy prime minister 
in the Kilman government—rather 
than upgrading the existing facility, 
Bauerfield, close to Port Vila. The 
rational behind the project was to 
make it possible for larger 747 and 
767 planes to be able to land in Vanu-
atu, which it was said is not possible 
at Bauerfield. The dream is that such 
planes would be able to fly nonstop 
from Asia, opening up a huge tour-
ist market for Vanuatu (VDP, 12 Jan 
2013).
One definite effect of the termina-
tion of Willie Jimmy was that it helped 
to slightly rectify the imbalance in 
the cabinet of Port Vila members, 
though five out of the six still held 
ministerial portfolios. The claim by 
the Opposition at this point that it 
had the numbers to table a motion of 
no confidence quickly faded when it 
became clear that this was not the case 
(VDP, 16 May 2013). The rumor seems 
to have been true, however, that Willie 
Jimmy was attempting to organize a 
new bloc to eventually challenge the 
Carcasses government (VDP, 27 May 
2013). 
As part of its strategy to under-
mine Carcasses, the Opposition 
issued a press release alleging that 
the prime minister was involved in 
illegal passport sales—a scandal that 
has featured in the media repeatedly 
at different times in the past. The 
Opposition said that it had confirma-
tion of a website originating in China 
“offering Vanuatu passports for sale 
with certificates of citizenship.” The 
press release also noted pointedly 
that if convicted, the prime minister 
could be “stripped of his citizenship 
and evicted from the country” (VDP, 
25 May 2013). The latter point was 
a not-so-subtle reference to the fact 
that Carcasses is not an indigenous 
Melanesian but rather a naturalized 
citizen of Tahitian and North African 
origin—a crude way of attacking the 
prime minister that would increas-
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ingly be used by his opponents in the 
months to come. 
The government had flagged the 
investigation of irregularities in the 
operation of the citizenship com-
mittee as one of its “100 Day List” 
priorities. In October, the Citizen-
ship Office had evidence that a “well 
established group had been issuing 
false and fake Vanuatu certificates to 
foreign nationals” and requested that 
new citizens present their documents 
for verification (VDP, 2 Oct 2013). It 
was reported that a number of Ni-
Vanuatu, including two Citizenship 
Office officials and some politicians, 
had been arrested and charged with 
issuing fake citizenship papers (VDP, 4 
Oct 2013). 
Unrelated to the issue of fraudulent 
passports, the government announced 
that it would be tabling a bill in Par-
liament to amend the constitution—
a repeal of article 13—that would 
make way for the recognition of dual 
citizenship in Vanuatu. The move was 
seen by many as benefiting Vanuatu by 
attracting remittances from future dual 
citizens living abroad, but the real 
goal appears to be quite different. The 
creation of the category of dual citizen 
is part of a plan to introduce what 
has come to be known as the Capital 
Investment Immigration Plan (ciip), 
which would be an expansion of the 
scheme established in 2012 to sell 
permanent resident visas to wealthy 
Chinese (see above). The ciip would, 
in effect, create economic citizens who 
meet certain conditions, including the 
investment of funds in Vanuatu (VDP, 
26 Nov 2013).
At the end of May, a by-election 
was conducted on Tanna to replace 
Harry Iauko after his untimely death 
the previous December. His son, 
Pascal Sebastian Iauko, ran and was 
claimed by the Opposition parties, 
who reminded voters prior to the 
election that Kilman had urged Pascal 
to follow in his father’s footsteps and 
promised the people of Tanna at the 
burial that they—the government at 
the time, but now the Opposition—
would elect his replacement. The 
combined support of the Opposition 
parties had been extremely success-
ful and Iauko won by a significant 
majority (VDP, 29 May 2013). Pascal 
Iauko assumed the leadership of the 
Iauko Group, which his father had 
organized to contest the 2012 election, 
and indeed did join Kilman, Lini, and 
others in the Opposition (VDP, 31 May 
2013). 
West Papua continued to attract 
political attention when at the msg 
leaders summit in Lifou, New Caledo-
nia, it was decided to defer consider-
ation of the issue of full membership, 
despite strong backing from Vanuatu 
for the discussion to proceed (VDP, 
19 June 2013). Carcasses had taken 
a strong stand in support of West 
Papua, but outspoken President of the 
Oceania Decolonization Committee 
Shem Rarua labeled the decision unac-
ceptable (VDP, 20 June 2013). At inde-
pendence, Rarua had been a strong 
member of the Vanua‘aku Pati, which 
supported West Papuan independence, 
and had continued to advocate for 
the cause despite breaking with the vp 
in 1991 to join Father Walter Lini’s 
National United Party. Carcasses’s 
response to the criticism on his return 
from the New Caledonia meeting was 
to again declare his strong support for 
West Papuan independence and to call 
for the Opposition and the govern-
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ment to unite on this important issue 
(VDP, 25 June 2013). 
Another matter discussed at the 
msg leaders summit in New Caledo-
nia that Carcasses felt strongly about 
was the msg Trade Agreement. On 
his return to Port Vila, he issued a 
strong statement that “Vanuatu does 
not benefit from this Trade Agreement 
and it is time we make our voice heard 
loudly” (VDP, 26 June 2013). The 
Vanuatu Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry Forum in July concluded that 
the msg Trade Agreement resulted 
in “huge trade imbalance which 
Vanuatu governments have ignored.” 
In the past, Vanuatu used to export 
large quantities of beef to Papua New 
Guinea, but now Melanesian trade 
goes mainly one way; in particular, Fiji 
is able to export a significant range 
of goods duty-free to Vanuatu (eg, 
ice cream, water, paint, soap, tim-
ber, paper products), while Vanuatu 
exports little in return (VDP, 4 July 
2013). It is clear that Vanuatu is not 
able to take advantage of the Trade 
Agreement because of the limited 
size of its manufacturing base—an 
indication that the country’s policy to 
encourage foreign investment is not 
working. Foreigners arrive to set up 
retail shops, but there is little signifi-
cant investment in areas that could be 
transformed into exports. Neverthe-
less, it is worth noting that the duty-
free products from Fiji are cheap when 
compared to similar imports from 
Australia and New Zealand, which 
is a significant benefit to Vanuatu 
consumers. 
Another minor reshuffle of the 
government occurred in July, with 
MP Toara Daniel from the Shepherds 
replacing Minister of Justice Silas 
Yatan, who stepped down willingly—
he said—because he felt that the 
“people of the Shepherd Outer Island 
do need an mp in an executive power 
[sic] to ensure that the population of 
the Shepherds Outer Islands is not left 
out of the important developments of 
the country” (VDP, 5 July 2013). The 
announcement several days later that 
the Opposition had tabled a motion 
of no confidence would lead one to 
suspect that the small reshuffle had 
something to do with shoring up the 
government coalition, though this was 
never confirmed publicly. Likewise, 
Carcasses dismissed Minister of Tour-
ism, Trade and Industry Marcellino 
Pipite for having signed the motion 
(VDP, 16 July 2013).
The Speaker of Parliament, how-
ever, ruled that the motion was not in 
order. He alleged that several signa-
tures on the motion had been forged 
and that two of the members of Parlia-
ment who signed were not eligible: the 
newly elected member from Tanna, 
Pascal Iauko, had not yet been sworn 
in, and Luganville mp George Wells 
was still under suspension until the 
end of the year (VDP, 12 July 2013). 
The leader of the Opposition, Ham 
Lini, challenged the Speaker’s decision 
in court (VDP, 16 July 2013). The chief 
justice, however, upheld the Speaker’s 
decision relating to the misuse of the 
signatures and agreed that neither 
Iauko nor Wells was eligible to sign 
the petition. His ruling was, therefore, 
that “the motion of no confidence in 
Prime Minister Moana Carcasses was 
invalid and of no effect” (VDP, 19 July, 
22 July, 26 July 2013).
It turned out that the plot to topple 
Carcasses was far more complex than 
appeared on the surface. Following 
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the 2012 election, Attorney General 
Ishmael Kalsakau and several others 
had submitted an electoral petition 
against the prime minister, Minister 
Tony Wright, and Minister Patrick 
Crowby for allegedly having bribed 
voters in the Seaside area of Port Vila 
with a bag of rice, money for kava, 
and vt1,000 to a family member. The 
expectation was that the electoral 
petition would succeed and that the 
government coalition would collapse. 
The result, however, did not go as the 
plotters had hoped, with the Supreme 
Court deciding that the accusations 
had not been proved and dismissing 
the electoral petition completely, and 
the coalition was preserved (VDP, 31 
July 2013). Yet another small reshuffle 
occurred a few days later with the 
appointment of mp Jonas James 
from Paama as minister of justice. 
At the same time, mp Toara Daniel 
from Shepherds moved from justice 
to  tourism, filling the gap left by the 
dismissal of Marcellino Pipite (VDP, 
3 Aug 2013). 
Having avoided two disruptive 
votes of no confidence, the govern-
ment was suddenly faced with an 
issue that had the potential to split 
the coalition from within. On the 
eve of the independence celebra-
tions, the prime minister unexpect-
edly announced that he had signed a 
concession agreement that “commit-
ted the people of Vanuatu to paying 
around vt33 billion for an airports 
infrastructure development project 
with a Singapore company, Vanu-
atu Trade Development Private Ltd 
(vtdpl),” which was linked in some 
obscure way to the gmr International 
Airports Pte Ltd. The proposal envis-
aged upgrades to Bauerfield Airport in 
Port Vila, Pekoa Airport in Luganville, 
Santo, and Whitegrass Airport on 
Tanna, as well as the construction of 
a new airport on North Efate (VDP, 3 
Aug 2013). 
It was never quite clear who or 
what other companies or individuals 
were actually behind the proposal, 
but the business arrangements were 
shocking. In return for construction 
of the Efate airport, the Vanuatu gov-
ernment would hand over full control 
of it to the company concerned for 
fifty years to manage all aspects of its 
operation—that is, to set and col-
lect all charges, such as landing fees 
and departure taxes, and control and 
profit from all associated commercial 
concessions and real estate. After fifty 
years, the airport would be handed 
back to Vanuatu, and all of this 
would, in theory, not cost the Republic 
of Vanuatu a single vatu. The us$350 
million loan guarantee was, in effect, a 
means of holding the Vanuatu govern-
ment to ransom—to ensure that it did 
not change its mind at some point and 
attempt to renege on the deal. This 
actually happened in the Maldives, 
with the government of the Maldives 
and the gmr company ending up in 
court (VDP, 7 Aug 2013). 
Not all members of the coalition 
were in agreement. The Daily Post 
headline read: “gjp, vp May Not Vote 
For us$350 Million,” noting that 
“some mps in government are suspi-
cious of the deal and may not vote 
in Parliament that promissory notes 
to the value of about vt33 billion be 
issued to the Singapore Company.” It 
was reported that the deal had been 
negotiated and signed by the prime 
minister without cabinet approval, 
though Deputy Prime Minister 
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Edward Natapei gave his support, 
with some reservations (VDP, 8 Aug 
2013). 
The idea of airport redevelopment 
has been around for years, but never 
carried out, due mainly to lack of 
funding. Indeed, in 2008, specific leg-
islation was passed by Parliament that 
laid out detailed procedures for the 
use of private funding as an alternative 
to aid or a government loan (Vanuatu 
Sessional Legislation 2008). Likewise, 
in January 2012, Ham Lini, the leader 
of the Opposition and minister for 
tourism at the time, announced that 
he had spoken to possible Korean 
backers and intended to promote 
the development of a new airport on 
North Efate, capable of accommodat-
ing larger aircraft than the existing 
airport, Bauerfield (VDP, 12 Jan 2013). 
While not opposing the idea of the 
construction of a new airport, he was 
strongly opposed to the current gmr 
project, labeling it a “scam” (VDP, 21 
Aug 2013). 
Parliament voted to set up an ad 
hoc committee to discuss the conces-
sion agreement further, and the project 
is still under negotiation (VDP, 28 Aug 
2013). With no clear picture about the 
source of funding, it is worrying to 
think about what effect such arrange-
ments might have on Vanuatu. Given 
the country’s tax haven status and 
associated potential for the laundering 
of dirty money—an activity successive 
governments have never wanted to 
acknowledge existed, let alone con-
trol—Vanuatu’s international standing 
could be seriously undermined. 
Indeed, it is clear that Vanuatu’s 
reputation as a focal point for shady, 
criminal activity is increasing. At the 
end of August, the commissioner of 
police announced the discovery of 
cocaine with a value of vt32 billion—
the biggest drug bust in the history 
of the South Pacific—concealed in 
a yacht that had been moored in 
Port Vila harbor for over two years. 
Originally called the Raj and renamed 
the Scope after coming to Vanuatu 
in 2011, the yacht had been searched 
earlier, when slight traces of cocaine 
had been detected, but no drugs were 
actually found. The cocaine was 
eventually uncovered below the steel 
floor of the engine under a layer of 
concrete—its discovery made possible 
with the assistance of the Australian 
Federal Police (VDP, 23 Aug, 24 Aug, 
26 Aug, 27 Aug 2013). 
This was not the first illicit drug 
haul discovered with a connection to 
Vanuatu. In October 2011, Austra-
lian Federal Police uncovered cocaine 
worth a$78 million in Bundaberg, 
Australia, on a yacht—Friday Free-
dom—that had arrived from Vanu-
atu as part of an annual yacht race. 
Australian Federal Police detected the 
yacht when they were investigating a 
money-laundering syndicate. Clearly, 
Vanuatu has become a transit point 
for drugs, which most likely is part 
of a larger network covering other 
islands in the South Pacific (abc News 
2011). Unfortunately, despite these 
recent events—including the suspicious 
circumstances surrounding the Phocea 
and the unexplained death of Minis-
ter Harry Iauko—there is very little 
discussion among politicians about the 
fact that Vanuatu is becoming a focal 
point of international criminal activity.
There are of course many indi-
viduals—politicians and government 
officials as well as others within civil 
society—who are prepared to speak 
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out. Transparency Vanuatu, for 
example, publishes a regular hard-
hitting column in the Vanuatu Daily 
Post highlighting issues and problems 
in government, and the Graon mo 
Jastis Pati was able to increase its 
numbers in Parliament in the 2012 
election by running on a platform that 
included anticorruption as a major 
issue. Likewise, gjp leader Ralph 
Regenvanu has been prepared to 
speak out about issues and confront 
individuals in Parliament in pursuit of 
more honest government. There was a 
sense in 2013, as the weeks passed and 
the government began to focus with 
some success on substantive issues, 
that things might be changing under 
the new Carcasses-led government. 
While there were rumors on several 
occasions of possible votes of no 
confidence, they never got beyond the 
talking stage. 
However, it is clear that the under-
lying factor that limits the effective-
ness of such individuals and organiza-
tions is Vanuatu’s political instability, 
brought on since 1991 by consecutive 
coalition governments. History has 
shown that it becomes almost impos-
sible for a weak coalition to take a 
strong stand on corruption when 
everyone knows that some of its own 
members are tainted and would not 
hesitate to bring the government down 
if they were exposed. Vanuatu is in 
need of some serious public discussion 
on how best to tackle this problem—
be it reform of the electoral system to 
reduce the negative effect of the exces-
sive number of candidates and politi-
cal parties, the imposition of stricter 
rules on the formation and operation 
of parties, or changes to parliamentary 
procedures to make it more difficult 
for elected members to change party 
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